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Introduction
In this thesis we investigate two issues, the use of convertible debt by Canadian companies
and the security issuance choice in the Canadian market.
In the ﬁrst part of the thesis we devote our attention to the use of convertible debt
by Canadian companies. A convertible bond is a security that can be exchanged for a
predetermined ﬁxed number of shares of the issuing company within a predetermined period
of time. In essence, a convertible is a package consisting of a straight bond and warrants
written on the issuing company stock. The question as to why companies issue convertible
debt has received much attention in the past. Practitioners most often view convertibles as
delayed equity and claim to issue them because of the lower coupon rate and to “sweeten” the
debt issue, which would be otherwise more diﬃcult to place. On the other hand, academics
have proposed theories that relate the use of convertible debt to informational asymmetries,
agency issues and tax motives. These theories in general suggest that companies that face
high debt- and/or equity-related agency costs could beneﬁt from issuing convertible debt as
opposed to other “straight” means of ﬁnancing.
First, in Chapter 2 we review the theoretical and empirical literature on the motives for
the issuance of convertible debt. The literature shows a large discrepancy between theory and
practice. Surveys show that managers base their motives for the use of convertible debt on
factors that are irrational according to the theoretical literature. This theoretical literature
in turn oﬀers a number of rational motives. These motives are based on the resolution of the
problems of informational asymmetry and agency costs, on tax motivations and managerial
entrenchment arguments. Most of the rational motives have been investigated in cross-
sectional studies, which oﬀer general support to at least some of them. However, survey
studies ﬁnd very little to no support for the rational motives. This might be due to either
the sensitivity of the surveys to the question contents, to the use of weak proxies in cross-
sectional studies, or a combination of these.
In Chapter 3 we study the announcement eﬀects and their determinants of convertible
debt issues in the Canadian market in order to identify issuer motives. The average wealth2 Introduction
eﬀect for the three-day event window around the announcement of convertible bonds between
1991 and 2004 is a signiﬁcantly negative -2.7%. When the issues are classiﬁed into equity-
and debt-like, we ﬁnd that the wealth eﬀects are signiﬁcantly more negative for the equity-
like convertible bond issuers. Equity-like convertibles are signiﬁcantly negatively aﬀected
by agency costs of equity. However, agency costs of debt do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
equity-like convertibles and agency costs of equity do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on debt-like
convertibles. These ﬁndings suggest that convertibles are used to mitigate diﬀerent aspects
of informational asymmetries. These ﬁndings are in line with motives proposed by Stein
(1992) and Mayers (1998). Moreover, we ﬁnd a shift in the convertible debt design towards
more debt-like convertibles that coincides with the popularity of conversion of businesses
into income trusts. However, when controlling for the convertible debt design and other
determinants of the wealth eﬀects, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerences that can be
attributed to this business structure.
In the second part of the thesis we analyze the security issuance decision in the Canadian
market. The security issuance decision is one of the most important long term ﬁnancial
decisions of the ﬁrm. Firstly, it has a strong impact on the stock returns, as diﬀerent types
of securities convey diﬀerent information to the market - the equity issues for example in-
duce strong negative announcement date excess returns. Secondly, it aﬀects relationships
and incentives of diﬀerent interest groups (managers, shareholders, debtholders) within the
ﬁrm, but also those between the insiders and the outsiders. Thirdly, it determines corporate
investment policies - equity for example provides more ﬂexibility in risk taking. The im-
portance of the security issuance decision is also demonstrated in managerial surveys, where
managers claim to consider ﬁnancial ﬂexibility, dilution of earnings and recent stock returns
of the greatest importance when it comes to the decision on the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing choice. The
security issuance decision is essentially a capital structure decision. Diﬀerent explanations
have been put forward in the past as to how and when do managers decide to increase or
decrease the leverage of the ﬁrm, such are the pecking-order model, the market timing model
and the agreement between insiders and outsiders.
In Chapter 4 we study determinants of public ﬁnancing choice in a relation to security
issuance theories. We ﬁnd that overvaluation increases the probability of issuing equity. The
post-announcement excess returns are lower for the high market-to-book equity issuers. Our
ﬁndings give support to the market timing theory of capital structure. We surprisingly ﬁnd
that straight debt issuers are more ﬁnancially constrained than equity issuers in general.
However, the largest equity issuers are more ﬁnancially constrained than the smallest ones.
This result indicates that smaller equity issuers time the market, while the largest seem to
exhibit the “pecking-order behavior”. We do not ﬁnd support for the theory that higher
levels of agreement between insiders and outsiders of the ﬁrm lead the ﬁrm to prefer equity
over debt.3
In Chapter 5 we use changes in short interest following the announcements of security
issues (withdrawals) to investigate market timing and pecking-order theories of capital struc-
ture. First, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant increases in short interest for equity and convertible bond
issuers, no signiﬁcant changes for straight bond issuers and some signiﬁcant decreases for
share repurchasers. More importantly, we examine the eﬀect of (over)valuation and ﬁnancial
constraint proxies on changes in short interest in order to test the market timing and the
pecking order explanations of capital structure. We do so for hot and cold equity markets
separately, as previous literature suggests that issuers and investors act diﬀerently. We ﬁnd
evidence to support both, the market timing and the pecking order explanations. In ad-
dition, we ﬁnd evidence of a positive and a negative relationship between changes in short
interest and stock returns, in particular in hot equity markets. Investors perceive equity
issue announcements and issuers’ characteristics diﬀerently in hot and cold equity issuance
markets. This implies either some degree of diﬃculty discerning among diﬀerent equity is-
suers in hot equity markets (due to easier mimicking and bunching of the issuers) or lack of
rational behavior in the case of market frenzies (herding).
Finally, in Chapter 6 we turn back to the use of convertible debt and analyze convertible
arbitrage, one of the most successful hedge fund strategies. We start by identifying convert-
ible arbitrage activities. We ﬁnd convertible bonds to be underpriced at the issuance dates.
At the same time, short sales of underlying equity signiﬁcantly increase. Both eﬀects are
stronger for equity-like than for debt-like convertibles. Although convertible arbitrage posi-
tively aﬀects markets by providing liquidity, we also ﬁnd that short sales pressures negatively
aﬀect both shareholders and existing bondholders. An investigation of the determinants of
convertible arbitrage returns shows that, over a one-year period following the issue, equity-
like convertibles earn a return that is more than 20 percentage points higher than the return
of debt-like convertibles. In recent years the returns from convertible arbitrage have strongly
decreased, because the universe of issuers shifted from the issuance of equity-like to debt-like
convertibles. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.
All the chapters of the thesis are based on the papers co-authored with Jenke ter Horst.
Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 6 are co-authored with Chris Veld as well and Chapter 4 is additionally
co-authored with Ming Dong.Chapter 2
Why do Companies Issue Convertible
Bonds? A Review of Theory and
Empirical Evidence
2.1 Introduction
Exchange-listed companies have a wide range of possibilities when they look for new sources
of ﬁnancing. Companies can use equity in the form of internally generated funds or issue new
shares of common stock. Alternatively, they can use debt in the form of bank loans or issue
bonds. The use of hybrid securities represents yet another possibility. The most well-known
hybrid securities are so-called convertible bonds which, at the option of the holder, can be
exchanged into shares of common stock of the issuing company. An example of a convertible
bond issue is the bond issue by General Motors Corporation in 2003. These bonds pay
an annual coupon of 6.25 percent. Furthermore, on their maturity date, the holder of the
bond has the option to choose between receiving the nominal value in cash or converting the
bond into 21 shares of the General Motors Corporation stock1. Convertible bonds possess
characteristics of both equity and debt: they resemble debt, because they pay a ﬁxed coupon
interest. On the other hand they resemble equity, because part of the price that is paid for
them is for the option to exchange the bonds into shares. The money paid for the option
does not have to be paid back by the company, irrespective of future developments of the
stock price.
An interesting question is what motivates companies to issue a hybrid security like a
convertible bond instead of issuing straight debt or equity. Ross, Westerﬁeld, and Jaﬀe (2005,
page 686) state that “probably there is no other area of corporate ﬁnance where real-world
practitioners get as confused as they do on the reasons for issuing convertible debt.” The
1The data on these convertible bonds is taken from the SDC database on new issues.6 Why do Companies Issue Convertible Bonds? A Review of Theory and Empirical Evidence
authors observe that practitioners generally argue that convertible bonds oﬀer the possibility
to issue equity at a higher price than the currently prevailing stock price and/or that they
oﬀer a possibility to attract debt at a low interest rate. The argument that equity can be
attracted at a higher price than the stock price at the issuance date of the convertibles is
based on the fact that the conversion price is generally higher than the current stock price.
The conversion price is the price for which the holders of the convertible bonds can buy
stocks. In the General Motors example the conversion price is $47.622. The conversion price
is higher than the stock price at the issuance date of the convertibles, which was $35.94. The
second argument that convertibles oﬀer a possibility to attract debt at a low interest rate is
based on the fact that the coupon rate on the convertibles is lower than the coupon rate a
company would have to pay on ordinary debt. In the General Motors example, the company
pays a coupon of 6.25 percent on the convertible bonds, while the closest comparable straight
bond of the same company had a yield to maturity of around 7.5 percent. However, both
these claims are refuted by academics who argue that the conversion price should not be
compared to the current stock price, and hence reject the ﬁrst argument. They also reject the
second argument, explaining that the lower coupon interest on convertible bonds is caused
by the fact that the holder of a convertible gets the option to buy stock in the future. Since
an option is a right and not an obligation, this option has a value, which is paid for by the
holder of the convertible by accepting a lower interest rate.
Academic theories in corporate ﬁnance concerning the question why companies issue con-
vertible debt are generally based on agency and asymmetric information models. However,
surveys among managers responsible for the decision to issue convertibles generally show
very little support for these theories. This shows that there is a large divergence between
the practitioner’s and the academic literature on the question why companies issue convert-
ible bonds. The objective of this chapter is to review the diﬀerent viewpoints and to see
where theory and practice agree, and where the large disagreement lies.
Before going into the question why companies issue convertible bonds, it is useful to give
a short overview of the market for these ﬁnancial instruments. The size of the market for
convertible debt varies between the countries considerably, with the U.S. market being the
single largest market for convertible bonds in the world, accounting for 30 percent of all the
convertible bond issues in the period 1990-2003, as shown in Table 2.1. The U.S. market is
followed by Japan, South Korea and Canada, while the largest Western European markets
account only for somewhat more than 9 percent of the total global issues.
With respect to the popularity of the convertible bonds over time, Table 2.2 shows that
globally there are no large variations in the number of issues over time. However, there is
2This is the nominal value of the bonds divided by the conversion ratio. The conversion ratio is the
number of shares that is acquired when the bonds are converted. In this example it is 21. This leads to a
conversion price of
$1,000
21 = $47.622.1. Introduction 7
an increased popularity of convertible debt between 1993 and 1999 in terms of the number
of convertible bond issues, which can again be observed in 2003.
Another interesting diﬀerence among diﬀerent markets is the issue size. As shown in
Table 2.3, the largest issue sizes, measured in mean and median values, are in the West-
ern European markets, while the smallest are in South Korea and Australia. The largest
variations, measured with the coeﬃcient of variation, are in the German and South Korean
market, while the smallest can be observed in Taiwan3.
As mentioned before, the objective of this chapter is to overview the theory and empirics
on the question why companies issue convertible bonds. This question is very relevant in
practice, because convertible bonds are not only frequently used by large exchange-listed
companies, but also by young companies that use venture capital. By answering the ques-
tion why companies issue convertible bonds we can also shed more light on the question why
companies issue other hybrid ﬁnancial instruments. These hybrids include convertible pre-
ferred stock and warrant-bond loans among others. Convertible preferred stock is preferred
stock with an option for the holder to convert it into common stock. A warrant-bond loan
is a loan with warrants attached. The most important diﬀerence between warrant-bonds
and convertible bonds is that the warrants in a warrant-bond loan can be detached from the
bonds after the issuance. We will not go into the choice that companies can make between
diﬀerent hybrid ﬁnancial instruments.
A related topic that will shortly be mentioned is that of the call policy of convertible
bonds. Convertible bonds are usually callable, which means that the company has a right
to call the bonds, and to repay the investor before maturity or conversion. Ingersoll (1977)
demonstrates that the optimal moment to call a convertible is when the conversion value
equals the call price. The conversion value is the value of the common stock to be received in
the conversion exchange. However, in an empirical study he ﬁnds that in practice the calls
show a delay. On average the conversion value of the bonds is 43.9 percent above the call
price. This ﬁnding of Ingersoll has led to a large amount of academic papers on the question
why convertible bonds are called late. Given that this is only a side issue in the decision to
issue convertible bonds, we will not discuss this topic further.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we review the theoretical arguments
for the issuance of convertible debt. Section 2.3 is dedicated to a review of empirical evidence,
based on diﬀerent types of empirical studies: event studies, cross-sectional analyses and
surveys. Section 2.4 concludes the chapter.
3Note that the number of issues in Table 2.3 can be diﬀerent than the reported number of issues in Table
2.2. This is due to missing information on issue sizes for some of the issuers in the SDC database.8 Why do Companies Issue Convertible Bonds? A Review of Theory and Empirical Evidence
2.2 Theoretical Motivations for the Use of Convertible
Debt
2.2.1 Capital Structure Irrelevance and Security Choice
In their seminal work on capital structure (ir)relevance Modigliani and Miller (1958) show
that the way a ﬁrm ﬁnances its investments does not matter for the market value of the ﬁrm.
It is irrelevant whether companies choose to issue equity, straight debt, convertible bond or
any other package of securities to ﬁnance their investments. Why do investors then in terms
of underlying equity valuation of the company react diﬀerently to the issue announcements
of diﬀerent types of securities4?
Modigliani and Miller build their model based on the assumptions of perfect capital mar-
kets8 and those of perfectly informed agents who trade securities, who share similar infor-
mation (symmetric knowledge) and are of equal (atomic) size. Their model, although shown
not to hold in reality, provides the cornerstone of the capital structure research framework.
Perhaps the most crucial assumption is the one about symmetric information and perfect
knowledge of the agents. This assumption has inspired numerous later strains of literature.
In reality agents posses diﬀerent information, contracts cannot be written such to cover for
all possible contingencies that might arise and many actions of agents are not observable and
/ or veriﬁable. We can describe such a setting with the notion of an asymmetric information
framework. In such a setting eﬃcient transmission of funds (contracts) between parties is
impaired and can, in the worst case, lead to a complete market collapse (see Akerlof 1970).
The main reasons are adverse selection and agency problems.
The adverse selection problem results in ex-ante unobservable and / or unveriﬁable type
of agents that the other party (principal) in the contract has to choose or determine. The
agency problem is a result of ex-post possible opportunistic behavior of an agent, once the
contract has been made, but the actions of the agent are unveriﬁable and contracts do not
cover all possible contingencies. In a ﬁnancing arrangement (contract) between a ﬁrm (agent)
and an investor (principal) all these issues play crucial roles and the severity of the adverse
selection and the agency problem aﬀects the eﬃciency of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing. The worse the
adverse selection and agency problems are, the less eﬃcient the ﬁnancing channel will be,
since a ﬁrst best solution cannot be achieved. A ﬁrst best solution is the outcome under
no adverse selection and agency problems. Put diﬀerently, the ﬁnancing will become more
expensive for the ﬁrms, because principals cannot diﬀerentiate between the agents properly,
since bad types can mimic good types. This drives out some positive net present value
investment opportunities (Myers and Majluf 1984) and creates a social dead weight loss,
4For the empirical evidence on wealth eﬀects associated with announcements of diﬀerent securities see
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since a ﬁrst best solution is not implemented. Good type agents thus try to send signals to
the principals about their true types in order to diﬀerentiate themselves and overcome this
issue. In such setting the capital structure, or the way a ﬁrm ﬁnances itself, is considered
to be a signaling device (Heinkel 1982), but above all the security types that compose the
capital structure are considered to be a signaling mechanism (Myers and Majluf 1984).
Producing a signal has to be costly in order to be perceived as credible. In other words,
only the agents that can aﬀord to produce the signal (good types) will do so, while bad types
will not mimic them, as the cost of the signal would exceed the beneﬁt (higher valuation
for example) of representing themselves as good types. Otherwise, the signal can be sent by
anyone and types cannot be correctly inferred. For example, a bad type ﬁrm will not issue
debt, since that increases the probability of the ﬁnancial distress much more than for a good
type ﬁrm. In that respect, a capital structure or a degree of leverage can serve as a credible
signal of the ﬁrm type. Similar is the case of diﬀerent types of security issues, where there
is an equity issue on one end of the spectrum and a straight debt issue on the other. The
paradox of both security types is their incompatibility. Namely, equity ownership induces risk
taking, due to limited liability. The most an investor can lose are the funds invested, while
the upper potential for gains is unlimited5. Debt ownership on the other hand induces risk
aversion, since the most debtholders can gain is the principal and a ﬁxed return. Debtholders
are not compensated for additional risk being undertaken by the ﬁrm and are therefore faced
with a concave payoﬀ function. In the case of the ﬁrm’s default on debt, when the realized
cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm is less than the principal, debtholders receive any cash ﬂow from the
ﬁrm. In the case where the realized cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm is greater than the principal,
debtholders receive only the principal and do not participate on any gains above that value.
As mentioned in the introduction, convertible bonds are hybrid instruments, which combine
features of straight debt and equity. They are straight debt packaged with a call option on
the ﬁrm’s equity, making it possible for convertible bondholders to participate in potential
value gain sharing of the ﬁrm.
2.2.2 Theoretical Motivations for issuing Convertible Debt
There are number of diﬀerent theoretical explanations as to why companies ﬁnance them-
selves with convertibles. These can be classiﬁed into several broader categories:
- Theories based on an asymmetric information framework (Brennan and Kraus 1987,
Brennan and Schwartz 1988, Kim 1990 and Stein 1992).
- Theories based on an agency problem framework (Green 1984, Mayers 1998 and Is-
agawa 2000).
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- Tax advantage based theories (Jalan and Barone-Adesi 1995).
- Theories based on managerial entrenchment (Isagawa 2002).
- Rationing in the equity market (Lewis, Rogalski and Seward 2001).
The theoretical explanations show an important distinction between adverse selection
models and agency theories on one hand, and the entrenchment theories on the other. The
distinction is in the underlying assumptions about the control over ﬁnancial and invest-
ment policies. Adverse selection models and agency theories solve for speciﬁc asymmetric
information and agency issues between insiders (managers and/or existing shareholders) and
outsiders (either new shareholders or bondholders) and assume maximization of the exist-
ing shareholder’s wealth (in the literature also referred to as the eﬃcient approach). The
entrenchment approach on the other hand assumes that ﬁnancial and investment policies
are determined by the entrenched manager (insider), who serves his or her own interests
(empire building and diﬀerent perks among other) and does not necessarily pursue value
maximization of the ﬁrm.
Theories based on the Asymmetric Information Framework
According to Brennan and Kraus (1987) convertible debt can costlessly mitigate investment
ineﬃciencies, which arise due to information asymmetry issues in the framework of Myers
and Majluf (1984) and Heinkel (1982). The information asymmetry can either concern
the uncertainty regarding returns on investments made by ﬁrms (mean of the distribution
of returns) or the uncertainty regarding the variance of returns (mean-preserving spread).
Brennan and Kraus develop such a single parameter model of information asymmetry. The
goal of the ﬁrm is to maximize the diﬀerence between the value of the funds, obtained from
the investors, and a true value of the ﬁnancing, given the full information about the ﬁrm. In
the equilibrium each ﬁnancing strategy6 is chosen by the worst possible type of ﬁrm for that
particular ﬁnancing strategy (this is the so-called ”lemons property”). Securities that can
lead to such equilibrium include convertible bonds, junior bonds, and bonds with warrants.
These securities can eﬀectively resolve the issue of adverse selection, as each type of ﬁrm
reveals itself with the choice of the ﬁnancing strategy. The strategy depends on the nature
of the information asymmetry problem.
Brennan and Schwartz (1988) argue that the only reason investors are willing to pay
more for a convertible bond than for a straight bond is because of its hybrid nature. The
cost of convertibles is evaluated on a weighted basis of the straight debt component cost
6Note that Brennan and Kraus make a distinction between securities and ﬁnancing. They consider
securities “to be basic claims traded in the capital markets”, while ﬁnancing in their terminology refers “to
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of convertibles and the equity option cost of a convertible. Convertible bonds are relatively
insensitive to the risk of the issuing company exactly because of their hybrid nature. Namely,
higher risk reduces the value of the straight debt component, but at the same time it increases
the value of the equity option component, thus having very limited overall eﬀect on the
value of convertibles. Brennan and Schwartz (1988: 59) point out that the relevant risk
is “...not only the risk of the company’s existing operations, but also the risk of any future
operations in which the ﬁrm may become involved over the life of the bond.” This relates to
the agency cost of straight debt. It arises from the diﬀerent payoﬀ structures of bondholders
and shareholders, and limited liability of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). With
straight debt outstanding, shareholders7 have strong incentives to increase the risk of the
company, which increases the upper potential for gains of shareholders, but reduces the value
of straight debt. Convertibles reduce these incentives, as their value is less sensitive to the
changes in the riskiness of the underlying equity8. Brennan and Schwartz (1988: 59) conclude
that “...convertibles are most likely to be used by companies which the market perceives as
risky, whose risk is hard to assess and whose payment policy is hard to predict.”
Constantinides and Grundy (1989) present a model in which an issue of a convertible
bond, combined with a partial share repurchase, serves as a credible signal of a ﬁrm type.
This resolves the information asymmetry problem and related underinvestment issue, when
the ﬁrm is restricted to equity ﬁnancing. Since the management owns a fraction of the
stock in an all-equity ﬁrm, they are interested in maximizing the value of the ﬁrm’s stock.
Management may not sell their stock or buy the securities issued by the ﬁrm. Constantinides
and Grundy show that in the fully revealing equilibrium the payoﬀ of the issued security has
to be similar to the payoﬀ of straight debt (concave payoﬀ function) for the low values of the
ﬁrm’s investments. On the other hand, for the high values of the ﬁrm’s investments, payoﬀ
of the issued security should be similar to the payoﬀ of equity (convex payoﬀ function).
Constantinides and Grundy argue that such payoﬀ structure of the security assures the
proper signaling incentives for the management (costly signaling). As previously discussed,
a convertible bond is a security that conforms to these requirements.
Similarly, in the model of Kim (1990) the convertible bond issue and in particular the
conversion ratio serve as a signal of ﬁrm’s type. The conversion ratio serves as a credible
signal of a company’s future earnings. In the equilibrium, lower expected future earnings
of the worse types induce higher conversion ratios. These imply more shares per bond and
thus higher dilution of future earnings, as those have to be shared with a relatively larger
share of new shareholders. The model yields a testable hypothesis that abnormal common
stock returns at the announcements of the convertible debt issues are negatively related to
7Here, we can also think of the management that acts in the interests of shareholders, if we set aside the
agency costs of equity.
8Note that this second argument of Brennan and Schwartz should essentially be classiﬁed in the moral
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the conversion ratio, since higher conversion ratios imply worse type ﬁrms.
According to Stein (1992) ﬁrms issue convertible bonds in order to get equity through
the ”back door” in situations where informational asymmetries make conventional equity
issues unattractive due to high issue costs and dilution (Myers and Majluf 1984). Stein’s
rationale resembles that of Constantinides and Grundy (1989), but has a diﬀerent empirical
implication. In the model of Constantinides and Grundy the share repurchase mechanism is a
way of signaling type of the ﬁrm to the market. This is not the case in Stein’s model, where
two factors are particularly important: call features of convertibles bonds and increased
possibility of ﬁnancial distress due to excess debt. In a fully separating equilibrium good
ﬁrms issue debt, medium quality ﬁrms issue convertible debt and bad quality ﬁrms issue
equity. Financing choice therefore serves as the signal to the market. Announcement eﬀects,
which are generally found to be negative for all kinds of security type issues, are according
to Stein’s model expected to be worst for equity oﬀerings, somewhat better for convertible
debt issues and the least negative for straight debt issues. These expectations are in line
with the adverse selection models of a capital structure.
Theories based on the Agency Problem Framework
Maximizing the value of the equity claim and maximizing the value of the ﬁrm can, with
risky debt outstanding, lead to agency problems (debtholder expropriation). Shareholders
have an incentive to substitute projects of lower risk with riskier projects. This is due to
their limited liability. Green (1984) develops a model in which option claims issued with
debt may mitigate those incentive problems. By addressing the ﬁnancing and incentive
problems simultaneously, the correct incentives can be induced with a convertible bond or
debt-warrant combination. This alters the incentives of the equity holders to take risk, as
part of the potential gains has to be shared with new shareholders, since option claims on
company’s equity are issued together with debt. However, Green’s analysis abstracts from a
number of other incentive (agency) problems, where the most important is the one between
management and shareholders. Therefore, the model does not eliminate all the agency costs.
The crucial characteristic of convertible and warrant bonds is sharing of the upper potential
of the equity gains, while there must be the lower bound of the gains, for which the ﬁxed
claim on the debt is paid (the option is not exercised). Only then will such instruments have
the desired eﬀect on incentives.
The model of Mayers (1998) is very close to that of Stein (1992), but is diﬀerent in
spirit, since Stein’s model is based on asymmetric information about assets in place, whereas
Mayers’s sequential ﬁnancing hypothesis is based on the uncertainty about the value of
future investment options. In Stein’s model the convertibility feature solves the ﬁnancing
problem at the time of the issue, whereas in Mayers’ model convertibility solves a future
ﬁnancing problem. Compared to straight bonds convertible bonds economize on issue costs,2.2. Theoretical Motivations for the Use of Convertible Debt 13
because they leave funds in the ﬁrm (convertibility feature) and reduce the leverage when
the investment option is valuable. On the other hand convertibles control the overinvestment
problem (see Jensen 1986) when the investment option is not valuable. The call provision is
an important feature of convertible bonds, when there is uncertainty about the maturity date
of the investment option. Mayers notes that existing evidence on convertible bonds supports
the sequential ﬁnancing hypothesis, but that much of it is also consistent with other theories,
since (Mayers 1998: 88) “...investment options provide opportunities for risk-shifting or are
a likely source of asymmetric information”. The sequential ﬁnancing hypothesis has no
direct implication for stock price reactions at the time of convertible debt announcements.
However, as none of the other motivations for the use of convertible debt predicts any
additional investment at the time of conversion, evidence of investment related activity at
the time of conversion would support the sequential-ﬁnancing hypothesis.
In the model of Isagawa (2000) the managerial investment decisions are aﬀected through
default risk rather than ﬁnancing constraints as in Mayers’ model. In cases, where managers
have empire-building tendencies9 and fear of default10, properly structured convertible debt
alleviates managerial opportunism. In essence, the model does not depend on the informa-
tional asymmetry problem and thus does not have any testable hypothesis regarding stock
price reaction following convertible debt oﬀer announcements.
Tax Advantage based Theories
Jalan and Barone-Adesi (1995) consider convertible bonds as delayed equity ﬁnancing and
motivate their use with a diﬀerent tax treatment of coupon interest and dividend payments
in a setting with market frictions and incompleteness. In such a setting issuing convertible
bonds increases the residual equity value of the ﬁrm, since the ﬁrm beneﬁts from the tax
shield as opposed to an up-front equity ﬁnancing. Cooperation between ﬁrms and investors
and the fact that ﬁrms have repeated need to tap into the ﬁnancial markets assure that
both ﬁrms and investors have an incentive to use convertibles and share their beneﬁts.
Compared to straight debt, convertible bonds oﬀer much less trade-oﬀ between interest
tax shields and cost of ﬁnancial distress. In the case of straight bonds higher interest tax
shields are only achievable trough higher indebtedness, which increases the probability of
ﬁnancial distress. On the other hand, convertible bonds oﬀer the beneﬁt of the interest tax
shields, but do not increase the probability of ﬁnancial distress as much. Empirical evidence
shows that ﬁrms tend to delay calls of convertibles, even though this goes against rational
explanation (Brennan and Schwartz 1988). This fact seems to support the tax motivation.
By delaying the call, ﬁrms leave more beneﬁts to convertible bondholders, thus cooperating
in the continuous game, where they repeatedly have to go back to the market for ﬁnancing.
9This relates to the so-called overinvestment problem related to free cash ﬂow. See Jensen (1986).
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Should they fail to cooperate and share tax beneﬁts with the investors, they would not be
able to issue new convertibles and exploit the tax beneﬁts.
Theories Based on Managerial Entrenchment
Isagawa (2002) analyzes the use of convertible bonds in a setting, where an entrenched
manager determines the ﬁnancial policy of the ﬁrm. This model is a deviation from the
other literature, which mostly assumes that corporate ﬁnancial policy is chosen such that
it maximizes shareholder’s wealth. Isagawa builds on the work of Zwiebel (1996) in which
the management chooses ﬁnancial policy based on its own interests. The interests are best
served if management remains in control of the ﬁrm and undertakes any expansion project
(empire building). In the absence of the market for corporate control managers have no
incentives to issue debt, since that increases the probability of bankruptcy (and loss of their
position). With the existence of the market for corporate control, the manager will issue
debt in order to fence the takeover. By doing that and distributing cash dividends, managers
can commit not to undertake value-decreasing projects. This, according to Zwiebel, explains
why managers would choose to issue debt. When there are no other ﬁnancing instruments,
managers issue straight debt, which increases a probability of bankruptcy, and undertake
the value-increasing project. By issuing callable convertible debt instead, managers can
reduce the probability of bankruptcy. This implicitly assumes that bonds will eventually be
converted into equity. A callable convertible bond is thus an eﬀective ﬁnancial instrument
for an entrenched manager, but it is not desirable from the standpoint of the value of a
ﬁrm. In this model the ﬁrm value decreases, since the probability of an ineﬃcient manager
being replaced decreases. Isagawa (2002: 266) concludes that “...this implies that corporate
ﬁnancial policy itself creates a conﬂict between the objectives of the management and the
owners...”.
Rationing in the Equity Markets
Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (2001) propose an alternative explanation for the issuance of
convertible debt. Their model is in the spirit of the explanation of the rationing in debt
markets (see Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Lewis et al argue that there may be cases in which
issuers want to issue common stock, but the ﬁrm’s participation in the equity market is
hampered. In case of rationing in debt markets, there is no alternative to raising debt, since
straight debt is the most senior security. In case of equity, which is the most junior security,
rationing may not necessarily exclude the ﬁrm from raising funds with a more senior security
such is for example convertible debt.2.3. Empirical Research 15
2.3 Empirical Research
2.3.1 Wealth Eﬀects Associated with Convertible Debt Oﬀering
Announcements
It is empirically well documented and consistent with the model of Myers and Majluf (1984)
that diﬀerent security types induce diﬀerent wealth eﬀects at the time of their announce-
ments. Seasoned equity oﬀerings induce the strongest negative wealth eﬀects11 of between
-2.5 and -4.5 percent for the U.S. market, while straight debt issues induce only slightly
(many times insigniﬁcant) negative wealth eﬀects12. In Table 2.4 it is shown that convert-
ible debt oﬀerings induce announcement date valuation responses that are between those
for equity and straight debt. Using the results of the previous empirical U.S. studies, we
have computed the weighted13 average wealth eﬀect associated with the convertible debt
issue announcements in the U.S. market of -1.63 percent, while the results of individual U.S.
studies vary between -0.6 and -3 percent.
However, the results for the wealth eﬀects associated with the announcements of con-
vertible debt oﬀerings diﬀer across countries and periods. Contrary to studies conducted
in the U.S. market, Kang and Stulz (1996) ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive abnormal returns in the
Japanese market and attribute those to deregulation in Japan during their sample period
and diﬀerent behavior of Japanese managers, who seem to be less concerned about short-
term results than their American counterparts. Similarly to Kang and Stulz, the abnormal
returns associated with convertible debt oﬀerings documented by Christensen, Faria, Kwok
and Bremer (1996) in the Japanese market are positive, but insigniﬁcant. This is also the
only diﬀerence they observe between the U.S. and the Japanese market in terms of abnor-
mal stock price reactions to announcements of diﬀerent securities, but they oﬀer no clear
explanation. De Roon and Veld (1998) also ﬁnd positive abnormal returns for convertible
oﬀering announcements in the Dutch market. They do not ﬁnd support for the notion that
diﬀerences in corporate governance structures cause the diﬀerence in abnormal returns. In a
study of the Taiwanese convertible bond market Chang, Chen and Liu (2004) ﬁnd diﬀerences
in the wealth eﬀects between the ﬁrst time issuers and seasoned convertible debt oﬀerings,
where the wealth eﬀects are signiﬁcantly positive for the ﬁrst and negative (but insigniﬁ-
cant) for the latter. They suspect that deregulation (similarly as in Japan) could account
for the diﬀerence, where relaxed criteria for issuance of convertible bonds leads to the issue
announcements being interpreted as a signal of the ﬁrm becoming more independent from
bank ﬁnancing (Kang and Stulz 1996).
11See for example Masulis and Korwar (1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and Asquith and Mullins
(1986).
12See for example Dann and Mikkelson (1984) and Eckbo (1986).
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Apart from country and period speciﬁc diﬀerences in studies, most of the variation in
the size of the wealth eﬀects is attributable to issuer and issue speciﬁc factors due to the
hybrid nature of convertible debt. More speciﬁcally, convertible debt can be structured such
that it is either more equity- or more debt-like, by adjusting the characteristics of the issue.
These include conversion price, maturity and call protection period among others. Typically,
convertibles with shorter maturities or call protection periods and lower conversion prices
are more likely to be in the money sooner and be converted into equity, which makes them
more equity-like. Longer maturities or call protection periods and high conversion prices are
characteristics, which make a convertible issue more debt-like. This eﬀectively provides an
important measure. First, by estimating whether the issue is more equity- or more debt-
like, it is possible to capture an important explanation for the diﬀerent size of the wealth
eﬀect associated with the announcement of a convertible debt issue. Second, it gives a
useful test for the theoretical motives behind issues of convertibles. Almost all researchers
agree to the following reasoning. Cases, where most of the convertibles are indeed more
debt-like, suggest that convertibles are structured such as to resolve issues mostly associated
with substitutions for straight debt (risk-shifting hypothesis of Green 1984, risk estimation
of Brennan and Schwartz 1988 and Brennan and Kraus 1987). On the other hand, if the
convertibles are more equity-like, this could be interpreted as support for delayed equity and
signaling motives (relating to theories of Stein 1992 and Kim 1990). Although the reasoning
that convertible bonds are a substitute for either debt or equity seems straightforward, it
could be the case that they are neither or perhaps something else, which so far has not been
theoretically proposed. This is also the most important point that future empirical research
should address. The structure of the convertible debt issue on the other hand does not have
any direct implication for the sequential ﬁnancing model of Mayers (1998) and Isagawa’s idea
behind the control of managerial opportunism (2000) and managerial entrenchment (2002).
For the measurement of the size of the equity component in a particular convertible
debt issue, diﬀerent authors propose several measures, which are summarized in Burlacu
(2000). The measure mainly used in the most recent literature is the so-called delta14 (see
Burlacu 2000 and Dutordoir and Van de Gucht 2004). The delta measure relates to the price
sensitivity of a convertible bond to the underlying equity, and takes values between 0 and
1. A value closer to 1 indicates that the sensitivity of convertible bond price with respect
to changes in the price of underlying equity is high, which makes the convertible bond
14Under standard Black-Scholes assumptions for the probability of conversion (option being in-the-money),









, where S is the current price of the
underlying stock, K is the conversion price, δ is the continuously compounded dividend yield, r is the
continuously compounded yield on a selected “risk-free” bond, σ is the annualized stock return volatility, T
is the maturity of the bond and N(.) is the cumulative standard normal probability distribution. The delta
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more equity-like. Therefore, we expect that more debt-like oﬀerings of convertible bonds
are associated with less negative abnormal returns and more equity-like oﬀerings with more
negative abnormal returns. Indeed, all the studies using the delta measure to determine the
characteristic of the convertible bond issue ﬁnd that issues with higher delta value induce
more negative wealth eﬀects. This is consistent with the more equity-like nature of such
issues.
2.3.2 Convertible Debt Structure and Empirical Tests of Theoret-
ical Motives
Stein (1992) ﬁnds support for his model in managerial motives, since in the earlier survey
research most managers state that convertible debt is issued in the function of ”delayed
equity”. The surveys do not support the implications of the signaling model of Constantinides
and Grundy (1989), since no ﬁrm in the surveys uses the proceeds to repurchase stock.
They rather use the proceeds for capital expenditures, general corporate spending and debt
reﬁnancing. Empirical evidence (Essig 1991) suggests that high debt-to-equity ratio ﬁrms,
ﬁrms with high informational asymmetries and high growth potential are signiﬁcantly more
likely to use issue convertible debt. Call provisions seem to be crucial, since most of the ﬁrms
force conversion in a short time after the issue date or call protection expiration. Mikkelson
and Partch (1986) document that convertible bond issues with high bond ratings (A and
above) have very negative wealth eﬀects associated with the announcements of convertible
debt issues, whereas issues with lower ratings essentially exhibit no wealth eﬀects. At ﬁrst,
this ﬁnding seems diﬃcult to reconcile with theory. However, Stein argues that the greater
the potential for ﬁnancial distress (lower bond rating), the more credible is convertible debt
as a signal of optimism, since without the conversion into equity companies would be left
with a debt overhang.
Davidson, Glascock and Schwartz (1995) investigate Kim’s signaling hypothesis and
Stein’s delayed equity motivation on a sample of 146 convertible bond issues in the U.S.
market between 1980 and 1985. Davidson et al propose the use of the expected time until
the convertible becomes at-the-money as a proxy that captures both Kim’s and Stein’s equity
related motives for issuing convertible debt. On one hand it depends upon the conversion
ratio, which is perceived as the signal sent to the market in Kim’s model. On the other
hand it depends on the market’s expectations about the ﬁrm’s growth rate, which relates
this measure to Stein’s delayed equity argument. Davidson et al argue that a relatively low
conversion ratio compared to the market’s expectations about the growth will result in a
relatively short expected time for the option becoming at-the-money, eﬀectively making the
convertible issue more equity-like and vice versa. Firstly, their results show that the average
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Secondly, the shorter the expected time until the convertible bond becomes at-the-money
(more equity like as conversion is more likely), the more negative the wealth eﬀect associ-
ated with the announcement is. The authors interpret the ﬁrst result as support for Stein’s
delayed equity motive and the second result as being consistent with Kim’s conversion prices
signaling mechanism.
Based on Stein’s argument for the use of convertible debt Jen, Choi and Lee (1997)
test two hypotheses using a sample of 158 convertible issues in the U.S. market between
1976 and 1985. The ﬁrst “growth funding” hypothesis states that companies with large and
growing capital needs and limited debt capacity are more likely to issue convertibles and thus
create a future equity base with lower ﬂotation and information costs (less dilution due to
information asymmetries). The second “expected cost of ﬁnancial distress” hypothesis states
that issuers with high expected costs of ﬁnancial distress and limited additional debt capacity
will have a greater incentive to reduce the interest coupon (due to the conversion option)
and lower the probability of ﬁnancial distress by issuing convertibles. Both hypotheses
together yield the idea that high-growth companies with limited debt capacity and high
expected costs of ﬁnancial distress are more likely to issue convertibles. The market is
expected to react more favorably to convertible issues announced by such companies than to
the issue announcements made by low-growth companies. Jen et al ﬁnd two-day abnormal
returns to be signiﬁcantly negative (i.e. -2.15 percent) for the whole sample. They also
note a stock price run-up prior to announcement date. Using a standard cross-sectional
regression analysis, where they regress the cumulative average abnormal returns on a set of
independent variables, they ﬁnd support for the two hypotheses and thus Stein’s “backdoor
equity” argument. Firms issue convertible debt because of the high-growth potential and
limited debt capacity (costly or unavailable debt ﬁnancing), while at the same time managers
believe that equity prices do not properly reﬂect the ﬁrm’s value and new equity issues would
not be favorable to the existing shareholders (costly equity ﬁnancing).
Similarly to Davidson et al (1995), Magennis, Watts and Wright (1998) explore Kim’s
signaling hypothesis on a sample of 45 convertible issues in the Australian market between
1986 and 1995. To measure, whether the convertible issue is more equity- or debt-like,
they use the expected time for the convertible options to become at-the-money as the proxy
measure. The longer the expected time to at-the-money of the conversion option is, the
more debt-like the convertible issue is. The size of the abnormal returns should be positively
related to the expected time of the convertible option to become at-the-money. Magennis et
al indeed ﬁnd this relationship to be positive and signiﬁcant . This yields support for Kim’s
signaling hypothesis. However, they claim that convertibles are not simply substitutes for
equity or debt, but rather “...a “ready-made” capital structure” (Magennis et al 1998: 313),
as a single convertible issue can be a “...simple and cheaper alternative (to separate debt and
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Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (1999) investigate Stein’s backdoor equity hypothesis and
Green’s risk-shifting hypothesis on a sample of 203 convertible issues on the U.S. market
between 1977 and 1984. If the hypothesis of risk-shifting holds, convertible debt issuers
must have higher agency costs than straight debt issuers. Should the Stein’s hypothesis be
correct, convertible debt issuers must have higher adverse selection and ﬁnancial distress
costs than common equity issuers. Lewis et al classify convertible debt oﬀers as either debt-
or equity-like by estimating the probability of conversion of convertible bond into equity at
the maturity15. They conﬁrm the ﬁndings of previous studies of announcement dates wealth
eﬀects, where the most negative eﬀects are for equity issues, a bit less negative for convert-
ibles issues and somewhat neutral for straight-debt issues. Firms that issue convertibles are
smaller in terms of capitalization (size is often seen as proxy for information asymmetry),
riskier in terms of total risk, with better pre-issue stock performance and more ﬁnancial slack
(consistent with the model of Myers and Majluf 1984) and with highly proﬁtable growth op-
portunities. Firms that issue debt-like convertibles are smaller than those that issue straight
debt, have higher market-to-book ratios, lower cash ﬂows, lower dividend payouts, higher
stock volatility and higher leverage before the issue. These ﬁndings about debt related costs
are consistent with the hypothesis that ﬁrms use debt-like convertibles to control for the
asset substitution (risk-shifting) problem. The equity related ﬁnancing costs indicate that
debt-like convertibles are issued when future economic conditions are expected to be good
(good growth opportunities). Investment opportunities are signiﬁcantly more proﬁtable for
equity-like convertible debt issuers than for common equity issuers. Equity-like convertible
issuers have more ﬁnancial slack than common equity issuers, which according to Myers and
Majulf (1984) implies greater adverse selection costs. Lewis et al see this as evidence that
issuing equity-like convertibles instead of common equity mitigates information asymmetry
problems. Common stock issuers are riskier, both in terms of systematic and total ﬁrm risk,
than ﬁrms that issue equity-like convertibles. Overall, the eﬀects of equity related costs are
consistent with the backdoor-equity hypothesis, since the adverse selection costs are higher
for equity-like convertible issuers than for common equity issuers.
In the follow up paper Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2001) investigate long-run perfor-
mance of companies issuing convertible debt. Lewis et al argue that issuers might be using
the convertible debt market because they were “rationed out” of the equity market. As
mentioned in Section 2.2.5 this provides another motive for issuing convertible debt. On a
sample of 566 convertible debt issues in the U.S. market from 1979 to 1990 they ﬁnd dete-
riorating operating performance of the issuers of convertible bonds following the convertible
debt issue compared to the matched sample of non-issuing ﬁrms. However, the diﬀerence
in operating performance is not signiﬁcant as in the case for equity issuing ﬁrms compared
15This is estimated using the standard Black-Scholes assumptions, where the underlying stock follows a
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to the matched sample of non-issuing ﬁrms. Lewis et al interpret these ﬁndings as evidence
somewhat contradicting the arguments of Green (1984) and Mayers (1998). Lewis et al argue
that in Green’s and Mayers’ models it is implicitly assumed that one of the consequences of a
convertible debt issue would be that ﬁrms invest only in positive net present value projects.
Given a relatively deteriorating performance of convertible bond issuers, they conclude that
convertible debt does not completely resolve risk-shifting and / or managerial discretion
(overinvestment problem). On the other hand, they see the ﬁndings as support for Stein’s
delayed equity motive, as ﬁrms may choose a convertible debt issue over an equity issue
when they expect improved operating performance in the future. Lewis et al consider the
ﬁndings on relative operating performance of convertible versus equity issuers as support for
their alternative explanation for the use of convertible debt due to the rationing in the equity
market. This rationing means that some ﬁrms are allowed to access the equity market, but
only if their post-issue performance proves to be suﬃcient.
Mayers (1998) empirically tests the proposed ”sequential ﬁnancing” rationale for con-
vertible debt issues. If the sequential ﬁnancing hypothesis holds, ﬁrms will exhibit intensive
investment-related activity at the time of calls of convertible bonds. Mayers documents that
issuers of convertible debt have higher than industry median leverage, higher market-to-
book ratios, higher R&D costs relative to sales and a lower than industry median ratio of
tangible to total assets. For these companies convertible debt represents 30 percent of total
debt on average. Somewhat contrary to the sequential-ﬁnancing hypothesis is the large size
of the ﬁrms in the sample, since the sequential-ﬁnancing hypothesis is based on the issue
cost economization, which is more important for smaller ﬁrms. Compared to a matching
sample of non-issuing ﬁrms, Mayers ﬁnds statistically signiﬁcant larger capital expenditure
changes for companies that issued and called convertible debt in the call year and in the
year following the call. Calls of convertibles that precede signiﬁcant changes in ﬁnancing
activity seem to be an important breakpoint. This breakpoint signals an increased rate of
new ﬁnancing, with straight debt being the most popular instrument. Mayers argues that
this evidence does not support Stein’s model, since calls are not being executed to avoid
possible ﬁnancial distress, as new debt is issued shortly after the calls. This, combined with
increased investment activities, gives support to the sequential-ﬁnancing hypothesis.
In their analysis of 129 convertible debt issues on the UK market in the period 1982
to 1996 Abhyankar and Dunning (1999) ﬁnd limited support for Stein’s model and for the
risk estimation arguments of Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Brennan and Schwartz (1988).
Similarly as in some other studies (for example McConnell and Muscarella 1995) they observe
a positive eﬀect on abnormal returns in ﬁrms, which use the proceeds to ﬁnance capital
expenditure, while a negative eﬀect is observed in ﬁrms, which dedicate the proceeds to
reﬁnancing, mergers and acquisitions and general expenditure.
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sample of 109 issues of Taiwanese ﬁrms. They develop and test two implications directly
related to Mayers’ model. The ﬁrst implication is related to the overinvestment problem.
If convertibles are an eﬀective way to mitigate this issue, they are more valuable in cases,
where current investments and future investment options are highly positively correlated.
According to Chang et al this is a feature generally found in ﬁrms with focused activities
and more volatile cash ﬂows (since they are not diversiﬁed). Therefore, such companies will
beneﬁt more from the use of convertibles. Essig (1991) documents volatility of corporate cash
ﬂows to be positively related to the use of convertible debt. The second testable prediction
refers to the net new ﬁnancing (gross proceeds less reﬁnancing) that companies will raise
during the life of convertible bond. If indeed Mayers’ hypothesis holds, companies want
to avoid costly external ﬁnancing when capital needs are high and should therefore mostly
rely on internal funds during the life of the convertible bond. Chang et al ﬁnd support for
both implications related to the sequential-ﬁnancing motivation for the issue of convertible
securities. The diﬀerence in size of the wealth eﬀects associated with the announcement of
the convertible debt issue between companies with more focused and companies with less
focused activities is signiﬁcant. The wealth eﬀects for the subsample of companies with
focused activities are signiﬁcantly positive, while negative and not signiﬁcant for those with
less focused activities.
In another paper Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2003) use a sample of 588 convertible debt
issues in the U.S. market in the period 1972 to 1992. They attempt to reconcile the diverging
evidence on the motives for convertible debt issues and determinants of stock price reactions
to convertible debt announcements. They analyze the impact of issuer characteristics on
the size of the wealth eﬀect associated with the announcement of convertible debt oﬀers.
They again split the issues according to the previously mentioned delta measure into more
equity- and more debt-like issues. Lewis et al ﬁnd support for the risk-shifting motive
proposed by Green (1984), as investment related issuer characteristics do not aﬀect the
investor reactions for the debt-like oﬀers. They do not document strong support for the
risk estimation argument proposed by Brennan and Schwartz (1988), as leverage negatively
aﬀects abnormal returns for issuers that are neither equity- nor debt-like. They ﬁnd strong
support for Stein’s (1992) backdoor equity hypothesis, as good industry-adjusted growth
opportunities of the issuers positively aﬀect abnormal returns, especially if they invest the
proceeds in new projects. Following a strain of the literature on market timing (see for
example Bayless and Chaplinsky 1996) they analyze the impact of the market, issue and
issuer characteristics on abnormal returns for subsamples of cold, normal and hot market
periods of security oﬀerings. They show that the size of the wealth eﬀect associated with the
announcement of convertible debt issue also depends on the aggregate volume of the issues
in the seasoned equity markets. Moreover, ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors seem to be more important
in periods of cold equity markets, when investors more closely analyze these factors than in22 Why do Companies Issue Convertible Bonds? A Review of Theory and Empirical Evidence
periods of more attractive equity issues.
Similar to the analysis of Lewis et al 2003 is the study of Dutordoir and Van de Gucht
(2004), conducted on 222 convertible debt issues on eight Western European markets in the
period 1990 to 2002. They explicitly test Brennan and Kraus’ (1987) and Stein’s (1992)
motivations for the use of convertible debt. Dutordoir and Van de Gucht document strong
support for the Brennan and Kraus’ model and only limited support for Stein’s backdoor-
equity motivation. In the analysis they point to certain diﬀerences between the U.S. and
Western European markets, as the convertible issues on Western European markets seem to
be more debt-like and ﬁrms are much larger than those on the U.S. market.
In Table 2.5 empirical research related to theoretical motivations for the issue of con-
vertible debt is summarized. The summarized studies use issue, accounting and stock prices
information to capture issuer and issue speciﬁc characteristics. In the studies a cross-sectional
analysis is mostly used as the research method; while Lewis et al 1999 for example also used
a multinomial logit model in their study to investigate security choice decision. As the table
shows, the most frequently tested motivation was Stein’s ”backdoor equity” explanation for
the use of convertible debt. The support for it (and Kim’s hypothesis as well) has consis-
tently been documented. Green’s (1984) and Mayers’ (1998) agency cost resolution based
arguments have also been explored and generally supported, but with some studies ﬁnding
contradictory or mixed evidence. Tax motivation and managerial entrenchment explanations
have not been tested directly to our knowledge, while little and mixed evidence has been
found to support Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Brennan and Schwartz (1988) motivations
for the use of convertible debt. One of the reasons for this disparity in popularity of in-
dividual motives might be in the ease of deriving and applying meaningful empirical tests.
To ﬁnd support for Stein’s motivation, most of the researchers rely on establishing whether
the largest share of convertible bonds in the sample is equity-like. All the other theoretical
motivations are more diﬃcult to address, as the nature of convertible debt is very complex.
2.3.3 Survey Evidence
There have not been many surveys on convertible debt issues. The ﬁrst survey was done by
Pilcher (1955), followed by Brigham (1966) and Hoﬀmeister (1977), while the latest surveys
include Billingsley and Smith (1996), Graham and Harvey (2001) and Bancel and Mittoo
(2004). The survey by Bancel and Mittoo (2004) has been conducted on an international
scale (European countries), while other surveys have been done for the U.S. market. The
sample sizes vary substantially across the surveys.
Pilcher’s (1955) sample includes 2216 responding presidents of corporations, Brigham
(1966) bases his conclusions on a sample of 22 responding ﬁrms, Hoﬀmeister’s (1977) survey
16There were actually 75 repondents, but only 22 are for companies that issued convertible debt. Others
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is composed of 55 respondents, Billingsley and Smith (1996) have a sample of 88 responding
ﬁrms, Graham and Harvey (2001) base their survey on 392 responses from CFOs and Bancel
and Mittoo (2004) have a sample of 29 ﬁrms from eight countries.
In most of the surveys questions were grouped into the following broader categories:
- Rationales (reasons) for issuing convertible securities
- Financing alternatives
- Use of funds
- Conversion policy
- Other factors
It is important to note that the diﬀerence between the questions about the use of convert-
ible debt related to the motives, put forward by practitioners, and the theoretical motives,
put forward by academics. In general, two distinctive motivations are put forward by prac-
titioners. Namely, practitioners seem to consider convertible debt as the cheaper source of
ﬁnancing than straight debt, as it bears a lower coupon rate. Closely related to this view is
also the role of the conversion option as the so-called “deal sweetener”, which helps achieve
a lower coupon rate and sell otherwise hard to sell debt issue. Secondly, practitioners tra-
ditionally consider convertible debt to be a way of selling the equity at a premium, as the
conversion price is higher than the current stock price. As previously mentioned, both views
are refuted by academics, who oﬀer other motives for the use of convertible debt.
As theoretical motivations for the use of convertible debt only started to emerge in
the late eighties, early surveys do not rely on any theoretical motivation for the issuance
of convertible debt, but rather rely on the mentioned general perceptions among investors
and managerial communities. Pilcher (1955) asked managers about the primary motivation
for issuing convertible securities, where raising a common equity and “sweetening” (with
conversion option) the senior security (debt) were oﬀered as possible answers. 82 percent
of respondents said that the prime motivation for the issue of convertibles was to raise
equity. Brigham (1966) based the questions on the primary interest in either equity or debt,
where a company was not able to issue one of those and opted for convertibles instead. 73
percent of the respondents claimed that their primary interest was in equity. He also asked
questions about equity undervaluation, concerns about equity dilution, high cost of straight
debt and targeting a particular investor’s group. 68 percent of respondents claimed that
convertibles were the way to sell the equity at a premium, while only 27 percent stated
that convertibles were issued in order to “sweeten” otherwise diﬃcult to sell straight debt
issue. Hoﬀmeister (1977) related the questions to interest rate reduction (cost of debt in
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sell issue (marketability in Pilcher 1955 and debt sweetening), and popularity of convertible
debt at the time, equity dilution and a favorable accounting treatment. 70 percent of those
surveyed found the issuance of delayed equity as an important feature of convertible debt,
while 58 percent claimed that reducing the interest cost was an important consideration.
Somewhat more than a quarter of the respondents said that marketability of the issue also
played an important role. Interestingly, Hoﬀmeister also found some diﬀerences between
large and medium-sized ﬁrms, where the managers of large ﬁrms more often stated cheaper
debt as the motivation for the use of convertibles, while the managers of medium-sized ﬁrms
perceived delayed equity as a more important reason.
By the time of the Billingsley and Smith 1996 survey several theoretical motivations for
the issuance of convertible bonds emerged. They used the questionnaire to test whether the
theories about delayed equity (Stein 1992) and risk shifting17 (Green 1984) in fact drive a
ﬁrm’s decision to issue convertible securities. Aside from the questions related to practical
motivations for the use of convertible debt, which were asked in previous surveys18, they also
asked questions about delayed equity and bondholder protection. On top of those, they also
pose a question about the advice of an investment banker and the popularity of convertible
debt at the time. The lower coupon rate compared to straight debt was cited as the primary
motivation for the issuance of convertibles by most of the mangers, while managers in general
oﬀered mixed responses regarding the sale of equity at a premium. The survey is also
the ﬁrst that explicitly asks about the ranking of other ﬁnancing alternatives that were
considered. Managers most often claimed that straight debt was the primary alternative to
convertibles, while equity issuance came second. Billingsley and Smith document a strong
support for Stein’s delayed equity argument, while almost no support for Green’s risk shifting
argument19. Surveyed managers also gave high importance to the window of opportunity for
the issuance of the securities.
Among the questions regarding capital structure, payout policy and capital budgeting
Graham and Harvey (2001) asked the surveyed CFOs speciﬁc questions about convertible
bonds. The questions were aimed at testing the risk estimation models of Brennan and
Schwartz (1977) and Brennan and Schwartz (1988), the risk shifting model of Green (1984)
and the sequential ﬁnancing model of Mayers (1998)20, as well as the delayed equity model
of Stein (1992). Similarly to previous surveys they also ask questions about equity dilu-
tion, lower coupons on convertibles and popularity of convertible securities at the time. 58
17Billingsley and Smith (1996) actually do not mention Green (1984) explicitly, but the question they ask
is a direct test of Green’s risk shifting proposition.
18lower coupon rates versus straight debt, over and undervaluation of stock at the time
19Note that results of the survey also depend on the way questions are asked. In most cases where questions
denote negative meaning, we do not believe that answers are equally truthful as with the other questions.
This might also provide an alternative explanation to ﬁnding no support for certain issues.
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percent of the respondents viewed convertible debt as an inexpensive way to issue delayed
equity, while more than 40 percent of the surveyed CEOs found a lower coupon rate to be an
important motive for the issue of convertible debt. Graham and Harvey ﬁnd support for the
risk estimation argument, since more than 40 percent of those surveyed stated that issuing
convertibles was a way to attract investors unsure about the riskiness of the company. Simi-
larly as in the study of Billingsley and Smith (1996) Graham and Harvey did not document
any support for Green’s risk shifting argument.
The survey by Bancel and Mittoo (2004) encompasses the widest spectrum of theoretical
motivations. Aside from delayed equity, risk shifting motives and the risk estimation mod-
els, they also formulate questions with respect to the signaling model of Constantinides and
Grundy (1989), which is closely related to that of Stein (1992). Bancel and Mittoo also ask
questions about the relationship between a convertible debt issue and rating requirements,
call provisions, dilution concerns, importance of covenants, tax advantage of convertibles21,
reducing the risk of hostile takeover22, popularity of convertible debt at the time and tapping
a group of international investors. They ﬁnd strong support for Stein’s delayed equity argu-
ment, since around 86 percent of respondents state “delayed equity” as the most important
or very important reason for the issue of convertibles. Around 55 percent of respondents
claim that the signaling role of convertibles is an important feature, which gives further sup-
port both to Stein’s and Kim’s (1990) models. Somewhat less support is documented for the
sequential ﬁnancing hypothesis (Mayers 1998), as only about 28 percent of the managers ﬁnd
the call feature of convertibles important and the same percentage claim that they would
force the conversion as and when future investment opportunities occur. Limited support is
shown for the risk estimation (Brennan and Kraus 1987 and Brennan and Schwartz 1988)
motivations for the use of convertible debt, as only about 21 percent of the respondents
claim that the most important reason for the issue of convertibles is to attract investors,
unsure about the risk of the ﬁrm. The same weak support is documented for the tax based
explanation23 (Jalan and Barone-Adesi 1995), while no support is found for Isagawa’s (2002)
managerial entrenchment motivation and Green’s (1984) risk shifting argument.
In the surveys managers were also asked to state and rank the ﬁnancing alternatives to
convertible debt at the time of the issue. These ﬁnancing alternatives range from simple
equity and straight debt to preferred stock (convertible and non-convertible), private place-
ments and synthetic convertible debt (debt with warrants). Bancel and Mittoo (2004) ﬁnd
that for the most of the companies convertible debt is the alternative to straight debt. The
result is somewhat in conﬂict with the responses relating to the question of delayed equity,
21Note that this is implicitly related to Jalan and Barone-Adesi (1995) argument, although Bancel and
Mittoo do not mention them.
22Note that this is implicitly related to the managerial entrenchment motivation by Isagawa (2002), al-
though Bancel and Mittoo do not explicitly relate the survey question to Isagawa’s argument.
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where over 80 percent of the managers ﬁnd that motive to be the most or very important. On
the other hand, this result is in line with the ﬁndings of Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2004)
for the Western European markets, where most of the convertible bonds are structured to
be more debt-like.
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) present a model of window of opportunity for seasoned
equity oﬀerings. They show that negative price reactions in hot equity markets are lower than
in cold equity markets and attribute this diﬀerence in part to reduced levels of informational
asymmetries. The same reasoning could then also be applied to convertible bond issues.
Bancel and Mittoo (2004) surveyed managers on how the market conditions aﬀected their
decision to issue convertibles, by asking them about the importance of the diﬀerent factors
(overvaluation and undervaluation of equity, levels of interest rates, volatility of the stock
market, among others). Most of the respondents claim that high stock market volatility,
which translates into a higher value of the conversion option, and low interest rates were the
key factors that aﬀected the timing of the convertible debt issue.
In Table 2.6 a summary of survey evidence relating to the theoretical motivations for the
use of convertible debt is presented. With respect to practical motivations for the issue of
convertible debt, surveys in general ﬁnd strong to moderate support for both ”cheap” debt
argument and the motivation based on selling the equity at the premium. The importance
of these two arguments, which are most often put forward by practitioners, varies over
time. For example, Hoﬀmeister (1977) notes that the shift he observes from delayed equity
ﬁnancing toward a desire to reduce debt interest cost is consistent with the highest interest
rates experienced in 30 years at the time. Nevertheless, both practical motivations have
remained very important arguments for managers. With respect to theoretical motivations
for the use of convertible debt, all the surveys ﬁnd strong evidence for the delayed equity
motivation. In the latest two surveys some support for the risk estimation argument and the
sequential-ﬁnancing hypothesis is documented, while no support is found for the managerial
entrenchment and risk shifting argument for the use of convertible debt in particular24. The
survey questions do not diﬀer much between (in particular the recent) surveys and aim at
the most direct tests of diﬀerent theoretical motivations for the use of convertible debt.
Although this direct approach is useful for the interpretation of the results, some questions,
which are too direct (for example the question on risk shifting or bondholder expropriation),
might invoke answers that do not reﬂect the true state of aﬀairs. The weakness of more
indirect questions of course is that the results might be subject to diﬀerent interpretations.
24Veld (1994) has done a survey for warrant-bond loans in the Netherlands. His ﬁndings are similar to
those of the studies for convertibles. He ﬁnds support for the practical motives, but not for theoretical
motives, such as for Brennan and Schwartz (1988) and Green (1994). His study does not include questions
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2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have summarized and reviewed the most relevant up to date literature on
the motives for the issuance of convertible debt. The evidence is far from being conclusive
and unanimous as to why companies choose to issue convertible debt and how these motives
aﬀect investor reactions to convertible debt issue announcements. However, there exist some
ﬁndings, which are common to all the empirical research.
First of all, the wealth eﬀects associated with the announcements of the convertible debt
announcements are generally negative and in between those for straight debt and equity. Sec-
ondly, convertible debt can be structured to be either more debt- or equity-like. Convertible
issues that are more equity-like induce stock market responses at the issue announcements
closer to those, documented for equity issues. This is consistent with the adverse selection
model of Myers and Majluf (1984). Thirdly, Stein’s (1992) delayed equity motive, Kim’s
(1990) signaling theory, Mayers’ (1998) sequential- ﬁnancing argument and Green’s (1984)
risk shifting hypothesis are the most investigated theoretical argumentations for the use of
convertible debt versus straight debt and / or equity. The support for the delayed equity
and signaling models found in cross-sectional analyses is corroborated in the surveys. Some
support is documented for the risk shifting hypothesis in the cross-sectional empirical anal-
ysis, but is completely refuted in the surveys. Limited evidence is provided for Brennan and
Kraus (1987) and Brennan and Schwartz (1988) risk estimation explanations, both in cross-
sectional analyses and surveys. Tax based motivation for the use of convertible debt (Jalan
and Barone-Adesi 1995) and Isagawa’s (2002) managerial entrenchment argument have not
been investigated in cross-sectional analyses and surveys yield no support either. Finally, to
a large extent surveys reveal that managers still ﬁnd a lower coupon rate of convertible debt
as an important argument for its issuance, although the importance of this motive varies
over time. Given that convertibles include a conversion feature (that comes at a price), a
view that convertibles are a cheaper source of ﬁnancing than straight debt is deceptive. The
same is true for the practitioners’ view that convertibles provide means of selling the equity
at a premium.
Based on a review on the theoretical and empirical literature on why companies issue
convertible bonds we can conclude that there are large discrepancies between theory and
practice. The practical point of view shows up in surveys among managers that were re-
sponsible for issuing convertible bonds. These surveys show that they base themselves on
irrational motives. The theoretical literature presents a number of rational motives. These
rational motives are conﬁrmed in some of the cross-sectional studies, but they are not con-
ﬁrmed in the survey studies. There are two possible explanations for the diﬀerent outcomes
of the survey and cross-sectional studies. The ﬁrst explanation is that the surveys are sensi-
tive to the question contents. Therefore they may not yield reliable results. It is often argued
that “managers act smarter than they speak”. Therefore they may follow rational motives,28 Why do Companies Issue Convertible Bonds? A Review of Theory and Empirical Evidence
without being aware of this. The second explanation is that the proxies in the cross-sectional
studies may be weak. For example, it is very hard to measure a concept of informational
asymmetry using only stock market and/or accounting data. In our view, future research
in this ﬁeld should aim for an approach that captures the best of both worlds. Such an
approach would ideally combine the diﬀerent techniques in one study. More speciﬁcally,
besides using surveys to ask direct questions, it is also possible to use them to ﬁnd proxies
for variables that are used in cross-sectional studies. This approach was used before by De
Jong and Van Dijk (2003) in a study on the capital structure of Dutch companies, and by
De Jong, Van Dijk, and Veld (2003) in a study on the dividend and share buy-back policies
of Canadian ﬁrms. We believe that such an approach may bridge the gap between theory
and practice.2.A. Tables 29
2.A Tables
Table 2.1: Number of convertible bond issues in diﬀerent regions and countries
Number of convertible bond issues in diﬀerent regions and countries in the period 1990-2003; source of the
data: SDC New Issues database
Region / Country Number of issues Percent of all issues




The Netherlands 152 2.1%
US 2166 30.0%
Canada 280 3.9%
Asia (All) 2967 41.2%
Hong Kong 110 1.5%
Japan 1632 22.6%
Taiwan 185 2.6%
South Korea 827 11.5%
Australia 235 3.3%
Rest of the World 535 7.4%
World (Total) 7208 100.0%30 Why do Companies Issue Convertible Bonds? A Review of Theory and Empirical Evidence
Table 2.2: Yearly breakdown of the number of convertible bond issues
Yearly breakdown of the number of convertible bond issues in the period 1990-2003; source of the data: SDC
New Issues database
















Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics of the issue sizes in diﬀerent countries and the Global market in the period 1990-2003.
The values are in millions of US dollars, except for N (number of issues) and CV (coeﬃcient of variation);
source of the data: SDC New Issues database.
Country Mean Median Min. Max. Std. dev. N CV
UK 324.66 159.50 23.40 2026.80 433.10 141 1.33
France 404.61 245.70 2.40 3097.20 481.16 215 1.19
Germany 149.84 56.40 3.90 5096.30 436.68 154 2.91
The Netherlands 368.25 200.90 0.30 2908.30 506.99 151 1.38
US 237.55 135.00 0.10 4500.00 331.71 2162 1.40
Canada 122.85 87.80 0.10 1500.00 167.92 236 1.37
Hong Kong 181.91 115.00 0.40 2500.00 342.48 109 1.88
Japan 116.36 65.80 0.10 2851.80 188.49 1632 1.62
Taiwan 124.65 100.00 13.20 700.00 100.25 185 0.80
South Korea 34.45 12.50 0.20 1317.80 91.38 804 2.65
Australia 93.65 8.50 0.10 1500.00 183.41 221 1.96
World(Total) 175.46 85.40 0.00 5096.30 307.55 7074 1.752.A. Tables 31
Table 2.4: Studies of wealth eﬀects associated with convertible debt issue an-
nouncements
CAAR denotes Cumulative Average Abnormal Return
Study Period Sample size CAAR (-1,0) (%) CAAR (0,1) (%)
U.S. domestic market
Dann and Mikkelson (1984) 1970-1979 132 -2.31 *** -
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) 1972-1982 33 -1.97 *** -
Eckbo (1986) 1964-1981 75 -1.25 *** -
Hansen and Crutchley (1990) 1975-1982 67 -1.45 *** -
Long and Sefcik (1990) 1965-1984 134 -0.61 *** -
Billingsley, Lamy and Smith (1990) 1971-1986 104 -2.04 *** -
Kim and Stulz (1992) 1970-1984 259 -1.66 *** -
Davidson III, Glascock and Schwarz (1995) 1980-1985 146 -1.40 *** -
Jen, Choi and Lee (1997) 1976-1985 158 -2.15 *** -
Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (1999) 1977-1984 203 -1.51 ** -
Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (2003) 1978-1992 588 -1.09 NA -
Arshanpalli, Fabozzi, Switzer and Gosselin (2004) 1993-2001 229 -3.07 *** -1.92 ***
Weighted average (sample sizes are weights) -1.63
Japanese domestic market
Kang and Stulz (1996) 1985-1991 561 0.83 *** 1.05 ***
Christensen, Faria, Kwok and Bremer (1996) 1984-1991 35 0.60 -
Taiwanese market
Chang, Chen and Liu (2004) 1990-1999 109 0.42 -
Australian market
Magennis, Watts and Wright (1998) 1986-1995 45 -1.08 ** -
Dutch market
De Roon and Veld (1998) 1976-1996 47 0.63 ** 0.54 NA
UK market
Abhyankar and Dunning (1999) 1982-1996 129 -1.20 *** -
French market
Burlacu (2000) 1981-1998 141 -0.20 *** -
Western European markets
Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2004) 1990-2002 222 -1.18 *** -1.42 ***
German and Swiss markets
Ammann, Fehr and Seiz (2004) 1996-2003 55 -0.18 -1.36 **
*** - denotes signiﬁcance at 1% level
** - denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Why do Companies Issue Convertible
Bond Loans? An Empirical Analysis
for the Canadian Market
3.1 Introduction
A question that receives considerable attention in the theoretical as well as the empirical
corporate ﬁnance literature is why companies issue convertible debt. While practitioners put
forward notions such as delayed equity, lower coupon rate and “sweetening” of deals that are
otherwise hard to sell1, academics have proposed theories that relate the use of convertible
debt to informational asymmetries (Brennan and Kraus, 1987, Brennan and Schwartz, 1988,
Kim, 1990, and Stein, 1992), agency issues (Green, 1984, Mayers, 1998, and Isagawa, 2000)
and tax motives (Jalan and Barone-Adesi, 1995). These theories in general suggest that
companies that face high debt- and/or equity-related agency costs could beneﬁt from issuing
convertible debt as opposed to other “straight” means of ﬁnancing. Prime candidates for
issuing convertible debt are companies for which straight debt or equity does not provide
the most eﬃcient way of ﬁnancing. These include companies to which one of the following
problems applies: diﬃculty in estimating risk, possession of ample growth opportunities,
high costs of ﬁnancial distress, ﬁnancial constraints, and/or high agency costs.
A convertible bond, from now on to be referred to as a convertible, is a bond that can
be exchanged for a predetermined ﬁxed number of “new” shares of the issuing company
1See, for example, surveys of managers by:
- Billingsley and Smith (1996) (for the U.S. market)
- Graham and Harvey (2001) (for the U.S. market)
- Bancel and Mittoo (2004) (for the European markets).36 Why do Companies Issue Convertible Bond Loans? An Empirical Analysis for the Canadian Market
within a predetermined period of time. In essence, a convertible is a package consisting
of a straight bond and warrants written on the issuing company stock.2 Empirically it is
well documented that diﬀerent security types induce diﬀerent wealth eﬀects at the time of
their announcements. For example, seasoned equity oﬀerings induce the strongest negative
wealth eﬀects (see, e.g., Masulis and Korwar, 1986, Mikkelson and Partch, 1986, and Asquith
and Mullins, 1986) of between -2.5 and -4.5 percent, while straight debt issues induce only
slightly (often insigniﬁcant) negative wealth eﬀects (see, e.g., Dann and Mikkelson, 1984,
and Eckbo, 1986). Given the hybrid character of convertibles, we can expect that the size
of the wealth eﬀects associated with the announcements of convertible security oﬀerings will
be between those for straight debt and equity.
Previous studies on stock market reactions to the announcements of convertible debt
issues in the U.S. market document signiﬁcant negative eﬀects of convertible debt announce-
ments in the range between -1 to -3 percent.3 Other studies on Anglo-Saxon markets ﬁnd
similar results. That is, Magennis, Watts and Wright (1998) and Abhyankar and Dunning
(1999) ﬁnd signiﬁcantly negative eﬀects for the Australian and the UK markets respectively.
Outside the Anglo-Saxon markets, the empirical evidence has been somewhat less conclu-
sive. Burlacu (2000), Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2006), Ammann, Fehr and Seiz (2006)
ﬁnd similar eﬀects for France, Western European markets, and Germany and Switzerland
respectively. However, results for other markets go in the opposite direction. More speciﬁ-
cally, Kang and Stulz (1996), and Christensen, Faria, Kwok, and Bremer (1996) ﬁnd positive
eﬀects for the Japanese market; Chang, Chen, and Liu (2004) ﬁnd positive (insigniﬁcant)
eﬀects for the Taiwanese market; and De Roon and Veld (1998) ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive
eﬀect for the Dutch market. The hybrid nature of convertibles and the institutional and
regulatory diﬀerences among countries and markets seem to be the driving force of the di-
vergence. This makes the analysis one of the more interesting ﬁelds in empirical corporate
ﬁnance today, since convertible debt can be structured to be either more debt- or equity-like
as to mitigate some of the risks and deﬁciencies associated with each of “plain” securities.
Following Lewis et al. (1999), Burlacu (2000), and Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2006),
we estimate the structure of the convertible debt design (i.e. how debt- or equity-like it is) by
employing the delta measure. The delta measure relates the price sensitivity of a convertible
to the underlying equity, and takes values between 0 and 1. A value closer to 1 suggests that
the convertible is more equity-like, since the probability of conversion is higher. In addition
we use the equity-to-debt component ratio as an alternative measure of the convertible
2Given that the exercise price is “paid” by redeeming the bonds, convertible bonds are in fact warrants
with a variable exercise price.
3These studies include Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Lewis, Rogalski and
Seward (1999, 2003), and Arshanapalli, Fabozzi, Switzer, and Gosselin (2004). See Table 12.4 of Loncarski,
ter Horst and Veld (2006) for a complete overview of studies on wealth eﬀects associated with convertible
debt issue announcements.3.1. Introduction 37
debt design, since the delta measure only captures the value of the equity component of a
convertible. We estimate the equity and debt components by using the valuation approach
proposed by Tsiveriotis and Fernandes (1998). Note that issuers of convertibles that are
more equity-like are hypothesized to be more adversely aﬀected by equity-related costs,
while debt-like issuers are hypothesized to be more negatively aﬀected by debt-related costs.
According to adverse selection models on capital structure (e.g. Myers and Majluf, 1984), we
expect that more debt-like oﬀerings are associated with less negative abnormal returns and
more equity-like oﬀerings with more negative abnormal returns. Moreover, we do not expect
more debt-like convertible oﬀerings to be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by equity-related agency costs
and more equity-like convertible oﬀerings by debt-related agency costs.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. The ﬁrst objective is to provide further evidence
on the market reactions to convertible debt oﬀerings by studying the Canadian market.
Although the Canadian market shares many of its design features with its U.S. counterpart,
closer scrutiny reveals some diﬀerences. First of all, the Canadian market is much smaller
than the U.S. market. Secondly, investment (income) trusts have become a very popular
mean of business organization after 2000 due to very favorable tax treatment.4 This study
therefore adds to the literature on the use of convertible debt. The convertible bonds issues
by income trusts are diﬀerent from those issued by regular companies in the sense that the
income trusts’ convertibles are more debt-like, while the regular companies issue more equity-
like convertibles. Therefore, the existence of income trusts allows us to study convertible
debt design in more detail.
The second objective is to examine the nature and determinants of the size of the wealth
eﬀect with respect to issuer characteristics and to relate these ﬁndings to theories about
motives for the use of convertible debt. We examine the inﬂuence of several issuer character-
istics on announcement reactions in the Canadian market for the period between 1991 and
2004. To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst study that examines the wealth eﬀects
associated with convertible debt issues in the Canadian market.
Our empirical ﬁndings are mostly in line with the seminal work of Myers and Majluf
(1984) on external ﬁnancing and the role of informational asymmetry. As in the U.S.,
the event study analysis shows that wealth eﬀects associated with the announcements of
Canadian convertibles oﬀerings yield signiﬁcantly negative abnormal returns of about -2.7%.
The analysis shows that this is to be attributed to the more equity-like nature of most of the
convertibles issued in the Canadian market in the period under consideration, in particular
before 2000. After 2000 most of the issues are made by income trusts and are very much
4Note that the Canadian government already has or is about to sidestep this regulation due to heavy tax
losses. Although income trusts have been around for more than 20 years, they were initially designed for
mature industries with steady cash ﬂows. However, lately the conversions of all sorts of business into income
trusts have grown out of proportions (see for example The Economist, June 22, 2005: Canada’s income
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debt-like in nature. The result is robust using diﬀerent convertible bond design measures.
With respect to the ﬁrm-speciﬁc determinants of announcement price reactions, we ﬁnd
that the abnormal returns are to be driven by factors related to equity-like features of
convertible debt. Debt-related costs, as proxied by interest coverage and leverage, do not have
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the market valuation. On the other hand, equity-related costs, proxied by
the stock price run-up (overvaluation issue) in particular, have a negative market valuation
eﬀect. Firms with higher dividend yields are mostly found to have higher cumulative average
abnormal returns related to the announcement of the convertible oﬀerings, as the dividend
payout serves as a disciplining device that lowers equity-related agency costs. Our results
appear to be robust across diﬀerent speciﬁcations, i.e. when we control for the stated use of
the proceeds (acquisitions, capital expenditures or reﬁnancing) and the design of convertibles
(debt- versus equity-like). These ﬁndings are in line with the theories that relate the use
of convertible debt to mitigate diﬀerent aspects of informational asymmetries, in particular
those related to the agency costs of equity (Stein, 1992 and Mayers, 1998). We do not ﬁnd
support for tax arguments for the use of convertible debt.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section reviews the
theoretical models yielding the testable hypotheses for our study. Section 3.3 describes the
sample, provides some summary statistics, and discusses the methodology. In Section 3.4 we
present the empirical results on the announcement returns and their determinants. Section
3.5 gives the conclusion.
3.2 Shareholder Reactions to Convertible Debt An-
nouncements
3.2.1 Wealth Eﬀects Associated with the Announcements of Con-
vertible Debt Oﬀerings
A general explanation of why investors react negatively to security oﬀerings follows from the
informational asymmetry between managers and the market with respect to value of assets
in place and/or future growth opportunities. In this respect, security oﬀerings are viewed as
special examples of the lemons problem presented by Akerlof (1970). The models of Myers
and Majluf (1984) and Miller and Rock (1985) can be viewed as speciﬁc applications of
the lemons problem. According to these models, when a company issues risky securities,
investors will demand a discount on the security price in order to be compensated for a
potential overvaluation of the ﬁrm. Therefore, the announcements of convertible issues are
predicted to have a negative impact on the issuer’s stock price.
From the results of previous studies it appears that the abnormal returns may be driven
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Canada and the U.K. have well-developed ﬁnancial markets and open corporations with
widely dispersed share ownership. On the other hand, network-oriented systems, including
those in Japan, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands have strong banks with large
share ownership and a greater role in monitoring. In the market-based systems it is ex-
pected that managers are more likely to act in the interest of existing shareholders, and
informational asymmetries may be larger. It follows from Myers and Majluf’s (1984) ad-
verse selection model that in these systems the market reaction to convertible debt issues
may be less favourable. In the network-oriented systems, where managers are more likely to
be entrenched given their institutional settings, the Myers and Majluf model may not hold.
A second explanation for negative stock returns at the announcement of convertible
debt issues attributes these returns at least in part to systematic underpricing of public
oﬀerings. If public oﬀerings are underpriced, then wealth is transferred from the ﬁrm’s
current stockholders to the purchasers of the underpriced securities. Evidence of underpricing
for convertibles at the issue date is reported by Loncarski, ter Horst and Veld (2007a) for the
Canadian market and Kang and Lee (1996) and Chan and Chen (2005) for the U.S. market.
Moreover, Loncarski et al. show that more equity-like convertibles are more underpriced
at the issuance date than more debt-like convertibles. This implies that a more negative
market response can be expected for announcements of the issuance of equity-like convertibles
compared to debt-like convertibles.
Given the adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf (1984) and the underpricing of
convertibles we test the following hypothesis regarding the wealth eﬀects associated with the
announcements of convertible debt oﬀerings.
H1: The market valuation eﬀect will be more negative for equity-like convertibles than for
debt-like convertibles.
3.2.2 Determinants of the Size of Wealth Eﬀects
The eﬀect of issuer characteristics on the size of the wealth eﬀect associated with the an-
nouncements of convertible debt oﬀerings can, in general, be separated according to the
dominating nature of the convertible issue (debt- versus equity-likeness) and related to the
motives for issuing such security. Convertible debt is a particularly useful ﬁnancing instru-
ment in cases where informational asymmetries and market imperfections make the use of
straight debt or equity more costly or even impossible.
Agency Costs of Debt
As Brennan and Schwartz (1988) and Brennan and Kraus (1987) show, convertible debt
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place. According to these explanations, convertible debt represents an alternative to straight
debt, which would be very costly and/or diﬃcult to issue. Green (1984) also considers
convertible debt as a resolution to the agency conﬂict between bondholders and shareholders,
where shareholders may be inclined to expropriate debt-holders by substituting less risky
investment policies for riskier ones due to their limited liability in a standard debt contract.
Since convertible debt can be turned into equity at the discretion of bondholders, it alleviates
the risk shifting problem and can therefore be viewed as a substitute for straight debt.
When treated as a substitute for straight debt, the information signalling model of Ross
(1977) suggests that the issuance of debt securities conveys favorable information to the
market. A manager of a successful ﬁrm may choose to increase leverage to send positive
signals to the market about the future performance of the ﬁrm;5 unsuccessful ﬁrms cannot
mimic these signals because they have insuﬃcient earnings to meet the debt payments. On
the other hand, Myers (1977) demonstrates the opposite – ﬁrms with a higher share of
growth opportunities with respect to the current value of the ﬁrm issue less debt. In the
spirit of Myers, increases in leverage can be interpreted as a worse signal about future growth
opportunities of the company.
From the debt perspective, the eﬀect of convertible debt issuance on leverage is not
obvious since it has both debt-like and equity-like components, if we analyze the entire
sample of convertible issues. However, for more debt-like convertibles, the level of debt-
related costs at the ﬁrm level should have a negative impact on the price response. This
leads to Hypothesis 2:
H2: Agency costs of debt will have a negative eﬀect on the market valuation for the more
debt-like convertibles and a non-negative eﬀect for the more equity-like convertibles
Firms are expected to face high debt-related costs when their ﬁnancial leverage is high and
earnings are not suﬃciently adequate to service the interest payments, since these factors
increase the risk of ﬁnancial distress and the threat of bankruptcy. With respect to debt-
related costs we test the following two sub-hypotheses, where we take leverage and the
Times-Interest-Earned (interest coverage) ratio as proxy measures for the level of debt and
the risk of ﬁnancial distress.
H2a: Higher ﬁnancial leverage negatively aﬀects the market valuation, in particular for more
debt-like convertibles.
5Here, it is assumed that manager’s compensation policy includes a penalty in cases of bankruptcy, which
makes the signal costly for the sender (manager). In reality this is usually the case, as managers lose their
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H2b: Interest coverage positively aﬀects the market valuation.
Agency Costs of Equity
From the equity component perspective, Kim (1990) and Stein (1992) argue that convert-
ibles are delayed equity and are used to signal the quality of the ﬁrm in the framework
of informational asymmetry. This is consistent with the adverse selection model of Myers
and Majluf (1984), where conventional equity issues are unattractive due to high issue costs
and dilution. Kim demonstrates that the conversion ratio serves as a credible signal of a
company’s future earnings. Stein argues that good quality ﬁrms issue debt, while medium
quality ﬁrms diﬀerentiate themselves from bad quality ﬁrms by issuing convertibles. If the
nature of a convertible issue is more equity-like, the equity-related adverse selection costs
should negatively aﬀect the price reaction to convertible debt oﬀerings. We therefore postu-
late the following hypothesis:
H3: Agency costs of equity will have a negative eﬀect on the market valuation for the more
equity-like convertibles and a non-negative eﬀect for the more debt-like convertibles.
If the nature of a convertible issue is more equity-like, the equity-related adverse selection
costs should negatively aﬀect the price reaction to convertible debt oﬀerings. Lucas and Mc-
Donald (1990) show why equity issues on average are preceded by positive abnormal returns.
However, in line with the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984), costs associated
with issuing equity should be higher for companies with larger stock price run-ups, since
they are more likely to be overvalued.
H3a: A period of positive abnormal returns preceding the announcement date negatively af-
fects the market valuation.
Another aspect of the issuer’s characteristics is related to the equity-like nature of convert-
ibles: the free cash ﬂow. Jensen (1986) points to the adverse eﬀect of free cash ﬂow on the
value for shareholders, in particular for low growth ﬁrms. He proposes debt to be a better
control or bonding device for managers than payout policy, as company’s future payouts
can be changed, while debt has to be repaid. Nevertheless, it has been documented that
reductions in dividends are associated with negative wealth eﬀects for shareholders, and
managers try to avoid negative changes in payout policy. This is especially the case if their
compensation schemes are related to shareholder value creation. Therefore payout policy has
a disciplining function for managers to act in shareholders’ best interests. We therefore test
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cost of equity).
H3b: Higher free cash ﬂow negatively aﬀects the market valuation.
H3c: Dividends payments positively aﬀect the market valuation.
Tax Motivation
Jalan and Barone-Adesi (1995) consider convertibles as delayed equity ﬁnancing, and moti-
vate their use with the diﬀerent tax treatment of coupon interest and dividend payments in
a setting with market frictions and incompleteness. In such a setting, issuing convertibles
increases the residual equity value of the ﬁrm, since the ﬁrm beneﬁts from the tax shield as
opposed to up-front equity ﬁnancing. The cooperative game, and the fact that ﬁrms have
repeated need for the ﬁnancial markets, assures that both ﬁrms and investors have an in-
centive to use convertibles and share their beneﬁts. Compared to straight debt, convertibles
oﬀer much less trade-oﬀ between interest tax shields and cost of ﬁnancial distress. In case of
straight bonds, higher interest tax shields are only achievable through higher indebtedness,
which increases the probability of ﬁnancial distress. On the other hand, convertibles oﬀer the
beneﬁt of interest tax shields. However, they give a smaller probability of ﬁnancial distress.6
We expect a positive eﬀect of the tax burden (marginal tax rate) on the size of abnormal
returns, especially in case of more equity-like convertibles, implying some evidence on the
tax motive argument. We therefore test the following hypothesis.
H4: Income taxes positively aﬀect the market valuation, in particular for more equity-like
convertibles.
Other Observations
From the reasoning so far it follows that price reactions to convertible debt announcements
should be negatively inﬂuenced by both debt- and equity-related agency costs, since con-
vertible debt encompasses both debt-like and equity-like components. We consider three
additional factors that inﬂuence both debt- and equity-related costs.
First, both debt-related costs (e.g. risk uncertainty and ﬁnancial distress costs) and
equity-related adverse selection costs should be lower for larger companies. Larger ﬁrms
tend to be more familiar to the market, lowering its respective issuing costs because less
information search and processing costs are required. On the other hand, the size of the
company increases the complexity and analysis, so that the larger company might actually
6A direct test of this tax motivated argument for the issue of convertible debt is also related to calls of
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be more opaque. Size, therefore, does not necessarily translate into a smaller adverse selection
problem. We therefore use the size of the ﬁrm as a control variable, but do not have any
a priori expectation about the direction of the eﬀect. The size of the company captures
complex interactions between diﬀerent issuer characteristics.
Secondly, De Jong and Veld (2001) argue that the problem of perceived overvaluation
will be worse for ﬁrms with suﬃcient slack in the form of liquid assets. The reason for this
is that slack provides an alternative source for ﬁnancing of new projects and thus enhances
the potential agency problem (overinvestment) between managers and shareholders. This
negative impact should be more pronounced for equity-like convertibles. It is not likely to
be detected in the overall sample of convertibles, since its role should be less strong for
more debt-like convertibles. However, there is also the opposite potential impact of slack. It
can be viewed as a build-up of internally generated and needed funds for increased capital
expenditures, when the external sources of ﬁnancing are very costly (i.e. along the lines of
the pecking-order theory of capital structure). This is in particular the case for companies
with higher risk and larger growth opportunities (more equity-like issuers). We therefore
include slack in our cross-sectional analysis without hypothesizing its overall eﬀect on the
valuation, since it does not only have a negative eﬀect of increased agency cost of equity,
but also a positive eﬀect of internal (less expensive) build-up of funds. In addition, slack
can also be viewed as collateral, in which case it should have a positive eﬀect on valuation
in case of debt-like convertibles, where it mitigates agency costs of debt.
Thirdly, a ﬁrm with good growth opportunities should face reduced debt- and equity-
related agency costs. De Jong and Veld (2001) argue that expectations in the market regard-
ing the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm’s projects reduce the potential for both the asset substitution
problems and adverse selection problems described earlier.
Finally, we investigate the eﬀect of the stated use of the proceeds. In the oﬀering prospec-
tuses, ﬁrms state the purposes for which the proceeds will be used, such as ﬁnancing acqui-
sitions, reﬁnancing debt, capital and general expenditures.
3.3 Data and Methodology
3.3.1 Sample Selection
The sample consists of convertibles issued between January 1991 and December 2004 by
Canadian companies that were listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. During that period
there were 207 convertible bond issues in total. We excluded issues made by ﬁnancial com-
panies (SIC division H - Finance, Insurance and Real Estate), and were left with 149 issues
by non-ﬁnancial companies. Data on announcement dates and other features of the convert-
ible bond issues were obtained from the SDC database and checked against press releases44 Why do Companies Issue Convertible Bond Loans? An Empirical Analysis for the Canadian Market
in Lexis-Nexis, Canadian newswires, company web sites and the SEDAR7 database. For 26
issues in our ﬁnal sample, we have found discrepancies in the announcement dates. In those
cases we used the earliest announcement date that we could ﬁnd. The criteria for an issue
to be included in our sample were:
- The announcement date had to be veriﬁable through a source other than SDC.
- The issuing ﬁrm’s stock price data had to be available in DataStream.
- The issuing ﬁrm’s accounting data had to be available in DataStream.
- The announcement should not confound with other corporate announcements.
- The conversion option relates to the equity of the issuing company (no exchangeable
bonds).8
- The issues of the same issuer had to be at least 120 trading days apart in order for the
estimation and event periods for diﬀerent issuers not to overlap.
Given the criteria, the initial 149 issues by non-ﬁnancial companies ﬁrst shrink to 129
due to stock price data availability, and further down to 107 issues due to accounting data
availability. Of those 107 issues, we could not verify the announcement date for 10 of them; 4
were exchangeable bonds (their conversion price relates to other than the underlying equity);
3 were too close together with the previous issues of the same issuer, causing an overlap of
event periods; and 4 were joined together with the convertible bond issues (by the same
issuer) announced on the same or the previous day. This means that our ﬁnal sample
consists of 86 bond issues oﬀered by 77 diﬀerent companies. The breakdown of issues over
the years is shown in Table 3.1.
<Insert Table 3.1 here>
From the table it appears that around 48 percent of the issues in our sample were oﬀered
after the end of 2000. This is approximately comparable with the issue year breakdown of
all the 136 non-ﬁnancial companies’ issues in the period, with somewhat better coverage
in the sample towards the end of the sample period due to scarce data availability for the
beginning of the 1990s. Oﬀerings seem to exhibit some bunching, with hot periods being
1993-1994 and the end of the 1990s onwards.
7SEDAR stands for “System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval” and is a service of CSA
(Canadian Securities Administration) providing public securities ﬁlings. (http://www.sedar.com/)
8An exchangeable bond may be converted into existing shares of the same or an alternative company. It
is much like a convertible, except that in a convertible the bond may be converted into new shares.3.3. Data and Methodology 45
3.3.2 Event Study Methodology
We use standard event study methodology to estimate the wealth eﬀects associated with
the announcement of convertible debt oﬀerings. To estimate the parameters of the market
model we use the Standard & Poor’s TSX (Toronto Stock Exchange) value-weighted total
return index to compute the market return. This is widely considered as the benchmark
for Canadian equities as it accounts for more than 200 stocks listed on the TSX or about
70% of the total market capitalization. The estimation period ranges from day -120 to day
-20 relative to the announcement date of the oﬀering. There is no signiﬁcant clustering of
the announcement dates of the oﬀerings, so residuals in the market model regressions for
individual issuers are not likely to be correlated.
3.3.3 Proxies
The variables that are used in the analysis are related to the hypotheses described in Section
3.2.
Leverage. Leverage (LEV) is measured as the ratio between total debt and total assets.
Times-Interest-Earned. The Times-Interest-Earned ratio (TIE) is a measure that is often
employed in practice, in particular in restrictive covenants that govern typical debt contracts.
It is deﬁned as EBIT (Earnings Before Income and Taxes) over interest expense. Slack.
SLACK is measured as the ratio of cash and equivalents over total assets. Free cash ﬂow.
Free cash ﬂow (FCFA) is measured as the ratio of free cash ﬂow (net income plus depreciation
minus capital expenditures) over total assets. Dividend yield. The dividend yield (DY) is
measured as the average dividend yield between (-15, -5) days relative to the announcement
date. Tax burden. The tax burden (TAXA) is measured as a ratio of income taxes over
total assets. Growth opportunities. Growth opportunities are measured using Tobin’s Q
(Q).9 The nominator of this ratio is computed as the sum of market value of equity (measured
as the average between (-15,-5) days relative to the announcement date), long term and short
term debt. The denominator is calculated as the book value of total assets. Size of the
ﬁrm. We have added a control variable for ﬁrm size, i.e. the natural logarithm of ﬁrm size
(LNTA). Size of the issue proceeds. We deﬁne the size of the issue proceeds relatively
9There is a possibility that Tobin’s Q-measure might be biased towards older and more mature ﬁrms.
However, the industrial composition of our sample (not reported in the chapter) suggests that the vast
majority of ﬁrms are from industries that are either not mature or from industries where the nature of
the business (natural resources) make the use of the Q-measure more viable. We have done a robustness
check using an estimated growth rate of sales (based on the three year growth rate of sales prior to the
announcement of the issue) instead of the Q-measure and it did not aﬀect the results. Similarly, we explored
use of other measure that can capture debt and equity related agency costs (intangible and tangible assets
for example). The use of these additional variables did not change our main results, but it did further reduce
our sample size, since the values for these variables were missing for several issuers. Therefore, we did not
include these variables in our ﬁnal analysis. The results are available from the authors upon a request.46 Why do Companies Issue Convertible Bond Loans? An Empirical Analysis for the Canadian Market
to the book value of equity (RISSEQ). This variable captures both the dilution eﬀect and
proxies for the agency cost of equity - higher relative issue proceeds indicate higher agency
costs of equity. Use of proceeds. Based on the stated use of proceeds, we deﬁne three
dummy variables that we use in the analysis: M&ADUM takes a value of 1 if issuer stated to
use the proceeds for acquisitions and 0 otherwise, REFDUM takes a value of 1 if issuer stated
to use the proceeds for reﬁnancing and 0 otherwise and CGXDUM is a dummy variable with
a value 1 if the issuer states to use the proceeds for capital and general expenditures and 0
otherwise.
Measurement of the Convertible Debt Design
The most diﬃcult variable to proxy is the measurement of the equity component of convert-
ible debt. As previously shown and used in the literature (see, e.g., Lewis et al., 1999 or
Burlacu, 2000), diﬀerent approaches can be used to determine the size of the equity compo-
nent embedded in a convertible bond design. Following Lewis et al. (1999), Burlacu, (2000)
and Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2006), we estimate the structure of the convertible debt
design (i.e. how debt- or equity-like it is) by employing the delta measure. The delta is
derived from the option pricing model of Black and Scholes (1973), adjusted for continuous
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where S is the current price of the underlying stock, K is the conversion price, δ is the con-
tinuously compounded dividend yield, r is the continuously compounded yield on a selected
“risk-free” bond, σ is the annualized stock return volatility, T is the maturity of the bond
and N(.) is the cumulative standard normal probability distribution. The delta measure
always takes a value between 0 and 1. Values closer to 1 indicate a high sensitivity of the
convertible bond value to the underlying equity (stock) value, implying a high probability
of conversion. As a proxy for the risk-free rate we use the yield of a Canadian government
benchmark bond of the closest matching maturity rounded upwards. For the stock price
volatility measure we use the annualized volatility of stock returns as estimated over the
period (-120,-20) relative to the announcement date of the oﬀering. In order to diﬀerentiate
between equity- and debt-like convertibles we use a delta cut-oﬀ value of 0.5. We will denote
the sub-sample with a delta smaller than 0.5 as more debt-like, while the sub-sample with
a delta greater than (or equal) 0.5 will be referred to as the more equity-like sample. For
comparison, Burlacu (2000) denotes convertibles with delta values below 0.33 as debt-like
and those with delta values above 0.66 as equity-like. Lewis et al. (2003) use cut-oﬀ values
for delta of 0.4 and 0.6 for classifying bonds as either debt or equity-like. Dutordoir and Van
de Gucht (2006) use the median delta value as a split for this classiﬁcation.3.4. Results and Analysis 47
The delta measure only captures the equity component of a convertible. It does not take
into account the credit quality and other important characteristics of convertibles such as
callability, putability, and early conversion. We therefore also use two alternative measures
for the size of the equity component relative to the size of the debt component in convertible
debt.10 The ratio of equity to straight debt component value of the convertible
bond (ED measure) is estimated using the convertible debt valuation approach proposed
by Tsiveriotis and Fernandes (1998). This ratio accounts for diﬀerent credit qualities among
issuers and other important features of convertibles.11 We estimate the model price of the
convertible bond at the issue, where the price is the sum of equity (value of the conversion
right) and straight debt component. We use values of ED greater than 1 as the reference
for the more equity-like convertibles, and values of ED lower than 1 as the reference for the
more debt-like convertibles.
Finally, we also compute a simple ratio of conversion value to the par value of the
convertible bond (M measure) - “moneyness”. This is deﬁned as the conversion value
at the announcement of the bond issue (CR · S0, where CR represents conversion ratio and
S0 represents the stock price at the announcement of the bond issue) over the par value of
the convertible bond.
3.4 Results and Analysis
3.4.1 Wealth Eﬀects Associated With the Announcement Dates
of Convertible Debt Oﬀerings
In Table 3.2 we present the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) as well as
tests for Hypothesis 1 regarding the wealth eﬀects associated with the announcements of the
convertible debt oﬀerings.
In Panel A of the table the results for the total sample are presented. CAARs are
signiﬁcantly negative over diﬀerent event windows for the total sample. In particular, the
eﬀect for the event window (-1,1) is a signiﬁcantly negative -2.7%. These results are in line
with the results from previous studies, in particular those for the U.S. market. Panels B and
C of Table 3.2 report the CAAR for the sub-samples with a value of the delta measure above
0.5 and below 0.5 respectively. The ﬁrst interesting result is the comparison of wealth eﬀects
for the sub-samples in the event window (-10, -2), where the CAAR of 2.24% is signiﬁcantly
positive for more equity-like convertibles (delta above 0.5), and signiﬁcantly negative (-
10Other measures that are available are the ratio between the conversion price and the stock price
(Kuhlman and Radcliﬀe, 1992) and the expected time for the conversion option to become “in the money”
(Davidson, Glascock and Schwartz, 1995). These measures can both be used to estimate the size of the
equity component.
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0.77%) for the more debt-like convertibles (delta below 0.5). The diﬀerence between the two
values is also signiﬁcant, which implies that prior to the announcement of the issue, more
equity-like issuers experience a signiﬁcant stock price run-up. This suggests that issuers try to
time their announcements after periods of favorable stock price movements. It also suggests
that the market is more likely to perceive the more equity-like issuers as overvalued at the
announcement dates of the convertible debt oﬀerings in our sample, given the prior streak of
positive abnormal returns. Therefore they react more negatively to the announcement. The
most negative CAAR for the more equity-like issuers are in the event window (0,20) with
a signiﬁcantly negative -6.32%, while more debt-like issuers do not experience signiﬁcant
wealth eﬀects during that period.
Based on the results in Table 3.2 we conclude that wealth eﬀects associated with the
announcements of convertible bond oﬀerings are signiﬁcantly more negative for the more
equity-like convertible issues than for the more debt-like issues.12 This conﬁrms Hypothesis
1.
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the CAARs over the event window (-20, 20) for the
total sample as well as for the two sub-samples with a delta measure above or below 0.5. A
striking result is that the wealth eﬀect continues to grow negatively after the announcement
date. For the total sample, we ﬁnd a CAAR of -1.35% at the announcement of the issue,
while over the event window (-1,2) the CAAR drops to -2.87% and continues to fall to -
4.62% over the event window (0,20). From the analysis of the two sub-samples it appears
that the more debt-like convertible issues (delta below 0.5) experience negative abnormal
returns somewhat prior to the announcement, i.e. -0.77% over the event window (-10,-2),
and this rebounds after the announcement of the oﬀering to around 0. Conversely, the
more equity-like convertible issues (delta above 0.5) exhibit a signiﬁcantly positive abnormal
return reaction prior to the issue announcement (2.24% in the event window -10,-2), but this
becomes signiﬁcantly negative after the announcement by decreasing to around -4% over the
event window (-1,2) and even further to -6.32% over the event window (0,20). Loncarski, ter
Horst and Veld (2007a) analyze convertible arbitrage in the Canadian market and show that
short positions in stock of equity-like convertible bond issuers increase signiﬁcantly more
immediately following the announcement of the issue than short positions in stock of debt-
like convertible bond issuers. They demonstrate that the increase in the short positions is
negatively correlated with the abnormal returns between the announcement and the issue
date of the bond.
12The ﬁndings in Table 3.2 are conﬁrmed using non-parametric test results as well. The Wilcoxon signed
rank test, which tests the diﬀerence in sums of ranks of the mean adjusted CAAR above and below medium,
gives signiﬁcant diﬀerences. These diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant for diﬀerent event windows (up to
20 trading days) following the announcement date. A similar result, using the diﬀerence in means between
Panels B and C in Table 3.2 is obtained using the non-parametric Kruskall-Wallis test for the equality of
subpopulations. These results are available on request from the authors.3.4. Results and Analysis 49
3.4.2 Convertible Bond Design
We classify convertible debt into more equity and more debt-like using three diﬀerent mea-
sures. Although somewhat problematic and questionable, the delta measure has been exten-
sively used in previous studies. In order to be able to compare the design of convertible debt
in the Canadian market with other markets (other studies) we use the delta measure as well.
In contrast to the studies for other markets (Dutordoir and Van de Gucht, 2006, for example,
ﬁnd convertible bonds in the Western European markets to be more debt-like than in the
U.S. market; Lewis et al. 1999 on the other hand report an almost normal distribution of
the delta for the U.S. market) we ﬁnd a bimodal distribution of the delta of the convertible
bond issues. We ﬁnd that prior to 2000 convertible debt issues in the Canadian market were
mostly equity-like (value of the delta>0.5). After 2000 most of the convertible bond issues
become debt-like with very low values of the delta. This change coincides with the increas-
ing popularity of conversion of businesses into income trusts. These are specially designed
ﬁnancing vehicles, where the trust is positioned as an immediate full owner of a typically
mature business. The cash ﬂows from the ultimate operating company, which the trust
owns, are usually fully distributed to the trust and then passed on to unit holders (owners
of the income trust) as dividends. Since the trust accrues no tax payments, investors then
(depending on the tax status of their investment) either pay no or lower taxes as they would
otherwise. The main beneﬁt of the income trust is therefore tax driven. Income trusts have
become very popular in the Canadian market after 2000. Jog and Wang (2004) report that
the number of income trust IPOs has grown from 9 in 1998 to 64 and 36 in 2002 and 2003
respectively, with the highest increase in the number of business trusts.
Contrary to the ﬁndings based on the delta we ﬁnd normal distributions of the ED and
M measures with strong asymmetry towards high values (more equity-like convertible debt
design).
3.4.3 Issue and Issuer Characteristics
In order to explore the characteristics of the issues and the issuing companies we examine
some descriptive statistics for the total sample and the two sub-samples according to the
delta measure. Selected descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.3.
In Panel A of the table we ﬁrst investigate the diﬀerences between debt- and equity-like
convertibles split based on the delta measure. From the diﬀerences in Panel A of the table it
appears that the more debt-like convertible issues have signiﬁcantly lower conversion premi-
ums (ratio between conversion price and stock price at the announcement date of the issue)
and shorter maturities than more equity-like convertibles, i.e. a conversion premium of 1.090
versus 1.233, and a maturity of 6.4 years versus 9.9 years. A signiﬁcantly lower conversion
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for the more debt-like convertibles should be higher than for the equity-like convertible, since
the probability of conversion should be lower. This is correctly reﬂected in a signiﬁcantly
lower maturity and also in the lower volatility (0.205 for more debt-like convertibles versus
0.484 for more equity-like). This can be explained in terms of time varying elements (con-
version price, maturity, volatility, dividend yield) that aﬀect the value of the delta measure.
Most of the debt-like issues in our sample occur towards the end of our sample period, while
the opposite is true for the more equity-like issues.
We have shown in Section 3.2 that issuers of the more equity-like convertibles experience
signiﬁcantly positive abnormal returns prior to the announcement of the issue, while those of
more debt-like convertibles experience signiﬁcantly negative CAARs. The same conclusion
can be inferred from Table 3.3, as the stock price run-up over the period (-10,-2) days prior
to the announcement is signiﬁcantly larger by 3 percentage points for the more equity-like
issuers.
Both types of issuers seem to have similar leverage on average (0.254 for the more equity-
like versus 0.218 for the more debt-like). The diﬀerence between interest coverage capacities
is not signiﬁcant.
There is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the Q-ratios of the equity-like
and the debt-like issues. The equity-like issues do seem to be accompanied by more risk,
as indicated by a higher volatility of respectively 48% versus 21% (annually). Note that
issuers of equity-like convertibles are characterized as those that might have wanted to issue
equity, but due to adverse selection and agency problems this would have been too costly or
impossible.
The level of slack is signiﬁcantly higher for the equity-like convertibles (8.5% of the
total assets versus 2.4% of the total assets for debt-like issuers). The dividend yield is also
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the issuers of the more equity-like and those of more debt-like
convertibles. While the issuers of debt-like convertibles have an average dividend yield of
around 12%, the issuers of equity-like convertibles have a signiﬁcantly lower dividend yield
of 0.6%. More equity-like issuers also have, on average, negative free cash ﬂow relative to
the total assets (-6.9% of the total assets), while the free cash ﬂow for the more debt-like
issuers is, on average, positive (1.6% of the total assets). This implies that, given the costly
external ﬁnance, more equity-like issuers seem to be more ﬁnancially constrained than more
debt-like convertible bond issuers.
In Panel B of Table 3.3 we explore diﬀerences between more debt- and more equity-like
convertibles where we split the convertibles based on the alternative measure of convertible
bond design - the equity-to-debt component ratio (ED). The results are similar as in Panel
A, except that statistical signiﬁcance for some of the diﬀerences changes. The ﬁndings here
suggest that equity-like issuers (ED > 1) have signiﬁcantly lower dividend yield, have more
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riskier. In Panel A only the delta measure signiﬁcantly diﬀers (by construction of the two
sub-samples) between the two sub-samples. However, in Panel B we observe that all three
measures of the convertible bond design - the delta (∆i), the ED measure and the simple
moneyness (M measure), signiﬁcantly diﬀer between debt- and equity-like convertibles. The
delta is, as expected, signiﬁcantly higher for the equity-like convertibles (0.755) than for
debt-like convertibles (0.371). Similar is the case of ED measure (6.095 versus 0.597). The
simple ratio of conversion value to par value of the bond (M) similarly shows that equity-like
convertibles are in the money at the issue (1.097), while the debt-like convertibles are not
(0.880). This suggests that the ED measure might be somewhat superior at capturing the
design of a convertible bond, but on the other hand the delta does provide similar results.
Overall, the more equity-like convertible issuers have more slack and lower free cash ﬂow.
Lower free cash ﬂow does imply that equity-like convertible bond issuers are more ﬁnancially
constrained than the issuers of debt-like convertibles. However, issuers of the equity-like
convertibles have signiﬁcantly higher slack than the issuers of debt-like convertibles, which
mitigates the problem of the ﬁnancial constraint. The issuers of equity-like convertibles also
have lower dividend yield and are riskier than the more debt-like convertible issuers. This is
in line with many previous ﬁndings (see for example Lewis et al., 1999; Jen et al., 1997) on
the characteristics of convertible debt issuers.
3.4.4 Cross-sectional Analysis of Determinants of the Size of the
Wealth Eﬀect
Analysis of the Total Sample, Convertible Debt Design and the Eﬀect of Income
Trust Business Design
In order to examine the impact on the size of the wealth eﬀect due to the implicit design of
convertibles (e.g. delta and the alternative measure of the convertible debt structure) and
the issuer characteristics associated with debt- and equity-related agency costs, we perform
a number of cross sectional regressions. The dependent variable is the cumulative average
abnormal return (CAAR) in the event window (-1,1) in all models we consider. In Table
3.4 we present the results based on the total sample. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation we test our
hypotheses regarding the eﬀects of debt-related agency costs (Hypothesis 2), equity-related
agency costs (Hypothesis 3), the eﬀect of the tax burden (Hypothesis 4) and the eﬀect of
some other determinants for the total sample of convertible debt issues.
Based on the results of the ﬁrst regression speciﬁcation in Table 3.413, we do not ﬁnd
support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. Leverage (LEV) has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the market
valuation in any of the speciﬁcations. The same holds for the proxy for Times-Interest-
13Note that the number of observations is less than 86 (initial sample) due to either missing accounting
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Earned (TIE). Hypothesis 3a is conﬁrmed, because we see that the market valuation is
worse after a period of signiﬁcant stock price run-up (a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient of
-0.3339). This implies that an increase in cumulative abnormal stock returns in the event
window (-10,-2) of 3 percent decreases the announcement related CAAR by 1 percentage
point. This conﬁrms the hypothesis that investors are more concerned with overvaluation
when the announcement of the issue is preceded by a streak of positive abnormal stock
returns. Next, we ﬁnd that the level of slack signiﬁcantly positively aﬀects CAAR. The
coeﬃcient of 0.1812 implies that an increase in slack of 10 percentage points increases the
CAAR related to the announcement of the issue by 1.8 percent. As mentioned earlier, this
result suggests that slack can be viewed as a build-up of internally generated funds. These
are particularly important when the external sources of ﬁnancing are very costly. Judging
by our results, this eﬀect dominates the eﬀect of the high agency costs of slack capital. We
expected the market valuation eﬀect to be less favorable when the issuing ﬁrm has more free
cash ﬂow (Hypothesis 3b). However, even though we ﬁnd the expected negative sign for the
coeﬃcient, it is not signiﬁcant. Therefore we cannot conﬁrm Hypothesis 3b. The coeﬃcient
for the payout proxy variable is a signiﬁcantly positive 0.3059. This implies that an increase
in dividend yield by 1 percentage point has, on average, a positive eﬀect on the CAAR at
the announcement of convertible debt oﬀering of around 0.3 percent, all else being equal.
This yields support for Hypothesis 3c and is in line with the disciplining role of the payout
policy. On the other hand, it could also account for the fact that dividend-paying companies
are usually mature and less risky companies. The more direct eﬀect of the disciplining role
of dividend payments needs to be explored on the subset of more equity-like convertible debt
issuers, where the agency costs of equity are assumed to be more important. The coeﬃcients
for growth opportunities (Q) and relative issue size (RISSEQ) do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
market valuation.
In the second speciﬁcation in Table 3.4, we additionally include a taxation proxy in the
cross sectional regression to test for the eﬀect of income taxes on the wealth eﬀect. While
other coeﬃcients remain practically unchanged, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of taxes on the
wealth eﬀect associated with the announcement of the convertible debt oﬀering. We therefore
ﬁnd no support for Hypothesis 4.
Note that an analysis for the total sample is not the most appropriate, since the design of
the convertible has to be taken into account as we argued in Section 3.2.2. We therefore also
estimate the third speciﬁcation in Table 3.4, where we include a control variable for implicit
issue characteristics by adding the delta measure as an explanatory variable. The delta
measure reﬂects how debt- or equity-like the convertible issue is, and therefore it captures
the issue characteristics comprehensively. Since a value of delta closer to 1 indicates a more
equity-like convertible issue, we expect to ﬁnd a negative relationship between the size of
the wealth eﬀect and the value of delta. The results of the third speciﬁcation in Table 3.43.4. Results and Analysis 53
are very similar to those in speciﬁcations 1 and 2. The eﬀect of delta on CAAR is not
signiﬁcant. In speciﬁcation 4 in Table 3.4 we include ED variable to account for the design
of a convertible bond (instead of the delta measure). We observe that ED has an expected
negative eﬀect (coeﬃcient of -0.0008) - more equity-like convertible issuers experience more
negative CAAR. However, the eﬀect is only marginally signiﬁcant, both in statistical and
economical terms. The results of speciﬁcations 3 and 4 suggest that issuer characteristics
and convertible bond design seem to be closely related, as there is no signiﬁcant additional
information in the measures of convertible debt design that aﬀects market valuation beyond
the issuers characteristics.
Given the speciﬁc role and organizational design of income trusts, we investigate the
impact of such business design on the size of the wealth eﬀect controlling for the convertible
debt design, measured both with delta and the ED measure. The results are presented in
columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.4. As can be observed, we were not able to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant
eﬀects and other results remain virtually unchanged.
The overall results suggest that perceived overvaluation (stock price runup), slack and
dividend yield signiﬁcantly aﬀect the size of the wealth eﬀect. The overvaluation is the most
robust result, as it persists even when controlling for a convertible bond design.
Agency Costs of Debt and Equity versus Convertible Debt Design
In order to test hypotheses related to impact of debt-related and equity-related costs on
the size of wealth eﬀects, we estimate the regressions separately for two sub-samples split
according to implicit issue characteristics (the delta and/or the ED measure). In Panel A of
Table 3.5 we present the estimation results of these two speciﬁcations for the two sub-samples
split by the cut-oﬀ value of 0.5 for the delta measure.14
Note that convertible issues with a value of delta below 0.5 are denoted as more debt-like,
while those with a value of delta above 0.5 are identiﬁed as more equity-like. We expect
that debt-related costs will have a market valuation impact for more debt-like convertibles,
and equity-related costs will have a valuation eﬀect for more equity-like convertibles. As the
results of the ﬁrst speciﬁcation (∆i < 0.5) in Panel A of Table 3.5 show, we do not ﬁnd
evidence that leverage has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the excess returns. This means that, just
like in Table 3.4, we do not ﬁnd any evidence to support Hypothesis 2a. The interest coverage
has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on CAAR (column 1) of more debt-like convertible bond
issuers. This can be interpreted as an evidence to support Hypothesis 2b. The economic
signiﬁcance of the eﬀect of interest coverage seems to be rather small, but given the very
high variation in the TIE ratio (between around -2 to around 40 for debt-like convertible
issues), the coeﬃcient of 0.0013 suggests that an increase in TIE of 8 leads to the increase in
14Note that the number of observations is less than 86 (initial sample) due to missing accounting items or
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CAAR of around 1 percent, all else being equal. We ﬁnd a positive, but not signiﬁcant eﬀect
of free cash ﬂow. Thus we are not able to conﬁrm Hypothesis 3c. Growth opportunities have
a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on CAAR (coeﬃcient of -0.0364), where an increase in the
Q-ratio of 0.3 leads to approximately 1 percent decrease in CAAR. Company size also has a
signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on CAAR. Although the negative eﬀect of growth opportunities
seems somewhat surprising, it is also possible to think of the Q-ratio as a proxy for the risk
of the company. This might lead to diﬃculties in risk estimation such that larger issuers
with higher growth opportunities (in the universe of more debt-like convertible issues) are
perceived to be riskier. A somewhat striking result is the signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of the
size of the issuing company on CAAR (coeﬃcient of -0.0360). As stated earlier, ﬁrm size
might not only mitigate adverse selection and agency problems, but could actually make
them more acute since the opaqueness can also increase with the size. To sum up, we ﬁnd
support for one of the hypotheses relating to the eﬀect of debt-related agency costs on the
wealth eﬀects associated with the announcement of convertible debt oﬀerings for the sub-
sample of debt-like convertibles, while equity-related agency costs do not adversely aﬀect the
valuation in this case. We do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect of tax burden on the valuation
(Hypothesis 4).
The second speciﬁcation (∆i > 0.5) in Panel A of Table 3.5 relates to the sub-sample of
more equity-like convertible bond issues. Here, we ﬁnd that proxies relating to the agency
cost of equity signiﬁcantly aﬀect the wealth eﬀects at the announcement of convertible debt
issues. More speciﬁcally, the prior stock price run-up negatively aﬀects the valuation, as
there is more concern about the potential overvaluation of the equity. As in Table 3.4, this
result can be interpreted as a conﬁrmation of Hypothesis 3a. The coeﬃcient for SPRUN
of -0.3407 suggests that a 5 percent positive cumulative average abnormal return in a ten
day period prior to the announcement of the issue leads to a negative -1.7 percent CAAR
following the announcement. Again, as in Table 3.4, we ﬁnd a marginally signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect of slack (coeﬃcient of 0.2011) on the valuation. As discussed previously, this conﬁrms
that the overall eﬀect of slack is positive, or, put diﬀerently, the ﬂexibility beneﬁts of such
“buﬀer” funds in the case of costly external ﬁnancing outweigh the agency cost of slack.
With respect to the taxation proxy, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the valuation in the
case of more equity-like convertible issues, again leading to the conclusion that Hypothesis
4 can not be conﬁrmed.
In Panel B of Table 3.5, we redo the sub-sample analysis for more debt-like versus more
equity-like convertibles using the alternative measure of equity-to-debt component of con-
vertible bond (ED). The results for the more equity-like convertibles (ED > 1) are partly
similar in terms of statistical and economic signiﬁcance as in the case of sub-sample analysis
based on delta measure in Panel A. One diﬀerence is the eﬀect of slack, which is now not
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positive (a coeﬃcient of 0.6200), giving support to Hypothesis 3c. This suggests that in the
case of equity-like convertibles, an increase in dividend yield of 0.01 leads to an increase in
CAAR of around 0.62 percentage points, all else being equal. Contrary to the results in
Panel A, the results for the sub-sample of the more debt-like convertibles, as deﬁned with
the value of ED below the value of 1, yield no support to Hypothesis 2. Summarizing, the
sub-sample analysis based on an alternative measure of convertible security design (equity-
to-debt component value) gives partly similar results regarding the eﬀect of the agency costs
of equity, but does not provide any conclusive evidence regarding the eﬀect of the agency
costs of debt.
De Jong and Veld (2001) argue that the proﬁtability of the projects reduces the potential
for asset substitution problems and adverse selection. In order to examine the eﬀect of the
stated use of the proceeds of the convertible issue on the wealth eﬀect, we estimate a speci-
ﬁcation where we include dummy variables for Merger & Acquisitions (M&A), Reﬁnancing,
and Capital Expenditure (CAPX) or General Expenditure (GENX).15 In Panel C of Table
3.5 we present the estimation results16 for the total sample of convertible debt issues over the
period 1991 - 2004. First, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the stated use of proceeds on
the valuation, as coeﬃcients for all dummy variables relating to the stated use of proceeds
are not signiﬁcant. Secondly, the eﬀect of other issuer characteristics on the wealth eﬀects
remains in line with the results from Table 3.4. We conclude that use of proceeds does not
seem to aﬀect the abnormal returns.
3.4.5 Relationship Between the Results and the Motives for the
Use of Convertible Debt
In Table 3.6 we present the summary of hypotheses and the results. Although convertibles
are hybrid securities that share characteristics of both equity and straight debt, they can
nevertheless be classiﬁed according to their speciﬁc debt- or equity-like nature.
Results for the total sample suggest that the agency costs of debt do not have any
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the CAAR around the announcement of the convertible bond issue (H2
is not conﬁrmed). On the other hand, agency costs of equity seem to have a negative
eﬀect (H3a always conﬁrmed and H3c mostly conﬁrmed), especially the degree of potential
overvaluation (stock price run-up prior to the announcement).
Moreover, similar is the case when we take into account the hybrid nature of convertibles
and split the sample into more debt- and more equity-like convertibles. Results based on such
classiﬁcation suggest that the agency costs of debt have no eﬀect on wealth eﬀects of debt-like
convertible issuers (H2a not conﬁrmed and H2b mostly not conﬁrmed), while no signiﬁcant
15Note that the number of observations is less than 86 (initial sample) due to missing accounting items or
delta measures for some issues.
16If issuers stated more potential uses of proceeds, we recorded the ﬁrst use stated as predominant.56 Why do Companies Issue Convertible Bond Loans? An Empirical Analysis for the Canadian Market
eﬀect of debt-related costs is found in case of equity-like convertibles. The opposite holds for
the agency costs of equity (H3a conﬁrmed and H3c mostly conﬁrmed). If we only focus on
the immediate wealth eﬀect of the announcement of the convertible debt issue as opposed
to issuing either straight debt or equity, the following can be argued. Issuers of equity-like
convertibles are better oﬀ issuing convertible debt than equity. The reason for this is that
the wealth eﬀects associated with the announcement of the convertible debt are negatively
aﬀected with the agency costs of equity. This implies that in such a setting convertible debt,
which is not 100% equity (lower agency costs of equity) can be seen as a good substitute
for equity. It creates a less negative response from the market as the debt-like feature acts
either as a commitment or as a controlling device reducing the impact of the agency costs
of equity. This lends support to the motives for the use of convertible debt as proposed by
Stein (1992) and Mayers (1998).
For issuers of debt-like convertibles, Green (1984) suggests that convertibles help resolve
the risk substitution threat faced by debtholders. This threat is increasing in the alignment
of incentives between managers and shareholders, since agency costs of equity are minimized
at the expense of agency costs of debt. We do not ﬁnd direct and strong evidence to argue in
favor of this theory. However, we ﬁnd that in the case of debt-like convertibles some proxies
for agency costs of equity aﬀect the wealth eﬀects in an opposite way as hypothesized for
equity-like convertibles. The regression results for the debt-like convertibles in column 1 in
panel A of Table 3.5 show that the free cash ﬂow and the dividend yield have opposite (albeit
not signiﬁcant) eﬀects on the valuation as in the case of equity-like convertibles (column 4
of the same table). This suggests that the lower agency costs of equity might have actually
negative valuation eﬀect in the case of debt-like convertibles. From such a perspective
an issue of straight debt would have been more desirable, as there would be no dilution
and no residual claims. This gives some (albeit indirect) support to Greens “risk shifting”
argument, as investors negatively perceive the issue of a security that reduces agency costs
of debt (mitigates incentive conﬂict between shareholders and holders of straight debt).
We ﬁnd no evidence for the tax hypothesis relating to the beneﬁts of the use of convertible
debt as opposed to the use of equity (Jalan and Barone-Adesi, 1995).
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we analyze the size and determinants of wealth eﬀects associated with the
announcements of convertible debt oﬀerings on the Canadian market in the period between
1991 and 2004.
Similarly to previous research for other markets, in particular the U.S., we ﬁnd a sig-
niﬁcant negative wealth eﬀect associated with the announcement date of convertible debt
oﬀerings. This eﬀect is signiﬁcantly more negative for equity-like convertibles than for debt-3.5. Conclusion 57
like. Contrary to the results for the U.S. market we ﬁnd the distribution of the delta (a
measure which reﬂects convertible bond design) to be bimodal. Canadian companies started
issuing predominantly debt-like convertibles after 2000. This switch coincides with the in-
creased popularity of conversions of the businesses into income trusts.
We ﬁnd support for the hypotheses related to the negative impact of equity-related agency
costs on the size of the wealth eﬀect. In particular, we ﬁnd that the determinants of the size
of the wealth eﬀects reﬂect the hybrid nature of convertible debt, where convertible debt
issues can be structured to be either more debt- or equity-like. More speciﬁcally, we show
that proxies for agency costs of equity negatively aﬀect abnormal returns associated with
the issue of more equity-like convertibles, while they do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect wealth eﬀects
associated with the more debt-like convertible issues. The opposite holds for the agency costs
of debt, albeit the evidence is much weaker then in the case of equity-related agency costs.
The results are robust according to diﬀerent speciﬁcations and use of diﬀerent measures to
classify convertible bond issues into more debt- or more equity-like. After controlling for
convertible debt design we ﬁnd no evidence that income trusts as particular organizational
structure aﬀect these results.
Relating the determinants of the wealth eﬀects to the motives for the use of convertible
debt we ﬁnd evidence that convertibles in the Canadian market used to be mostly a substitute
for equity (as proposed by Stein, 1992), but were also used as a sequential ﬁnancing device,
where the straight debt nature of the convertible is used as a commitment device for managers
(Mayers, 1998). Lately however, when convertible issues in Canada shifted towards more
debt-like design, the role of convertibles has become less clear.58 Why do Companies Issue Convertible Bond Loans? An Empirical Analysis for the Canadian Market
3.A Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Breakdown of convertible debt issues according to year of the issue
Distribution of non-ﬁnancial Canadian companies that announced a convertible bond loan in the period from
January 1991 to December 2004 by announcement year. The announcements are identiﬁed from the SDC
database. Announcements are eliminated for the following reasons (1) no stock and / or accounting data
available; (2) non-veriﬁable announcement dates; (3) non-standard convertible bonds; (4) issuance dates
overlap or are very close to issuance dates of other securities.
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Table 3.5: OLS regressions of abnormal returns at the announcement date of
convertible debt oﬀering on issue and issuer characteristics for split samples
Dependent variable is the cumulative average abnormal return in the event window (-1,-1) around the convertible debt oﬀering
announcement. Cumulative average abnormal returns are for the sample of 86 convertible bond announcements by Canadian
companies from January 1991 to December 2004. The convertible bond announcements are identiﬁed from the SDC database.
Abnormal returns are based on the market model, estimated over a 100-day period for each company (from day -120 to day -20).
LEV is computed as the ratio between total debt and total assets. TIE is the Times-Interest-Earned ratio. This is deﬁned as
EBIT (Earnings Before Income and Taxes) over interest expense. SLACK is the ratio of cash and equivalents over total assets.
SPRUN is the cumulative average abnormal stock return measured over the window (-10,-2) relative to the announcement date.
FCFA is the ratio of free cash ﬂow (net income + depreciation - capital expenditures) over the total assets. DY is the dividend
yield. Q is the Tobin’s Q-ratio measured as (market value of equity measured as average between (-15,-5) days relative to the
announcement date + book value of long and short term debt) over the book value of total assets. TAXA is the ratio of income
taxes over total assets. LNTA is the natural logarithm of total assets. RISSEQ is the ratio of the issue proceeds over the book
value of equity. ∆ is a measure of the sensitivity of the value of convertible bond with respect to the value of the underlying
equity. This measure is calculated using the option pricing model of Black and Scholes corrected for continuous dividend
payments (see Equation 3.1). ED is the equity-to-debt component ratio based on the Tsiveriotis and Fernandes convertible
bond valuation model. M is the “moneyness” measure deﬁned as a ratio between conversion value at the announcement of the
convertible bond issue and the par value of the bond. DMA is a dummy variable with a value 1 if the issuer stated to use the
proceeds for acquisitions and 0 otherwise. DREF is a dummy variable with a value 1 if the issuer stated to use the proceeds for
reﬁnancing and 0 otherwise. DCGX is a dummy variable with value 1 if the issuer stated states to use the proceeds for capital
and general expenditures and 0 otherwise. All the standard errors are White heteroscedasticity corrected. Under the null of
the F-test all the bj are equal to 0.
* - denotes signiﬁcance at below 10% level, ** - denotes signiﬁcance at below 5% level and *** - denotes signiﬁcance at below
1% level
Panel A: Delta split
∆i < 0.5 ∆i > 0.5
Variable bj t bj t
LEV -0.0559 -0.92 -0.0045 -0.15
TIE 0.0013 2.46 ** -0.0001 -0.39
SLACK 0.0970 0.69 0.2011 1.91 *
SPRUN -0.0271 -0.19 -0.3407 -2.22 **
FCFA 0.1455 1.26 -0.0836 -1.35
DY -0.0516 -0.44 0.6603 0.56
Q -0.0364 -2.39 ** -0.0075 -1.12
TAXA 0.0445 0.12 -0.0782 -0.10
LNTA -0.0360 -3.96 *** -0.0002 -0.04
RISSEQ 0.0139 0.46 0.0160 1.16
intercept 0.5283 4.00 *** -0.0454 -0.53
n 20 56
Adj. R2 0.537 0.276
F-test ** **64 Why do Companies Issue Convertible Bond Loans? An Empirical Analysis for the Canadian Market
Panel B: Equity-to-debt component split
ED < 1 ED > 1
Variable bj t bj t
LEV 0.0014 0.03 0.0461 0.78
TIE 0.0010 1.23 -0.0001 -0.01
SLACK 0.1030 0.84 0.2575 1.49
SPRUN -0.0959 -0.54 -0.4156 -2.27 **
FCFA 0.0416 0.44 -0.1448 -1.54
DY 0.2908 1.60 0.6200 1.97 **
Q -0.0177 -0.81 -0.0016 -0.16
TAXA -0.2806 -0.49 -0.1014 -0.08
LNTA 0.0074 0.46 0.0006 0.07
RISSEQ 0.0616 0.90 0.0066 0.33
intercept -0.1406 -0.63 -0.0798 -0.56
n 26 39
Adj. R2 0.188 0.306
F-test **





SLACK 0.1906 2.13 **
SPRUN -0.3211 -2.21 **
FCFA -0.0474 -0.98
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Figure 3.1: Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR)
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for the total and two sub-samples split according to the
value of the delta over the event window (-20, 20)



















































Δi < 0.5Chapter 4
Determinants of Public Financing
Choice
4.1 Introduction
The security issuance decision is essentially a capital structure decision - an increase or a
decrease of the leverage of a ﬁrm. Leverage increasing actions refer to the issue of straight
debt, convertible debt or a share repurchase1. On the other hand, leverage decreasing actions
refer to the issuance of equity, but also to some extent to the issuance of convertible debt.
Diﬀerent explanations have been put forward in the literature as to how and when managers
decide to increase or decrease the leverage of a ﬁrm, and empirical tests on these theories
have yielded mixed results. The pecking-order model (Myers and Majluf, 1984) argues that
due to informational asymmetries diﬀerent ﬁnancing options bear diﬀerent ﬁnancing costs
and ﬁrms will prefer ﬂexibility in ﬁnancing. They will only issue the “costliest” security
(equity) when ultimately needed - i.e. when ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained. Previous
research, conducted for the US and the UK markets (see for example Bayless and Chaplinsky,
1991; Hovakimian, Opler and Titman, 2001), mostly ﬁnds that equity is preferred over
debt by smaller and riskier companies, those with better growth opportunities and lower
leverage and less proﬁtable ones, consistent with pecking-order. Related to capital structure
theories Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) demonstrate support for the pecking-order theory.
However, the pecking-order is refuted in other research (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2003; Leary
and Roberts, 2005; Helwege and Liang, 1996). According to the market timing model
managers are able to time the market and issue equity when the ﬁrm’s stock is overvalued and
retire equity when undervalued. Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) ﬁnd evidence inconsistent with
market timing, while a growing body of papers show that ﬁrms time the market with equity
1Convertible debt is a mixture of straight debt and equity. The debtness depends on the characteristics
of the issue and on the evolution of the share price after convertible debt issue.68 Determinants of Public Financing Choice
issues (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Gomes and Philips, 2005). More recently, Dittmar
and Thakor (2007) argue that ﬁrms issue equity when the agreement between insiders and
outsiders is high, regardless of the ﬁrm’s valuation.
In this chapter we revisit some of the security issuance theories using a sample of Canadian
ﬁrms that repurchase shares, issue equity, debt, and convertibles between 1998 and 2004. We
test the three aforementioned theories of ﬁrms’ public ﬁnancing choice / capital structure
- market timing, pecking-order and the agreement between insiders and outsiders. Market
timing is particularly interesting, since most previous research ﬁnds stock price run-ups prior
to the announcement of equity issues, but subsequently fails to provide conclusive evidence
that managers time the market. We therefore look at pre- and post-announcement period
excess returns in relationship with market-to-book values to shed more light on the issue.
Tests of the pecking-order theory provide mixed answers as well. We use a comprehensive
measure of ﬁnancial constraint - the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index - to examine if at least
some ﬁrms are forced into issuing equity, a result that is consistent with the pecking-order
model of the preference for ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. Finally, a recently proposed explanation
(Dittmar and Thakor, 2007) of the agreement between insiders and outsiders as the motive
for issuing equity is examined. In addition to the investigation of the issuance theories, we
compare determinants of the choice between convertible debt, straight debt and equity in
order to revisit motives for issuing convertible debt compared to straight debt or equity.
We ﬁnd strong and consistent evidence that equity overvaluation leads companies to
choose equity over debt issuance. Firms with high prior stock returns and high market-
to-book ratios tend to issue equity rather than debt, and equity issuers tend to earn lower
post-issue returns than debt issuers. Strikingly, among equity issuers, overvalued ﬁrms as
measured by the market-to-book ratio, earn signiﬁcantly lower returns in the three months
after the issuance, despite the less negative returns during the initial announcement period.
Overall, these results give support to the market timing argument for issuing equity, con-
sistent with previous ﬁndings on market timing (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Gomes and
Philips, 2005), but in contrast to Jung et al. (1996) who reject market timing on the basis
of the ﬁnding that high market-to-book equity issuers earn higher announcement returns.
Our long-run returns evidence indicates that investors tend to mis-react on the initial eq-
uity issuance announcement, but this misreaction is corrected in the months following the
issuance.
To test the pecking-order hypothesis of security issuance, we relate the issuance decision
to the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index of ﬁnancial constraints. Strikingly, we ﬁnd that accord-
ing to the KZ index straight debt issuers are on average more ﬁnancially constrained than
equity issuers. However, after controlling for the size of the issuer we ﬁnd evidence that
ﬁrms with high KZ index are more likely to issue equity. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the smallest
equity issuers are less ﬁnancially constrained than the largest ones, but are more overvalued.4.2. Capital Structure Theories and the Security Issuance Choice 69
This implies a dual nature of equity issuers, where smaller equity issuers time the market,
while the largest ones seem more prone to “pecking-order” behavior.
We ﬁnd no evidence that companies issue equity when the agreement between outside
investors and insiders is high (Dittmar and Thakor, 2007). On the contrary, we ﬁnd that
the probability of issuing equity increases in the level of “disagreement”, as proxied by the
discrepancy between actual and forecast earnings or dispersion of analyst forecasts. Since
these proxies are also measures of information asymmetry, our results are inconsistent with
ﬁndings based on US studies that ﬁrms with high levels of information asymmetry tend to
issue debt to avoid high informational costs. At the very least, our evidence suggests that the
conclusion that ﬁrms with high levels of information asymmetry or disagreement between
insiders and outsiders prefer equity issuance is not robust to diﬀerent capital markets.
Finally, we ﬁnd convertible debt to represent the alternative to straight debt and be used
to ”sweeten” a debt issue. However, some ﬁndings on the agency costs of convertible debt
issuers are also consistent with the sequential ﬁnancing motive for the use of convertible debt
(Mayers, 1998).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we discuss related
research, present capital structure theories and relate them to hypotheses that we test. In
Section 4.3 we describe proxies that we use to test the hypotheses and describe construction
of the data. In Section 4.4 we present sample characteristics, explore the diﬀerences between
diﬀerent security issue types and investigate market timing, pecking-order and agreement
theories of capital structure individually. In Section 4.5 we proceed with the analysis of
the relationship between the security issuance choice and capital structure theories in a
mulitinomial choice setting. Section 4.6 discusses a dual nature of equity issuers. Section
4.7 concludes.
4.2 Capital Structure Theories and the Security Is-
suance Choice
4.2.1 Previous Research
Previous research has found that equity oﬀers coincide with high market valuations of equity
(see for example Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Jung et al., 1996; Hovakimian et al., 2001).
Two thirds of CFOs surveyed by Graham and Harvey (2001) claim that undervaluation
(overvaluation) of equity was one of the most important considerations in their decision to
issue equity. Baker and Wurgler (2002) show that past market valuations have strong and
persistent eﬀect on capital structure or, in other words, managers try to time the market.
Firms raise equity when the cost of equity is “unusually low” or market-to-book values (if
considered as proxy for misvaluation) are extremely high. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1991)70 Determinants of Public Financing Choice
show that ﬁrms issue equity in periods of reduced information asymmetry in the markets,
when the announcement period excess returns are less negative (hot equity markets). They
also ﬁnd that higher risk and larger ﬁrms prefer issuing equity over straight debt. Gomes
and Philips (2005) ﬁnd strong evidence for the market timing hypothesis. The probability of
issuing equity increases with stock price returns prior to the announcement compared to the
benchmark portfolio. Moreover, they show that market timing is a particular characteristic
of public equity markets.
According to the pecking-order model (Myers and Majluf, 1984) diﬀerent ﬁnancing op-
tions bear diﬀerent ﬁnancing costs due to informational asymmetries and ﬁrms will prefer
ﬂexibility in ﬁnancing. A broad deﬁnition assumes that ﬁrms will only issue the “costli-
est” security (equity) when ultimately needed - i.e. when ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained.
Previous research, conducted for the US and the UK markets (see for example Bayless and
Chaplinsky, 1991; Hovakimian et al., 2001), mostly ﬁnds that equity is preferred over debt
by smaller and riskier companies, those with better growth opportunities and lower leverage
and less proﬁtable ones, consistent with pecking-order. Related to capital structure the-
ories Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) demonstrate support for the pecking-order theory.
However, the pecking-order is refuted in other research. Frank and Goyal (2003) do ﬁnd
some evidence that large ﬁrms exhibit “pecking-order” behavior, but overall evidence goes
against it. Fama and French (2005) show that equity issues are very frequent and typically
not a result of a “duress”. Gomes and Philips (2005) investigate the private versus public
security decision and subsequent security type choice. They ﬁnd that the probability of
issuing securities in the private market increases in the degree of informational asymmetry.
For securities issued in the public market they ﬁnd support for the pecking-order theory of
capital structure, as the probability of issuing equity decreases for ﬁrms with high degrees
of informational asymmetry. The opposite holds for ﬁrms that issue debt.
Jung et al. (1996) use the security issue choice to test three theories of capital structure
on a sample of US ﬁrms in the period 1977 to 1984: Myers’ and Majluf’s (1984) pecking-
order model, the agency model and market timing model. The agency model refers to the
agency cost of equity, which is mitigated with the use of debt. Debt serves as a disciplining
device that lowers free cash ﬂows and managerial discretion. Although the “timing model”
is inherent in both the pecking-order and the agency model, Jung et al. investigate whether
timing is of the ﬁrst order importance in the security decision process. They ﬁnd bond (debt)
issuers to be signiﬁcantly larger companies that pay more dividends, have less leverage, lower
market-to-book ratios and have not experienced positive stock price run-ups during the 11
months prior to the announcement. Companies with better growth opportunities (measured
by the market-to-book ratio) and better cumulative excess stock performance in the past
are signiﬁcantly more likely to issue equity. Jung et al. conclude that their ﬁndings support
the agency model, since they ﬁnd some evidence against the pecking-order model - some4.2. Capital Structure Theories and the Security Issuance Choice 71
ﬁrms issue equity against their type. Moreover, they argue that no evidence is found for the
market timing explanation of capital structure, since the announcement date excess returns
are more negative for lower market-to-book ratios or less overvalued ﬁrms.
Boot and Thakor (2003) argue that ﬁrms value ﬂexibility. They deﬁne ﬂexibility as
the ability to take action that one (manager) thinks is the best even when others (group
of investors) disagree. Flexibility depends on how the ﬁrm is ﬁnanced, where ﬂexibility
increases from the debt to equity spectrum. Boot and Thakor argue that ﬁrms trade the
ﬂexibility provided by issuing equity against debt tax shield. The main implication of their
idea is that ﬁrms issue equity when stock prices are high and issue debt when stock prices
are low.
Dittmar and Thakor (2007) provide an additional explanation on why (when) ﬁrms issue
equity. They argue that companies issue equity when agreement between managers and
outside investors is high. This is typically the case in periods of high equity valuation (high
stock prices). The main implication of Dittmar’s and Thakor’s argument is that companies
will issue equity when agreement with outsiders is high, regardless of the valuation of a
company. This is in some contrast to market timing and pecking-order hypotheses that
predict equity issues in times of high stock prices and / or high degree of ﬁnancial constraint,
regardless of the level of agreement between managers and outsiders.
Apart from researchers that studied the pure play between equity and debt, there are
some that looked also into other (hybrid) security types such are convertible bonds and
convertible preferred shares. Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (1999) investigate motives for
the issuance of convertible debt by comparing it to pure equity and pure debt. Lewis et
al. argue that companies issue convertibles when the costs of either equity or pure debt
issues are too high. They document that ﬁrms that issue convertible debt are signiﬁcantly
smaller than debt issuing ﬁrms, have lower dividend yields, but higher slack, market-to-
book ratios and higher excess returns prior to the issue announcement. Compared to equity
issuing ﬁrms, convertible bond issuers have signiﬁcantly more slack and have signiﬁcantly
higher announcement date returns. They do not ﬁnd volatility of stock returns and slack to
have statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the security decision choice, while on the other hand
they ﬁnd leverage to have a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on the probability of issuing equity.
Hovakimian et al. (2001) document that companies are more likely to issue convertibles than
common equity if they have a lower market-to-book ratio (Q ratio) and have experienced
lower pre-announcement stock returns.
4.2.2 Hypotheses and Deﬁnitions of Proxy Variables
In this chapter we examine three distinct explanations of the ﬁrm’s capital structure - market
timing, pecking-order and agreement between insiders and outsiders of a ﬁrm.72 Determinants of Public Financing Choice
Market Timing
In a survey of managerial practice in the US Graham and Harvey (2001) ﬁnd that managers
consider equity market prices as one of the most important factors in their decision to raise
equity or equity-like securities. Moreover, Baker and Wurgler (2002) empirically demon-
strate that low leverage ﬁrms issue equity when their valuation is high and high leverage
ﬁrms raise funds when their valuations are low. This implies:
H1: Overvaluation increases the probability of issuing equity-like security.
However, Jung et al. (1996) show that high market-to-book (MB) ﬁrms earn higher an-
nouncement period abnormal returns than low MB ﬁrms. In their view this represents
evidence against market timing. To show the contrary, we investigate an additional hypoth-
esis related to market timing by equity issuers:
H1a: Post-announcement excess returns will be decreasing in market-to-book ratio for equity
issuers.
Pecking-Order Hypothesis
According to the pecking-order hypothesis (Myers and Majluf, 1984 and Myers, 1984) com-
panies are faced with diﬀerent levels of informational asymmetries, which create an adverse
selection problem. As a results there is a ﬁnancing hierarchy that ﬁrms will follow, where
internal ﬁnancing (retained earnings) will be used ﬁrst, followed by external debt-like ﬁnanc-
ing. Equity will only be issued when the debt capacity is used up. This suggests that equity
ﬁnancing is used when ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained and cannot take up any additional
leverage. In other words, this implies:
H2: Higher degree of ﬁnancial constraints increases the probability of issuing equity-like se-
curity.
(Dis)agreement between insiders and outsiders
Dittmar and Thakor (2007) propose an alternative explanation of the security issuance choice
to resolve the ambiguity of market timing hypotheses of capital structure. Compared to
market timing or pecking-order explanations of capital structure, according to their propo-
sition companies will issue equity when agreement with outsiders is high, regardless of the
(over)valuation of a company and / or degree of ﬁnancial constraint.
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equity-like security.
4.3 Data and Deﬁnitions of Variables
4.3.1 Sample Construction
We analyze three types of public security issues on the Canadian market in the period
between 1998 and 2004: straight debt (bond) issues, equity issues and convertible debt
issues, as well as share repurchases (equity withdrawal). The data on the new issues is
gathered from the SDC New Issues database. During this period, there were 1,075 corporate
nonconvertible debt issues, 95 convertible debt issues, 3,439 equity issues and 1,415 intended
share repurchases in the corporate sector.2 We ﬁrst eliminate all ﬁnancial companies from
our sample (SIC 6000-6999). This leaves us with 440 corporate nonconvertible debt issues,
58 convertible debt issues, 2,271 corporate equity and 1,084 intended share repurchases.
Next, we match the sample with the WorldScope accounting data, as well as stock price and
market value of equity data from Datastream.3 Since data in Datastream is not available for
all non-ﬁnancial companies in our sample, we are left with 142 corporate nonconvertible debt
issues (made by 40 diﬀerent companies), 51 convertible debt issues (made by 41 diﬀerent
companies), 682 corporate equity issues (made by 341 diﬀerent companies) and 575 intended
share repurchases (made by 238 diﬀerent companies). The total sample contains 1,450
diﬀerent security issues and share repurchases made by 546 diﬀerent companies.
Next, we gather data on analysts forecasts from the I/B/E/S database available through
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Analysts’ forecasts are available for 108 corporate
nonconvertible debt issues, 43 convertible debt issues, 463 equity issues and 469 intended
share repurchases. However, quite a few companies are only covered by a single analyst.
Therefore, we are only able to compute dispersion of forecasts for the companies that are
covered by more than one analyst. This results in dispersions of earnings forecasts for 106
nonconvertible debt issues, 38 convertible debt issues, 353 equity issues and 360 intended
share repurchases.
4.3.2 Deﬁnitions of Variables
As described in Section 4.2.2, where we deﬁne the hypotheses, we group our proxies such to
test diﬀerent hypotheses related to capital structure theories. We therefore deﬁne groups of
2Note that this does not include the issues placed by government or government agencies.
3Note that availability of data refers to a particular company being listed in Datastream and not to the
actual accounting numbers per se. Number of companies in tables of descriptive statistics and regression
tables might therefore be diﬀerent, depending on the availability of data for the variables used in the analysis.74 Determinants of Public Financing Choice
variables that we use to test hypotheses regarding (1) market timing, (2) pecking-order and
(3) agreement between insiders and outsiders.
Market Timing
According to H1 overvaluation increases the probability of issuing equity. This implies that
managers will exploit periods of equity overvaluation and will issue equity. Similarly, when
managers perceive ﬁrm’s equity to be undervalued they will repurchase ﬁrm’s stock. To test
this hypothesis we look into stock returns prior to the announcement of the issue, together
with other measures of equity valuation (market-to-book ratio, Q-ratio), as deﬁned below:
- Stock price run up prior to the announcement of the issue: SRB = ARi
−60,−10,
where ARi
−60,−10 is estimated using the standard market model4 with the total return
on TSX 300 market index being a proxy for the market return.
- Stock returns after the announcement of the security issue: SRA = ARi
10,60,
where ARi
10,60 is estimated using the standard market model with the total return on
TSX 300 market index being a proxy for the market return.
- Stock returns at the announcement of the security issue: AR = ARi
−1,1, where
ARi
−1,1 is estimated using the standard market model with the total return on TSX
300 market index being a proxy for the market return.
- Growth opportunities - Q ratio or market-to-book value is deﬁned as:
Q =
book values of long term and short term debt + market value of equity
total assets
- Market-to-book value of equity is deﬁned as MB =
market value of equity
book value of equity , where mar-
ket value of equity is taken 5 trading days prior to the announcement.
We expect equity issuers to have signiﬁcantly higher stock price run ups and higher
market-to-book (MB) values than debt issuers or share repurchasers. Moreover, stock re-
turns after the announcement of the issue are expected to be decreasing in market-to-book
ratios, if managers time the market.
Pecking-order
H2 predicts that the probability of equity issuance is increasing in the degree of ﬁnancial
constraint, as companies issue equity as a last resort to ﬁnance proﬁtable projects (after they
have exhausted internal reserves and debt capacity). To test this we look into a number of
ﬁrm characteristics that proxy for the amount of internally generated funds, debt capacity
and ﬁnancial constraints.
4Return on any security i is deﬁned as Rit = α + βi · Rmt + it. Rit and Rmt are the period t returns on
security i and the market portfolio respectively. it is the error term.4.3. Data and Deﬁnitions of Variables 75
- Leverage is deﬁned as: LEV =
long term debt
total assets




- Payout is deﬁned as cash dividends relative to the assets: DIV A = cash dividends
total assets .
- Slack is deﬁned as: SLCK =
cash and equivalents
total assets
- Size of the company is deﬁned as logarithmic value of total assets, where we deﬂated
the value of total assets with the consumer price index (CPI1997 = 100):
LNTA=log(deﬂated total assets)
Firms with low internally generated funds (low free cash ﬂow), a low debt capacity (high
leverage) and high ﬁnancial constraints (high payout, low slack) are supposed to be more
likely to issue equity.
In addition, we employ a comprehensive measure of ﬁnancial constraint, where we follow
Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003). They use a four-variable version of the Kaplan-Zingales
(KZ) index, which is constructed based on the coeﬃcients of the restricted ordered logit
model. This is in some contrast to the approach used by Lamont, Polk and Sa´ a-Requejo
(2001), where they use a ﬁve-variable version of the index. They include the Q-ratio as an
additional component of the index. We choose not to include the Q-ratio as component of
the index, as a high Q-ratio might indicate an overvaluation and thus “contaminate” the
index as the measure of ﬁnancial constraint. We therefore construct the KZ index as:
KZit = −1.002 ·
CFit
Ait−1







CF represents sum of the depreciation, the amortization and the income before extraor-
dinary items, A stands for total assets, LEV represents leverage as debt over the sum of debt
and equity and CASH represents cash and short-term investments. The KZ index is higher
for ﬁrms which are more ﬁnancially constrained, since such ﬁrms have exhausted their debt
capacity (high leverage), have low cash ﬂows from operations and / or need to pay higher
dividends. H2 implies that the probability of issuing equity should be increasing in the value
of KZ. More ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are forced to issue equity.
Agreement between Insiders and Outsiders
We explore this implication by ﬁrst computing the parameter of agreement between managers
and outsiders. We follow Dittmar and Thakor and deﬁne the agreement parameter α as the
relative diﬀerence between actual (EPSa) and last forecasted EPS. Dittmar and Thakor
argue that higher α represents higher agreement, as outsiders are less likely to question the
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addition, we measure the disagreement between insiders and outsiders by looking at the
dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Higher dispersion implies higher disagreement.
- Agreement parameter α is deﬁned as a relative diﬀerence between actual (EPSa)




- Dispersion of analysts’ forecast is deﬁned as an absolute value of the coeﬃcient of
variation of forecasted earnings for t+1 year, where t is the year of the security issue:
DISP =|
standard deviation of earnings forecasts
mean earnings forecast |
- Volatility is deﬁned as the relative volatility of stock returns: RV OL =
σi
σM, where σi
is the volatility of stock price returns of company i and σM is volatility of the returns
of the TSX 300 market index measure over a one year period (250 trading days) prior
to the announcement of the security issue.
According to H3 higher alpha implies higher probability of equity issue regardless of equity
valuation on the market. Similarly, low dispersion implies low disagreement (high agreement)
and higher probability of equity valuation.
Other variables
Unrelated to a single hypothesis we deﬁne additional variables that provide some insight into
characteristics of the issuers (repurchasers).
- Issue size is deﬁned as the value of the issued security or repurchased stock, where
we deﬂated the value of the issue size with the consumer price index (CPI1997 = 100):
ISS=deﬂated issue size
- Relative issue size is deﬁned as the nominal amount of funding raised with the issue
relative to total assets: RISS = issue size
total assets
- Number of analysts that follow the company and provide estimates.
4.4 Results of the Analysis
4.4.1 Sample Characteristics and Bivariate Analysis
In Table 4.1 we present descriptive statistics and pairwise diﬀerences in means between dif-
ferent security types for selected characteristics that we use as proxies for market timing and
the pecking-order theories of capital structure, as well as proxies for disagreement between
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In Panel A we ﬁrst report characteristics and diﬀerences between diﬀerent issuers related
to market timing. Based on the results in the table we ﬁrst observe that equity issuers
experience signiﬁcant positive excess stock returns prior to the issue (mean value of 19.65%).
These are 18.44 percentage points higher than those for straight debt issuers (mean value
of 1.22%). Similar is the case when we compare equity issuers to convertible debt issuers
(20.55 percentage points higher mean excess returns) and to companies that repurchase
stocks (21.46 percentage points higher mean excess return).
Companies that announce stock repurchases experience signiﬁcantly negative excess re-
turns prior to the announcement of the share repurchase programme (mean value of -1.80%).
Quite the opposite is the case in the period following the announcement of the issue, when
share repurchasing companies face a mean 8.28% excess return. In a three month period
following the announcement of the issue5 excess returns are more negative for equity issuers
(mean value of -3.2%) than for straight debt issuers (mean value of 0.05%), but the diﬀerence
is marginally signiﬁcant. On the other hand convertible bond issuers experience signiﬁcant
positive excess returns (mean value of 1.61%). We present all these results in Figure 4.1.
When we look at the diﬀerences in market-to-book (MB) values, we observe companies
that repurchase shares to have the lowest MB values (1.4251), while equity issuers have
the highest MB values (mean MB value of 3.3262). The diﬀerence in MB values between
equity issuers and issuers of debt-like securities (straight debt, convertible debt and share
repurchases) is statistically signiﬁcant.
Moreover, announcement period abnormal returns show that equity issuers on average
experience 2.10 percentage points lower abnormal returns than straight debt issuers. Compa-
nies that announce share repurchase programs experience on average 3.37 percentage points
higher abnormal returns than equity issuers. The results are consistent with previous litera-
ture on the wealth eﬀects associated with the announcement of diﬀerent security issues6, with
the exception that convertible bond issuers experience 1.20 percentage points more negative
excess returns around the announcement of the issue than equity issuers. It appears from
Figure 1 that companies choose to issue equity after a period of stock price run-up, which
is then followed by a decline of the equal magnitude. The opposite seems to be the case
for share repurchases, where companies engage in them after a prolonged period of stock
underperformance (compared to the market).
5Note that we treat announcement date returns separately, as we want to capture post-announcement
excess returns.
6Seasoned equity oﬀerings induce the strongest negative wealth eﬀects (see for example Masulis and
Korwar, 1986, Mikkelson and Partch, 1986 and Asquith and Mullins, 1986) of between -2.5 and -4.5 percent
for the U.S. market, while straight debt issues induce only slightly negative wealth eﬀects (see for example
Dann and Mikkelson, 1984 and Eckbo, 1986). Convertible debt oﬀerings induce announcement date valuation
responses that are between those for equity and straight debt (see for example also Lewis, Rogalski and
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All this evidence is consistent with previous literature on market timing (see for example
Baker and Wurgler, 2002) where equity issuers time the market and issue equity after a
period of positive returns and / or before a period of declining stock returns relative to
the market. This conﬁrms H1. Fama and French (2005) argue that ﬁrms repurchase shares
(retire equity) when leverage is low and / or investment opportunities lower the value of debt
capacity (low Q). In our sample (see Table 4.1) we observe that companies that repurchase
shares have the lowest Q ratio (mean value of 1.4251) and a low leverage comparable to
equity issuers (mean value of 0.1798). This is in line with the ﬁndings of Fama and French.
Next, we look at the variables related to the pecking-order explanation of capital structure
(Panel B of Table 4.1). First, we observe that leverage signiﬁcantly diﬀers across diﬀerent
types of issuers. A signiﬁcantly higher leverage for straight debt issuers (mean value of
0.2891) compared to equity issuers (mean value of 0.1716) is surprising and counterintuitive.
One does expect that ﬁrms with higher leverage do not have suﬃcient debt capacity to issue
debt. However, it is also true that other characteristics of the companies determine borrowing
capacity as well (proﬁtability, collateralibility of assets, etc.). On the other hand, equity
issuers do have on average signiﬁcantly lower (negative) cash ﬂows (mean value of -2.80% of
assets) compared to straight debt issuers (9.79%) and stock repurchasers (9.90%). Equity
issuers on average also pay less cash dividends (1.01% of total assets) than straight debt
issuers (2.13%) and convertible debt issuers in particular (3.73%). Somewhat surprising is
the ﬁnding that equity issuers on average tend to keep signiﬁcantly more cash and equivalents
on their balance sheets (mean value of 15.95% of total assets) than straight debt issuers
(5.08%). These results are somewhat diﬃcult to reconcile with pecking-order theory of
capital structure (and our Hypothesis 2) if looked upon individually. Financially constrained
ﬁrms (potential equity issuers) are expected to have higher leverage, low cash ﬂows, low
dividend payments and low balances of slack on their balance sheets. In order to assess
the ﬁnancial constraint better we look into a comprehensive measure of ﬁnancial constraint,
the four-variable Kaplan-Zingales index (see equation 4.1). Furthermore and contrary to
the expectations, the results for the index itself (variable KZ) do not show equity issuers
to be more ﬁnancially constrained than straight debt issuers. Even contrary, straight debt
issuers seem to be marginally more ﬁnancially constrained than equity issuers (diﬀerence in
means of 0.1412). Equity issuers are signiﬁcantly more ﬁnancially constrained only compared
to convertible bond issuers (diﬀerence of 0.6787). In addition, we compute an industry
demeaned KZ index (KZind)7 to account for uneven distribution of security types across
diﬀerent industries. The results are comparable to the ones obtained using the “raw” index
measure. This evidence gives no support to the pecking-order explanation of the capital
structure (Hypothesis 2), that is that ﬁrms issue equity when they are ﬁnancially (equity)
constrained. The only piece of evidence consistent with pecking-order theory is the fact that
7We deﬁne industry at 1-digit SIC code4.4. Results of the Analysis 79
equity issuers are signiﬁcantly smaller ﬁrms compared to straight debt issuers (diﬀerence in
log total assets of 3.50) or ﬁrms that repurchase shares (diﬀerence of 1.13).
We use several proxies to measure agreement between insiders and outsiders of the ﬁrm.
The results for these proxies are shown in Panel C of Table 4.1. First, we assume that higher
dispersion (absolute value of coeﬃcient of variation of forecasted earnings) implies higher
asymmetry (disagreement) of information between investors (outsiders) and insiders. It is
therefore not surprising to see that equity issuers seem to suﬀer more from this phenomenon
(mean DISP of 0.4087) than debt issuers (mean DISP of 0.1178). Secondly, we look at the
values of the α measure. According to Dittmar and Thakor (2007) high values of α show
higher agreement between insiders and outsiders. Our results show no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in α between issuers of diﬀerent securities. We therefore ﬁnd no support for the Dittmar and
Thakor explanation (Hypothesis 3) that companies issue equity when agreement between
insiders and outsiders is high (high alpha), regardless of ﬁrm valuation (market timing). In
addition, we compute the measure of the volatility of the ﬁrm’s stock returns relative to the
market volatility (RVOL) and ﬁnd that equity issuers have signiﬁcantly higher volatility of
stock returns (4.2744) than straight debt issuers (1.7419), convertible debt issuer (2.2554)
and share repurchasers (3.0471). The results overall indicate that there is more disagreement
(higher dispersion of analysts’ forecasts) in the case of equity issuers compared to straight
debt issuers. This is in contrast to H3.
In Panel D of Table 4.1 we additionally present some other characteristics of the issues
and issuers. Results show that more analysts cover debt issuers (median value of 10) than
equity issuers (median of 4). This is also not surprising if we look at the size of the companies
that issue straight debt and those that issue equity. The average issue size of the straight
debt is around 154 million CAD, while the one of equity is around a third of that (57 million
CAD). The average size of the share repurchase is around 45 million CAD. Finally, the
relative issue size of equity represents on average around 27% of the assets of the issuing
company at the time of the issue, but only around 4% in the case of straight debt issuers.
Given the costs of issuing securities and signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the sizes of diﬀerent issuers,
this is not surprising. Small equity issuers seem to issue larger shares of the new equity
compared to their size.
4.4.2 Market Timing
In Panel A of Table 4.1 we observe that equity issuers have signiﬁcantly larger excess returns
prior to the announcement of the issue than straight debt issuers and share repurchasers
(leverage increasing security issuance actions). In addition, they also have signiﬁcantly lower
announcement date excess returns compared to straight debt issuers and share repurchasers.
Although this and the signiﬁcantly higher market-to-book (MB) values for equity issuers
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show that announcement date excess returns are signiﬁcantly lower for equity issuers with
lower MB values, which goes against market timing hypothesis. Although we document the
same ﬁnding, we further investigate post-announcement excess returns for equity issuers. In
Table 4.2 we present results of announcement date excess returns and post-announcement
excess returns for equity issuers sorted into MB quartiles.
In Panel A of the table we present the results of a standard market model event study
approach to calculating abnormal (excess) returns. First, we observe that excess returns in
the period around the announcement of the issue are more negative for low MB ﬁrms (mean
CAR(−1,1) of -2.92%) than for high MB ﬁrms (mean CAR(−1,1) of -0.36%). This is consistent
with the ﬁnding of Jung et al. (1996). However, when we look into post-announcement
excess returns we observe the opposite. Cumulative post-announcement abnormal returns
are signiﬁcantly higher for low MB ﬁrms (mean CAR(2,60) of 2.52% and mean 1-year excess
return CAR(2,250) of 50.21%) than for high MB ﬁrms (mean CAR(2,60) of -20.54% and mean
CAR(2,250) of -42.01%). We interpret this as conﬁrmation of Hypothesis 2a. Moreover, high
MB ﬁrms earn signiﬁcantly higher pre-announcement cumulative abnormal returns (mean
CAR(−60,10) of 20.92%) than low MB ﬁrms (mean CAR(−60,−10) of 4.78%).
In order to provide stronger support for this ﬁnding, we also perform a matching ﬁrm
excess returns analysis. We use size-MB matched ﬁrms approach to compute buy-and-hold
abnormal returns (BHAR).8 For each calendar month we ﬁrst sort all the ﬁrms listed on the
Toronto Stock Exchange into deciles based on the market-to-book (MB) values. Then we
match the issuing ﬁrm’s MB value to a corresponding decile and among the ﬁrms within the
decile we ﬁnd the one which is the closest in size (the size is the market value of equity).
The diﬀerence in buy-and-hold returns for a given time period between the issuing and
the matching ﬁrm is a buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). We present the results for
BHAR in Panel B of Table 4.2. For the most part the results are similar to those in Panel
A. Firms with higher MB have signiﬁcantly higher pre-announcement BHARs (a diﬀerence
in BHAR(−60,−10) of around 32 percentage points between the highest and the lowest MB
quartile). Contrary to the ﬁndings in Panel A, announcement date excess returns are here
higher for the ﬁrms with lower MB (the diﬀerence between the highest and the lowest MB
quartile is only marginally signiﬁcant though). Post-announcement excess returns are here
again signiﬁcantly larger for the lower MB ﬁrms - BHAR(2,60) is by 11 percentage points
larger (1-year excess return BHAR(2,250) by 18 percentage points) for the lowest MB quartile
ﬁrms compared to the highest MB quartile ﬁrms.
Finally, we perform a cross sectional multivariate regression analysis in order to provide
further test of market timing hypothesis. We estimate reduced form models based on the
following full speciﬁcation for equity issuers only:
CAR(2,60),i = β0 + β1 · LNMVi + β2 · Ωi + β3 · KZi + β4 · Θi + β5 · RISSi + i, (4.2)
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where CAR(2,60),i denotes post-announcement excess returns, LNMVi represents log of mar-
ket value of the company, Ωi corresponds to the market timing proxies (market-to-book ratio,
pre-announcement excess returns and Q-ratio), KZi represents the raw KZ index of ﬁnancial
constraint, Θi denotes “agreement” proxies (α and DISP), RISSi represents the issue size
relative to the total assets of the ﬁrm and i denotes an error term.
We present the regression results in Table 4.3. In all the models in Panel A of the
table market timing proxies (MB, CAR(−60,−10) and Q) signiﬁcantly negatively aﬀect post-
announcement excess returns. Overall, results in this section show that overvalued equity
issuing ﬁrms (high MB, high pre-announcement excess returns, high Q) seem to time the
market, where managers take advantage of the overvaluation and issue overvalued equity.
The results refute the ﬁndings of Jung et al. (1996), where they do not ﬁnd support for
market timing, but rather propose the agency model of capital structure.
In Panel B of Table 4.3 we redo the analysis using size-MB matched ﬁrm post-announcement
excess returns (BHAR(2,60)) as the dependent variable instead of CAR(2,60). The results are
similar when MB-ratio is used as the overvaluation proxy, while pre-announcement excess
returns and Q-ratio do not seem to signiﬁcantly aﬀect post-announcement excess returns of
equity issuers.9
4.4.3 (Dis)agreement between the Insiders and the Outsiders
In Panel C of Table 4.1 we observed no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the value of α (agreement)
between diﬀerent security issues (stock repurchases). On the other hand, there were sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences in dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts (disagreement). However,
in order to better investigate the explanation for security issuance decision proposed by
Dittmar and Thakor (2007), we need to relate the decision to issue equity to the valuation
of the issuer and the agreement between insiders and outsiders of the issuing ﬁrm. Dittmar
and Thakor propose that the decision to issue equity will be driven solely by the agreement
between insiders and outsiders of the ﬁrm (high value of α), regardless of the valuation. Oth-
erwise, market timing considerations have important eﬀects on the security issuance decision.
Therefore, we sort all the issuers into quartiles based on company valuation (book-to-market
ratio) and agreement parameter α. Then, we construct a matrix of valuation (columns) and
agreement quartiles (rows) and compute percentage of equity issuers for each matrix ﬁeld.
We present the results in Table 4.4.
In both panels of Table 4.4 the ﬁrst number in each cell represents the fraction of eq-
uity issues and the second number represents the number of all issuers pertaining to that
particular cell.
9We have also estimated models in both panels with the inclusion of industry and year dummies and the
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In Panel A we present the relationship between agreement between insider and outsiders
and valuation. We observe that the decision to issue equity is mostly driven by high stock
prices (valuation), as the highest proportions of equity issuers are in high valuation quartiles
(market-to-book), irrespective of agreement parameter α (the diﬀerences between the highest
and the lowest α quartiles for a given market-to-book quartile are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero - the bottom most row). We observe that the proportion of equity issuers across
agreement quartiles is almost the same, between 0.461 and 0.462 (the “Total” column). This
is in contrast with the prediction of Dittmar and Thakor, where equity issuance is driven by
the agreement parameter α. On the other hand, the proportion of equity issuers signiﬁcantly
increases in market-to-book ratios (MB) from 0.291 for the lowest MB quartile to 0.690 for
the highest MB quartile (the “Total” row of Panel A).
In addition, we perform the same analysis using the disagreement parameter (coeﬃcient
of variation of analysts’ earnings forecasts - DISP) and present the results in Panel B of
Table 4.4. Contrary to no relationship between proportion of equity issues and agreement
parameter α that we demonstrate in Panel A, we observe that the proportion of equity issuers
here is signiﬁcantly increasing in disagreement. While 34.0% of all the issues are equity issues
in the lowest DISP quartile, 61.9% of issues are equity issues in the highest DISP quartile (the
“Total” column). This indicates that while the probability of equity issues is not increasing
in the agreement, it is certainly increasing in disagreement and market-to-book value. Based
on this we reject the “agreement” explanation of equity issuance (Hypothesis 3) and claim
that ﬁrms time the market and issue equity when valuation is high, regardless of the level of
agreement between insiders and outsiders.10
4.4.4 Convertible Debt versus Straight Debt or Equity
We ﬁnd diﬀerences between both convertible debt and straight debt issuers and convertible
debt and equity issuers. Convertible debt issuers are riskier, are signiﬁcantly less ﬁnan-
cially constrained and seem to suﬀer from higher informational asymmetry or disagreement
between insiders and outsiders of the ﬁrm than straight debt issuers. On the other hand,
equity issuers have higher market-to-book values and are more ﬁnancially constrained than
convertible debt issuers. Since convertible debt issuers are in many respects more similar
to straight debt issuers, it is puzzling that they experience announcement date excess re-
turns very close and even more negative than equity issuers. These negative excess returns
however do rebound in the post-announcement period, while the post-announcement excess
returns of equity issuers are negative. Most of our ﬁndings here are in some contrast to the
ﬁndings of Lewis et al. (1999). Our evidence suggests that the few ﬁrms that issue con-
vertible debt do so mostly as an alternative to straight debt. They are the least ﬁnancially
10We did the similar analysis where we replaced the α quartiles with the quartiles based on the relative
volatility of returns. The results are similar to those in Panel B.4.5. Choice Model Analysis Results 83
constrained of all the issuers, do not have the highest leverage and are reasonably proﬁtable,
so there is little doubt that they do not have suﬃcient debt capacity left to issue straight
debt. This implies that convertible debt to this extent serves as a substitute for straight
debt, where issuers use the sale of the conversion option to lower their debt ﬁnancing costs
(deal sweetener). This is consistent with motives that are put forward by managers in the
surveys on the use of convertible debt11. On the other hand, convertible debt issuers have
lower market-to-book values than equity issuers, but do have signiﬁcantly higher cash ﬂow
compared to equity issuers. This result suggests that issuing equity directly could prove to
be very costly, as ﬁrms with very high cash ﬂows and poor growth opportunities (proxied
by MB and Q-ratios) are considered to have the highest agency costs of equity. From this
perspective, convertible debt could also be looked upon as a substitute for equity, where the
straight debt component serves as a bonding device, should the future project ex-post prove
not to be valuable. This reasoning is in line with the proposition made by Mayers (1998),
where convertible debt serves as a sequential ﬁnancing device. If certain investment options
of ﬁrms prove to be ex-post valuable, debt is converted into equity and new debt capacity
to ﬁnance valuable projects is obtained.
4.5 Choice Model Analysis Results
In this section we turn to a multivariate choice model analysis. We estimate a multinomial
probit model, where companies can simultaneously decide on two distinct securities: equity
and straight debt. In addition to that companies can also repurchase stock, which is similar
to increasing the leverage. We use a multinomial probit as the issue under investigation fails
to assure the so-called independence from irrelevant alternatives property of the multinomial
logit model. This property is generally referred to as the IIA property. Clearly, if any of
the security types is taken away as possibility, the choice between the remaining three is
not unaﬀected, as companies that considered issuing the withdrawn security type will not
proportionally redistribute themselves among the remaining alternatives. If for example the
choice set is narrowed down by removing the equity issue, we can expect more of the potential
equity issuers to decide to issue convertible debt than straight debt or repurchase stocks.
Therefore, we use a multinomial probit, which does not require the IIA property.12
In Table 4.5 we present the results of the multinomial probit regression, where the depen-
dent variable is a categorical variable denoting selected security type. As the base outcome
we set equity issue and confront the probability of issuing equity (leverage decreasing secu-
rity decision) to the two leverage increasing security decisions - issue of straight debt and
11See for example Graham and Harvey, 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004.
12We have formally tested whether multinomial logit model assures the IIA and diﬀerent tests showed that
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share repurchase. All the models are estimated with industry (at 1-digit SIC code) and year
dummies.
Models 1, 2 and 3 of the table refer to a setup where we jointly test all the hypotheses
using KZ index as the proxy for ﬁnancial constraint. Models diﬀer in proxies that we use to
test hypothesis related to the market timing theory of capital structure (security issuance).
In Model 1 we proxy for the market timing by using the MB-ratio, in Model 2 we use the
pre-announcement excess return (CAR(−60,−10)), while in Model 3 we use Q-ratio.
Let us ﬁrst turn to the market timing hypothesis. In the table we observe that higher
excess stock returns prior to the announcement of the issue (higher valuation) increase prob-
ability of issuing equity - coeﬃcients for CAR(−60,−10) of -0.474 in Model 2 for straight debt
issuers compared to equity issuers and -0.675 for share repurchasers compared to equity is-
suers. Somewhat surprising is the fact that market-to-book (MB) ratio of equity does not
aﬀect choice between straight debt and equity. On the other hand, comparison of equity
issuers and share repurchasing ﬁrms shows that higher MB-ratio does increase the proba-
bility of issuing equity compared to repurchasing shares (coeﬃcient in Model 1 of -0.180).
Moreover, the same holds when we use Q-ratio as the proxy for overvaluation (coeﬃcient in
Model 3 of -0.437). These last two results lead us to believe that Q-ratio is predominantly
a valuation measure rather than a measure for growth opportunities.
Next, we turn to the pecking-order hypothesis. We ﬁrst test it by using the raw KZ
index variable (Models 1-3) as a comprehensive proxy for ﬁnancial constraint. Contrary
to the ﬁndings based on the bivariate analysis in Table 4.1, we ﬁnd support for pecking-
order theory of capital structure (Hypothesis 2). A ﬁnancial constraint proxied by KZ index
negatively aﬀects probability of issuing straight debt (coeﬃcients for KZ between -0.339 and
-0.301 in Models 1-3) or repurchasing shares (coeﬃcients between -0.188 and -0.115) versus
issuing equity. Note that in all the models we use ﬁrm size as the control variable. The results
for ﬁrm size show that larger ﬁrms are more likely to issue straight debt or repurchase shares
than issue equity. It therefore seems that when controlling for the ﬁrm size in a multivariate
setting degree of ﬁnancial constraint has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on security issuance decision,
despite the fact that straight debt issuers are on average more ﬁnancially constrained than
equity issuers.
Finally, in Models 1-3 we use proxies for agreement (α) between insiders and outsiders
to explore the agreement hypothesis of Dittmar and Thakor (2007). There is no signiﬁcant
eﬀect of the agreement proxy on probability of issuing equity (decrease in leverage) versus
straight debt or share repurchase (increase in leverage).
In Models 4-6 we repeat the same analysis but use the individual components of KZ
index as proxies for ﬁnancial constraints of the company. The results for the market timing
proxies (MB, CAR(−60,−10) and Q) remain virtually the same for both, straight debt issuers
and ﬁrms that repurchase shares. Again, there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the “agreement”4.6. Market Timing versus Pecking-order - Dual Nature of Equity Issues 85
proxy (α) on the security issuance choice. However, diﬀerent components of KZ index do
have diﬀerent eﬀects on probabilities of issuing straight debt versus equity or repurchasing
shares versus issuing equity. Firms with low internally generated funds (low cash ﬂows),
low debt capacity (high leverage) and high ﬁnancial constraints (high payout, low slack) are
predicted to be more likely to issue equity. Indeed, ﬁrms with higher leverage (coeﬃcients
for LEV between -3.084 and -2.844 in Models 4-6) are more likely to issue equity, while those
with more slack are more likely to issue straight debt (coeﬃcients for SLACK of 1.962 and
1.890 in Models 4 and 5). Similarly as in the case of straight debt issuers, ﬁrms with higher
leverage are more likely to issue equity than to retire one (coeﬃcients for LEV between -
1.676 and -1.155 in Models 4-6). On the other hand, we ﬁnd the probability of issuing equity
decreases in cash ﬂows (coeﬃcients for CFA between 7.159 and 7.820 in Models 4-6), but
increases in the payout. Firms that pay more dividends are more likely to issue equity than
repurchase shares (coeﬃcients for DIVA between -9.453 and -8.437 in Models 4-6). Strong
evidence on the negative eﬀect of cash ﬂows and leverage (opposed to issuing straight debt)
and the positive eﬀect of dividend payments on probability of issuing equity (opposed to
repurchasing shares) again gives support to the pecking-order theory of capital structure.
To summarize, multinomial choice model analysis provides evidence to support market
timing hypothesis and pecking-order theory of capital structure, while no support is found
for the insider-outsider “agreement” explanation of security issuance.
4.6 Market Timing versus Pecking-order - Dual Na-
ture of Equity Issues
Given the conﬂicting evidence of bivariate and multivariate analysis regarding pecking-order
hypothesis, in particular the values of KZ index, we continue to further explore diﬀerences
within the subsample of equity issuers. In Section 4.5 we observed that KZ index does have
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the choice between straight debt and equity when controlling for the
size of the ﬁrm. We therefore partition the subsample of equity issuers into size quartiles
(based on the log of total assets) and compare diﬀerent characteristics among them. We
present the results in Table 4.6.
Diﬀerences between size quartiles in Table 4.6 show that the largest equity issuers are
signiﬁcantly more ﬁnancially constrained than the smallest equity issuers (diﬀerence in KZ
of 0.3086). Moreover, they have signiﬁcantly higher leverage (diﬀerence in LEV of 0.2116),
less slack (diﬀerence in SLACK of -0.2591) and pay more dividends (diﬀerence in DIVA of
0.0175). However, they also have signiﬁcantly more cash ﬂow (diﬀerence in CFA of 0.2864),
but higher leverage, lower slack and higher dividend payments have prevailing eﬀect to
account for the higher mean value of KZ index.
On the other hand, the smallest equity issuers have signiﬁcantly higher market-to-book86 Determinants of Public Financing Choice
value of equity (diﬀerence in MB of -6.6872), higher values of Q-ratio (diﬀerence in Q of
-4.7650), higher pre-announcement excess stock returns (diﬀerence of -0.1663) and more
negative post-announcement excess returns (diﬀerence of 0.1288).
These diﬀerences imply that smaller equity issuers seem to be issuing equity as the
result of market timing (issuing overvalued equity), while the largest equity issuers seem
to be issuing equity as the result of “pecking-order behavior” (issuing equity when being
ﬁnancially constrained).
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we look into the determinants of security issuance decision in the Canadian
market in a period between 1998 and 2004, where we focus on the external ﬁnancing in the
public market (equity, straight debt, convertible debt and the share repurchases). We use a
comprehensive set of accounting and market variables to revisit capital structure theories -
market timing, pecking-order and agreement between insiders and outsiders.
Overall, we ﬁnd strong and consistent evidence that overvaluation leads companies to
choose equity over debt. This gives support to the market timing argument for issuing equity.
The striking ﬁnding about market timing is that despite the less negative announcement
period returns of equity issuers with high market-to-book ratios, the long-run performance
of those issuers is much weaker than that of issuers with low market-to-book ratios. This is
consistent with previous ﬁndings on market timing (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Gomes
and Philips, 2005), but in contrast to Jung et al. (1996) who refute market timing on
the basis of the ﬁnding that the announcement excess returns are decreasing in the ﬁrms’
market-to-book ratios. Our results also provide support for pecking-order explanation of
capital structure. However, there is a dual nature of equity issuers. Small equity issuers
tend to time the market, while the largest equity issuers seem to issue equity as a result
of “pecking-order behavior”. We ﬁnd no evidence that companies issue equity when the
agreement between outside investors and insiders is high (Dittmar and Thakor, 2007). At the
very least, this ﬁnding suggests that the conclusion that ﬁrms with high levels of information
asymmetry or disagreement between insiders and outsiders prefer equity issue is not robust
to diﬀerent capital markets. Finally, small diﬀerences between straight debt and convertible
debt issuers that suggest that few ﬁrms that issue convertible debt do so to “sweeten” the
deal and achieve lower debt ﬁnancing costs. We also ﬁnd some evidence that is consistent
with Mayers’ (1998) proposition on the sequential ﬁnancing role of convertible debt, where
the agency costs of issuing equity could prove to be extremely high and companies issue
convertible debt to mitigate these costs.4.A. Tables 87
4.A Tables
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
Mean(x), median(cx
50) and number of observations (n) for excess stock price returns prior to the announce-
ment of the issue (SRB = ARi
−60,−10), excess stock price returns after the issue (SRA = ARi
2,60),
Tobin’s Q ratio (Q =
book values of long term and short term debt + market value of equity
total assets ), market-to-book value
of equity (MB =
market value of equity
book value of equity ), free cash ﬂow (FCFA =
net income+depreciation-capital ex.
total assets ), payout
(DIV A = cash dividends
total assets ), slack (SLACK =
cash and equivalents
total assets ), leverage (LEV =
long term debt
total assets ), relative
volatility (RV OL = σi
σM , where σi is annualized standard deviation of stock price returns of company i based
on 250 trading days before the announcement of the issue and σM is annualized standard deviations of the
returns of the TSX 300 market index based on 250 trading days before the announcement of the issue),
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts (DISP =|
standard deviation of earnings forcasts
mean earnings forecast |), number of analysts’ forecasts
(NAN), size (LNTA=log of deﬂated total assets; deﬂator 1998=100), relative issue size (RISS = issue size
total assets)
and KZ index that measures a degree of ﬁnancial constraint (see equation (1)). All variables except α, DISP,
NAN, LNTA, RISS, ISS and KZ are winsorized at 2.5% of top and bottom values. SD denotes straight debt,
E denotes equity, CB denotes convertible debt and REP denotes stock repurchases. Q, MB, SLACK, FCFA,
DIVA and LEV are also industry demeaned. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the level below 1, 5 and
10% respectively. Diﬀerence in means is equal to zero under the null.
Panel A: Proxies for Market Timing
Security Statistics SRB AR SRA Q MB
x 0.0122 0.0026 0.0005 1.5794 2.5267
SD c50
x -0.0009 0.0005 -0.0204 1.4454 2.1130
n 140 140 140 132 137
x 0.1965 -0.0183 -0.0320 3.3262 4.8735
EQ c50
x 0.0447 -0.0228 -0.0871 1.8924 2.8189
n 547 550 550 544 549
x -0.0089 -0.0303 0.0161 1.6885 2.2591
CD c50
x -0.0252 -0.0204 0.0154 1.3156 1.6236
n 50 51 51 50 50
x -0.0181 0.0154 0.0828 1.4251 1.8991
REP c50
x -0.0209 0.0054 0.0347 1.1596 1.3822
n 549 549 549 473 479
SD-EQ -0.1844 *** 0.0210 *** 0.0326 * -1.7468 *** -2.3468 ***
CD-EQ -0.2055 *** -0.0120 *** 0.0481 * -1.6377 *** -2.6144 ***
REP-EQ -0.2146 *** 0.0337 *** 0.1148 *** -1.9011 *** -2.9744 ***
CD-SD -0.0211 -0.0329 *** 0.0156 0.1090 -0.2676


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel C: Proxies for Disagreement between Insiders and Outsiders
Security Statistics α DISP RVOL
x -0.0010 0.1178 1.7419
SD c50
x 0.0000 0.0448 1.5012
n 108 106 141
x -0.0287 0.4087 4.2744
EQ c50
x 0.0000 0.1639 3.7853
n 446 353 565
x -0.0274 0.3586 2.2554
CD c50
x 0.0000 0.2470 2.0131
n 24 18 51
x -0.0312 0.3283 3.0741
REP c50
x 0.0000 0.0962 2.5180
n 408 360 562
SD-EQ 0.0277 -0.2909 *** -2.5325 ***
CD-EQ 0.0013 -0.0501 -2.0190 ***
REP-EQ -0.0025 -0.0804 -1.2003 ***
CD-SD -0.0264 0.2408 ** 0.5135 **
SD-REP 0.0302 -0.2105 *** -1.3322 ***
Panel D: Other Characteristics
Security Statistics ISS RISS NAN
x 153.9200 0.0450 10.7778
SD c50
x 132.0423 0.0281 10.0000
n 142 141 108
x 56.8894 0.2663 5.1879
EQ c50
x 25.2630 0.1972 4.0000
n 685 576 463
x 219.4254 0.1690 4.4000
CD c50
x 88.0282 0.1066 2.0000
n 51 50 25
x 45.3455 0.0430 6.0917
REP c50
x 5.0736 0.0248 4.0000
n 571 498 469
SD-EQ 97.0306 *** -0.2214 *** 5.5899 ***
CD-EQ 162.5360 *** -0.0973 *** -0.7879
REP-EQ -11.5440 ** -0.2233 *** 0.9038 ***
CD-SD 65.5054 0.1240 *** -6.3778 ***
SD-REP 108.5746 *** 0.0020 4.6861 ***90 Determinants of Public Financing Choice
Table 4.2: Market timing and Excess Returns
Pre-announcement excess returns CAR(−60,−10), announcement date excess returns CAR(−1,1) and post-
announcement excess returns CAR(2,60) and CAR(2,250) for equity issuers sorted according to market-to-
book quartiles. CARs in Panel A are computed using the standard market model, where market return
is represented as a total return on TSX 300 index. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) in Panel B
represent size-MB matched ﬁrm abnormal returns. x represents mean excess return, c50
x corresponds to
median excess return and n to number of observations. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the level below
1, 5 and 10% respectively. Diﬀerence in means is equal to zero under the null. Under the null excess returns
are equal to zero. Tests of signiﬁcance of the excess returns are performed for the total sample of equity
issuers only.
Panel A: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (Market Model)
MB quartile Statistics CAR(−60,−10) CAR(−1,1) CAR(2,60) CAR(2,250)
x 0.0478 -0.0292 0.0252 0.5021
1 c50
x 0.0422 -0.0261 0.0271 -0.0607
n 129 129 129 129
x 0.0341 -0.0239 -0.0375 -0.1005
2 c50
x 0.0216 -0.0221 -0.0384 -0.1064
n 131 131 131 131
x 0.0658 -0.0161 -0.0742 -0.2659
3 c50
x 0.0454 -0.0127 -0.0869 -0.3816
n 130 130 130 130
x 0.2092 -0.0036 -0.2054 -0.4201
4 c50
x 0.1109 -0.0244 -0.1834 -0.6805
n 123 123 123 123
x 0.0875 *** -0.0173 *** -0.0713 *** -0.0661
Total c50
x 0.0433 -0.0227 -0.0517 -0.2924
n 513 513 513 513
Diﬀerence in means (Q4-Q1) 0.1614 *** 0.0255 ** -0.2306 *** -0.9402 ***
t-statistics -3.40 -1.73 4.71 4.24
Panel B: Buy-and-hold Abnormal Returns (size-MB matched ﬁrms)
MB quartile Statistics BHAR(−60,−10) BHAR(−1,1) BHAR(2,60) BHAR(2,250)
x 0.0112 0.0161 0.0247 -0.1222
1 c50
x -0.0086 0.0088 0.0147 -0.0644
n 129 129 129 129
x 0.0233 0.0092 -0.0203 -0.0724
2 c50
x 0.0234 0.0040 -0.0148 -0.0405
n 131 131 131 131
x 0.1400 0.0095 -0.0363 -0.0189
3 c50
x 0.0835 -0.0046 -0.0170 0.0155
n 130 130 130 130
x 0.3353 -0.0047 -0.0862 -0.3025
4 c50
x 0.2809 -0.0084 -0.0939 -0.1655
n 123 123 123 123
x 0.1286 *** 0.0075 ** -0.0296 * -0.1309 ***
Total c50
x 0.0741 -0.0012 -0.0171 -0.0632
n 513 513 513 513
Diﬀerence in means (Q4-Q1) 0.3241 *** -0.0207 * -0.1110 *** 0.1803 *





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.4: Security Issuance and (Dis)agremeent
Quartiles matrix of market-to-book values (columns) and agreement parameter α (rows) (Panel A) and
quartiles matrix of market-to-book values (columns) and disagreement parameter (coeﬃcient of variation
of analysts’ earnings forecast - DISP) in rows (Panel B). α is deﬁned as a relative diﬀerence between
actual (EPSa) just prior to the announcement of the security issue and the last forecasted EPS (EPSf):
α =
EPSa−EPSf
EPSf . DISP is deﬁned as an absolute value of the coeﬃcient of variation of forecasted earnings for
t+1 year, where t is the year of the security issue: DISP =|
standard deviation of earnings forecasts
mean earnings forecast |. First value in
cells represents proportion of equity issuers for a given cell, the second value represents number of all issuers.
Panel A: Agreement between Insiders and Outsiders and Valuation
market-to-book quartile
1 2 3 4 Total Diﬀ. Q4-Q1 t-stat
1 0.284 0.423 0.513 0.795 0.461 0.511 *** 6.08
74 52 39 39 204
2 0.299 0.418 0.538 0.625 0.487 0.326 *** 4.98
α 87 98 106 128 419
quartile 3 0.250 0.500 0.429 0.636 0.479 0.386 ** 2.31
12 16 21 22 71
4 0.300 0.383 0.426 0.814 0.462 0.514 *** 5.79
50 60 68 43 221
Total 0.291 0.416 0.491 0.690 0.474 0.399 *** 9.24
223 226 234 232 915
Diﬀ. Q4-Q1 0.016 -0.040 -0.086 0.019 0.001
t-stat 0.19 -0.42 -0.85 0.21 -0.02
Panel B: Disagreement between Insiders and Outsiders and Valuation
market-to-book quartile
1 2 3 4 Total Diﬀ. Q4-Q1 t-stat
1 0.077 0.368 0.362 0.410 0.340 0.333 *** 4.02
26 38 69 61 194
2 0.200 0.286 0.300 0.587 0.342 0.387 *** 3.97
DISP 40 63 50 46 199
quartile 3 0.283 0.418 0.460 0.763 0.459 0.480 *** 5.12
53 55 50 38 196
4 0.446 0.512 0.722 0.889 0.619 0.443 *** 5.67
65 43 36 45 189
Total 0.293 0.387 0.434 0.637 0.438 0.344 *** 7.07
184 199 205 190 778
Diﬀ. Q4-Q1 0.369 *** 0.144 * 0.360 *** 0.479 *** 0.279 ***



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.6: Characteristics of Equity Issuers by Size Quartiles
Variables are size of the company (log value of total assets), excess stock price returns prior to the an-
nouncement of the issue (CAR(−60,−10)), equity market-to-book ratio (MB =
market value of equity
book value of equity ), To-
bin’s Q ratio (Q =
book values of long term and short term debt + market value of equity
total assets ), excess stock price returns
after the announcement of the issue (CAR(2,60)), leverage (LEV =
long term debt
total assets ), cash ﬂow over assets
(CFA =
net income+depreciation
total assets ), payout (DIV A = cash dividends
total assets ), slack (SLACK =
cash and equivalents
total assets ) and
KZ index that relates to ﬁnancial constraint (see equation 4.1). All variables except KZ are winsorized at
2.5% of top and bottom values. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the level below 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
Under the null diﬀerence between quartiles is equal to zero.
Size Quart. Statistics LNTA MB CAR(−60,−10) Q CAR(2,60)
x 9.4716 9.1599 0.2017 6.3272 -0.1388
1 c50
x 9.6517 6.7070 0.1167 5.2108 -0.1365
n 115 115 115 115 115
x 11.0821 4.5383 0.0560 3.2534 -0.1104
2 c50
x 11.0392 3.2191 0.0280 2.2069 -0.1151
n 134 134 134 133 134
x 12.3557 3.2566 0.0714 2.1436 -0.0336
3 c50
x 12.3262 2.1881 0.0549 1.6557 -0.0541
n 135 135 135 132 135
x 14.0023 2.4727 0.0353 1.5623 -0.0100
4 c50
x 13.7928 1.8137 0.0285 1.2775 -0.0133
n 129 129 129 128 129
x 11.7906 4.7176 0.0875 3.2348 -0.0713
Total c50
x 11.8158 2.7598 0.0433 1.8801 -0.0517
n 513 513 513 508 513
Diﬀ. in means (Q4-Q1) 4.5307 *** -6.6872 *** -0.1663 *** -4.7650 *** 0.1288 ***
t-statistics 43.43 -9.22 -3.46 -11.33 2.79
Table 4.6 continued
Size Quart. Statistics KZ LEV CFA DIVA SLACK
x 0.2672 0.0737 -0.2056 0.0007 0.3091
1 c50
x -0.0048 0.0047 -0.1496 0.0000 0.2573
n 107 115 114 114 114
x 0.3400 0.1308 -0.0256 0.0053 0.1887
2 c50
x 0.2769 0.0290 0.0310 0.0000 0.0788
n 131 134 134 134 133
x 0.4136 0.2014 0.0302 0.0161 0.0880
3 c50
x 0.8297 0.1896 0.0630 0.0000 0.0354
n 132 132 132 132 132
x 0.5758 0.2853 0.0807 0.0183 0.0500
4 c50
x 0.9635 0.2978 0.0775 0.0061 0.0108
n 128 129 129 129 129
x 0.4045 0.1753 -0.0245 0.0104 0.1543
Total c50
x 0.5434 0.1386 0.0525 0.0000 0.0569
n 498 510 509 509 508
Diﬀ. in means (Q4-Q1) 0.3086 ** 0.2116 *** 0.2864 *** 0.0175 *** -0.2591 ***
t-statistics 2.23 11.49 11.09 6.00 -10.9996 Determinants of Public Financing Choice
Figure 4.1: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns
Cumulative average abnormal returns around the announcements of security issues (share repurchases). t0
represents the announcement date of the security issue (share repurchase). SD refers to straight debt (bonds),
EQ refers to equity issues, CD to convertible bond issues and REP to announced share repurchases.


















































Security Issue Announcements, Short
Interest, Market Timing and
Pecking-order
5.1 Introduction
Short interest (short sales) has been studied extensively, in particular the relationship be-
tween short interest and stock returns or put diﬀerently, the informational content of short
sales. However, the views on the informational content of short sales are diﬀerent. Diamond
and Verrechia (1987) argue that short interest negatively aﬀects stock returns, as given the
cost of shorting the stock, only informed traders will engage in the activity, thus conveying
the new (bad) information to the market. A positive relationship between short sales and
stock returns stems from the fact that open short positions will eventually have to be closed,
thus resulting in a higher probability that the price of a highly shorted stock will eventually
have to rise due to increased demand. The third perspective on a relationship between short
sales and stock prices oﬀers no informational link between the two, since short interest is a
result of diﬀerent hedging and arbitrage strategies (Brent, Morse and Stice, 1990). Most of
the empirical research has failed to provide conclusive evidence about the relationship (see
for example Brent et al., 1990, Senchack and Starks, 1993), also due to the poor quality and
low frequency of data on short interest1.
While there are numerous papers on the wealth eﬀects (excess returns) associated with
announcements of diﬀerent security issues2, the evolution and diﬀerences in short interest
1Aitken, Frino, McCorry and Swan, 1998 for example use intraday data on short sales in the Australian
market and ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative relationship between short sales and stock returns.
2Seasoned equity oﬀerings induce the strongest negative wealth eﬀects (see for example Masulis and
Korwar, 1986, Mikkelson and Partch, 1986 and Asquith and Mullins, 1986) of between -2.5 and -4.5 percent
for the U.S. market, while straight debt issues induce only slightly negative wealth eﬀects (see for example98 Security Issue Announcements, Short Interest, Market Timing and Pecking-order
across diﬀerent security types around security issue and share repurchase announcements
have not been studied. Therefore, we ﬁrstly investigate changes in short interest around the
announcements of diﬀerent security issues (straight debt, equity and convertible debt) and
share repurchase programs, as well as diﬀerences in the changes between diﬀerent security
types. Moreover, previous studies on the relationship between short interest and stock
returns were performed on a cross-section of stocks at any given point in time, while we
look at the cross-section of stocks where short interest clearly bears information content
(announcement of a security issue or share repurchase).
On the other hand, corporate ﬁnance literature has provided some inconclusive evidence
on market timing theory regarding the capital structure of ﬁrms. Although ﬁrms are generally
observed to issue equity after periods of longer positive stock price movements (Baker and
Wurgler, 2002), recent evidence has suggested that the eﬀects are not persistent (Alti, 2006
and Hovakimian, 2006 for example). Secondly, we use data on short interest and exploit
the information bearing corporate event to test the market timing and the pecking-order
hypotheses of capital structure. According to the market timing hypothesis managers time
the market and issue equity when it is overvalued, while increase leverage when equity is
undervalued (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). If this is the case, we should observe signiﬁcantly
larger increases in short interest for equity issuing ﬁrms, which in large part revert back to
pre-announcement levels shortly after, as stock prices adjust. Moreover, the increase in the
short positions will be positively related to the (over)valuation of equity. Previous literature
(see for example Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996 and Korajczyk and Levy, 2003) has shown
that in hot and cold equity markets issuers give diﬀerent considerations to the security to
be issued and investors react diﬀerently to security issue announcements. Therefore, we also
expect the changes in the short interest to diﬀer in hot and cold equity issuing markets
because of the market sentiment and issuer characteristics (in particular overvaluation).
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) show that ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms consider the timing of
the issues, while the constrained ﬁrms do not. Given this, we expect that the short interest
will be decreasing in the degree of ﬁnancial constraint, as ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms do not
issue equity when overvalued and in hot equity market periods only. This represents a test of
the pecking-order hypothesis on the capital structure (Myers and Majluf, 1984), according
to which ﬁrms issue equity when ﬁnancially constrained and cannot ﬁnance projects with
other means of ﬁnancing.
Lastly, we investigate the relationship between the short interest and excess stock returns.
We do so on a contemporaneous basis, where we compare the announcement date excess
returns with the corresponding short interest change, but also on a delayed basis, where we
Dann and Mikkelson, 1984 and Eckbo, 1986). Convertible debt oﬀerings induce announcement date valuation
responses that are between those for equity and straight debt (for an overview see Loncarski, ter Horst and
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explore the relationship of the announcement date excess returns and the lagged changes
in the short interest. This way we analyze both, the explanations for the negative and the
positive relationship between short interest and stock returns.
In summary, we use the announcements of security issues and share repurchase programs
to a) investigate their eﬀect on the short interest, b) use the short interest data to test
the market timing and the pecking-order hypotheses of capital structure and c) revisit the
relationship between short interest and stock returns.
We ﬁnd that short interest signiﬁcantly increases after the announcement of equity and
convertible debt issues. In the case of the former the changes in large part revert back to
the pre-announcement levels, corresponding to a reversion in stock prices (disappearance
of overvaluation). In the case of convertibles the changes persist over a longer period of
time due to convertible arbitrage activities (as shown by Loncarski, ter Horst and Veld,
2007). This is also clearly seen in the cumulative average abnormal returns, where the initial
announcement date returns are more negative for the convertible debt issue announcement
than for equity issues, but they revert back to pre-announcement levels much quicker. In
our view, this is due to diﬀerent informational content of short interest in both cases. More
importantly, we show that the diﬀerence in the determinants of the changes in short interest
in hot and cold equity issuing periods, where companies clearly time the market and take
advantage of overvaluation, in particular during hot equity issuing markets. Investors are
able to observe this ex-post, but they do not diﬀerentiate between companies that time the
market and those that issue equity because they are ﬁnancially constrained. However, the
opposite is the case in cold equity issuing markets. This suggests that screening abilities
of investors are impaired during hot equity market periods, which managers seem to take
advantage of. This provides evidence of both, the market timing and the pecking-order
hypothesis of capital structure. We also ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of the company size on changes
in short interest across the board (even when controlling for the issue type), which suggests
that size of the issuer does represent a limit to arbitrage in short interest market (as also
shown by d’Avolio, 2002 and Ackert and Athanassakos, 2005 for example). Finally, we show
that the relationship between the changes in short interest and stock returns is both, negative
if investigated contemporaneously and positive if investigated on a lagged basis.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2 we relate changes
in short interest to the announcements of increases (decreases) in leverage, market timing
hypothesis and pecking-order explanation of capital structure. In Section 5.3 we present our
data on short interest and issuer characteristics. Section 5.4 is devoted to the analysis of
changes in short interest following the announcements in increase (decrease) in leverage. In
Section 5.5 we perform an analysis of the cross-sectional determinants of changes in short
interest following the leverage increase (decrease) announcements that we use to test the
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diﬀerent market sentiment periods (hot versus cold equity issuing markets) and to separate
the eﬀects of the market timing and pecking-order hypothesis of capital structure. Section
5.6 concludes.
5.2 Short Interest, Stock Returns and Market Timing
Previous research on wealth eﬀects associated with announcements of diﬀerent security issues
has consistently shown that equity issue announcements are associated with signiﬁcantly
negative excess returns (between 2 and 3 percent), while the debt issue announcements are
accompanied with zero or slightly positive excess returns. In a frictionless market short
interest with informational content would represent a “ﬂip” side of stock returns. The
stock returns and short interest would therefore exhibit a negative relationship3. However,
markets are not frictionless and there are limits to arbitrage, in the short interest market
in particular.4 Nevertheless, a corporate event with strong informational content, such as
a security issue announcement, should still have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the changes in short
interest even in a market with limits to arbitrage. Note that we assume here that the shorting
is done by the informed investors - i.e. a corporate event (in this case an announcement of
a security issue) provides new information to the market on which the informed shorters
react, as there is an increased (or decreased) beneﬁt from the shorting, all else equal. We use
data on short interest to a) examine the market timing and the pecking-order hypothesis of
capital structure and b) explore relationship between excess returns and short interest.
The market timing hypothesis of capital structure (see for example Baker and Wurgler,
2002) predicts that managers time the market and issue equity when equity valuation is high
or put diﬀerently, when managers perceive the ﬁrm’s equity to be overvalued (lower future
returns). The converse holds for withdrawals (repurchases) of equity. According to the neg-
ative relationship between stock returns and short interest, we should observe a signiﬁcant
increase in the short interest for leverage decreasing security issue announcements (overvalu-
ation) and no or a signiﬁcant decrease in short interest following a leverage increasing security
issue announcement (undervaluation). Put diﬀerently, short interest will be increasing in the
(over)valuation around the issue announcement date. Moreover, if companies issue equity
(leverage decreasing securities) when managers perceive their ﬁrms to be overvalued and the
equity issue conveys this information to the market, one would expect to see a reversion in
the short interest when stock prices adjust to the increase in the short interest due to the
3Ackert and Athanassakos (2005) document this for the Canadian market.
4For extensive analysis of the short interest market in the US see d’Avolio, 2002 for example. More
speciﬁcally, Ackert and Athanassakkos (2005) show that the supply of short interest is constrained for the
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overvaluation - i.e. equity issuing ﬁrms will experience a strong reversion in short interest
following the postannouncement short interest increase.
However, it can also be the case that a large part of the short interest increase is not
related to overvaluation or undervaluation of equity. In that case we should observe no or
only a minor reversion in short interest following the post-announcement increase in short
interest. This would be typical of convertible arbitrage activities in the case of convertible
bonds (see for example Loncarski et al., 2007) and would also imply that the eﬀect of the
increase in short interest in this case would have limited impact on stock returns compared
to the issues of overvalued equity.
The pecking-order explanation of capital structure (Mayers and Majluf, 1984) hypoth-
esizes diﬀerent levels of informational asymmetries between outsider and insiders of the
companies lead to an adverse selection problem. This results in the ﬁnancing hierarchy that
ﬁrms follow. For their ﬁnancing ﬁrms will use internal ﬁnancing (retained earnings) ﬁrst,
followed by external debt-like ﬁnancing. External equity is issued only when debt capacity
is used up. This suggests that equity ﬁnancing is used when ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained
and cannot take up any additional leverage. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) for example show
that ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms issue equity when macroeconomic conditions are favor-
able, while such conditions do not aﬀect a security issuance decision of ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrms. Similarly, Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) ﬁnd evidence that the equity issuance is
pro-cyclical, as the adverse selection costs are lower in the expansionary parts of the business
cycles. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) demonstrate that market reactions to seasoned equity
issuance are more favorable in hot equity markets, which shows existence of the windows
of opportunity for equity issuance. This evidence shows that a) ﬁrms choice of ﬁnancing
is aﬀected by the macroeconomic and ﬁnancial market conditions and b) investors perceive
information conveyed by the security choice diﬀerently in hot and cold equity markets.
To be able to separate the market timing hypothesis from the pecking-order hypothesis
of capital structure we investigate hot and cold equity market periods separately. First
of all, issuers in hot equity markets are more likely to be overvalued. However, there will
always be equity issuers that are ﬁnancially constrained and would issue equity for a diﬀerent
reason than market timing. In hot equity market periods, bunching of equity issuers can
make it more diﬃcult for investors to tell such issuers apart because of adverse selection
issues. Interestingly enough, it may also be the case that screening abilities of investors
are diminished in such periods because of overwhelming market sentiment (frenzy). Note
that such predictions indicate some sort of behavioral explanation of investors’ behavior in
the markets. Rational investors would always consider the diﬀerences in issuers and would
tell apart market timers and ﬁnancially constrained equity issuers. We see a short interest
that is decreasing in the degree of ﬁnancial constraint, in particular in cold equity markets,
as evidence to support and separate the pecking-order hypothesis from the market timing102 Security Issue Announcements, Short Interest, Market Timing and Pecking-order
hypothesis.
5.3 Data
We analyze three types of public security issues on the Canadian market in the period
between 1998 and 2004: straight debt (bond) issues, equity issues and convertible debt
issues, as well as share repurchases (equity withdrawal). The data on the new issues is
gathered from the SDC New Issues database. During this period, there were 1,075 corporate
nonconvertible debt issues, 95 convertible debt issues, 3,439 equity issues and 1,415 intended
share repurchases in the corporate sector.5 We ﬁrst eliminate all ﬁnancial companies from
our sample (SIC 6000-6999). This leaves us with 440 corporate nonconvertible debt issues, 58
convertible debt issues, 2,271 corporate equity and 1,084 intended share repurchases. Next,
we match the sample with the WorldScope accounting data, as well as the stock price and
the market value data from Datastream.6 Since the data in Datastream is not available for
all non-ﬁnancial companies in our sample, we are left with 142 corporate nonconvertible debt
issues (made by 40 diﬀerent companies), 51 convertible debt issues (made by 41 diﬀerent
companies), 682 corporate equity issues (made by 341 diﬀerent companies) and 575 intended
share repurchases (made by 238 diﬀerent companies). The total sample contains 1,450
diﬀerent security issues and share repurchases made by 546 diﬀerent companies.
Data on short interest (short sales) was obtained from the Toronto Stock Exchange Group
(TSX Group). TSX provides information on consolidated short positions for stocks traded on
TSX and TSX Venture exchanges twice a month (every 15th and the last day of the month),
as reported by brokers. Frequency of the short interest data is twice as high compared to the
short interest data on the US market, where reports are in general available once a month.
Only non-zero short interest is reported, so the number of observations with non-missing
values varies over reporting periods. In general the short interest data is available for at
least 80 corporate straight debt issues, 40 convertible debt issues, 413 equity issues and 280
share repurchases.
5Note that this does not include the issues placed by government or government agencies.
6Note that availability of the data refers to a particular company being listed in Datastream and not to
the actual accounting numbers per se. Number of companies in tables of descriptive statistics and regression
tables might therefore be diﬀerent, depending on the availability of the data for the variables used in the
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5.4 Stock Returns and Changes in Short Interest
5.4.1 Wealth Eﬀects Associated with Leverage Increase (Decrease)
Announcements
In Table 5.1 we ﬁrst show wealth eﬀects associated with the announcements of security issues
and share repurchase programs. The announcement eﬀects are estimated using a market
model. For the market portfolio return we use the Standard & Poor’s TSX (Toronto Stock
Exchange) value-weighted total return index, which is widely considered as the benchmark
for Canadian equities. It accounts for more than 200 stocks listed on the TSX or about 70%
of the total market capitalization. Denoting the announcement period, reported by SDC, as
day 0, the estimation period for the parameters of the market model ranges from day -250
to day -60.
In line with previous studies on the wealth eﬀects associated with the announcements of
security issues we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative market reaction to equity issues (CAAR−1,1 =
−1.832%) and convertible debt issues (CAAR−1,1 = −3.030%), while no signiﬁcant mar-
ket response in the case of straight bond issue announcements (statistically insigniﬁcant
(CAAR−1,1 = 0.264%). On the other hand we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive market response
to the announced share repurchase programs (CAAR−1,1 = 1.541%).
In addition to the announcement date related wealth eﬀects, we show evolution of cu-
mulative average abnormal returns in a wider period around the announcement date of the
security issue (withdrawal) in Figure 5.1. From Figure 5.1 we can observe that equity issues
are characterized with a signiﬁcant cumulative average abnormal return run-up prior to the
issue announcement, followed with a prolonged decline. On the other hand, share repurchas-
ing companies are plagued with prolonged negative cumulative average abnormal returns
prior to the repurchase announcement. There is hardly any abnormal returns action in the
case of straight bond issuers, while convertible debt issuers experience a strong negative
market response immediately after the issue announcements, but the returns do rebound
shortly after. However, in order to say more about the relationship between stock returns
and changes in short interest we need to look into the latter ﬁrst.
5.4.2 Levels and Changes in Short Interest
In Panel A of Table 5.2 we present levels of short interest for diﬀerent security types (share
repurchasers) and diﬀerent reporting periods. Short interest level in period t (sit) is deﬁned
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reporting period t and n represents total number of shares outstanding. Note that TSX
reports consolidated broker positions twice a month (every fortnight).
From Panel A of Table 5.2 we ﬁrst observe that the relative level of short interest after the
announcement of the issue (from si0 onwards) is the highest in the case of convertible bond
issues (increasing to beyond 2 percent), while in the case of the other two security types and
share repurchases it remains below 1 percent. Of course, we cannot compare levels across
diﬀerent securities, as a) initial levels of short interest (si−1) are diﬀerent and b) sizes of the
issuers diﬀer, which means that limits of arbitrage in the short interest market diﬀer across
company sizes and security types.
Therefore, we need to look either at pairwise diﬀerences in short interest between pe-
riod t and the period prior to the announcement (t=-1) or into diﬀerences in means across
consecutive periods for a given security type.
In Panel A of Table 5.2 we ﬁrst look into signiﬁcance in pairwise diﬀerences (as denoted
by stars in the column corresponding to the number of observations in a given short interest
reporting period). Note that number of observations change over the reporting period, so the
pairwise diﬀerences refer only to the observations in period t that were also reported having
short interest in period t-1. Based on the signiﬁcance levels of these pairwise diﬀerences we
can conclude that only equity and convertible debt issuers experience a signiﬁcant increase
in the levels of short interest following the announcement of the issue.
In Panel B of Table 5.2 we investigate the diﬀerences in relative short interest between
consecutive periods and test whether these diﬀerences are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
We compute the diﬀerences as:
dt = sit − sit−1 (5.2)
From Panel B we observe that in a reporting period (d0) in which the announcement
of the issue takes place short interest immediately increases in the case of equity issuers
(0.040%) and convertible debt issuers (0.641%). In the next period (d1) there is the largest
additional signiﬁcant increase for equity issuers (0.421%) and signiﬁcant decrease for share
repurchasers (-0.040%). More interestingly, there is a signiﬁcant decrease in period 3 for
equity issuers (-0.137%), which suggests some reversion in short interest.
Similar can be inferred from the graphical representation in Figure 5.2, where we scale
the preannouncement level of relative short interest for each security type (share repurchase)
to 100. We observe that the largest increase (150 percent within a month of the issue an-
nouncement) is experienced by convertible debt issuers. Moreover, the increase is persistent
over a longer period of time, which suggests that the increase is for the larger part not to be
attributed to the perceived overvaluation of equity. In case of equity issuers we also observe
a large increase in short interest (around 75 percent within a month of the issue announce-
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after the announcement of the issue. If we compare Figures 5.1 and 5.2, we can observe some
correspondence between short interest and stock returns following the announcement of the
issue.
Initial levels of short interest (si−1) diﬀer across diﬀerent security types and the same
absolute diﬀerence in the relative short interest represents quite diﬀerent informational con-








In Table 5.3 we show mean and median values, together with standard deviations sepa-
rately for hot and cold equity market periods. We deﬁne a hot market period as a period in
which a three month moving average of the number of equity issues exceeds the median value
of our sample. The converse holds for cold market period (i.e. number of equity issues is
below median value). We show the value separately for hot and cold equity market periods,
as we will later perform a separate analysis for hot and cold equity issuance market periods.
The ﬁrst thing that can be noted in Table 5.3 are very large diﬀerences between mean and
median values. This indicates that in relative terms changes in short interest are substantial,
in particular for equity and convertible debt issuers, but also that dispersion of such relative
changes is quite wide. In terms of median values we observe the largest increases in short
interest for equity issuers in hot equity markets (1.685 in period 1) and convertible bond
issuers in cold equity markets (1.636 in period 0). We observe stronger reversion in short
interest for equity issuers in hot equity markets (0.867 in period 3) than in cold equity
markets (0.909 in period 3). These ﬁndings are similar to the ﬁndings based on Table 5.2
and Figure 5.2.
All the results are in line with the expectations based on the market timing hypothesis of
capital structure. Firms issue overvalued equity. The announcement of such issue is followed
by a strong increase in short interest and subsequent partial reversion once the (overvalued)
stock prices decline.
5.5 Cross-sectional Determinants of the Changes in
Short Interest
We devote this section to the analysis of cross-sectional determinants of the changes in
short interest, which we more speciﬁcally use to test the market timing and the pecking-
order hypotheses of the capital structure. To do so, we estimate the following two models,
where we regress the relative changes in short interest on the variables that proxy for the
(over)valuation (pre and post announcement excess returns, announcement date excess re-106 Security Issue Announcements, Short Interest, Market Timing and Pecking-order
turns and market-to-book value) and ﬁnancial constraint (KZ index), controlling for size




t,i =θt,0 + θt,1 · CAAR(−60,−10),i + θt,2 · CAAR(−1,1),i + θt,3 · MBi (5.4)
+ θt,4 · KZi + θt,5 · LNTAi + i,
δ
SI
t,i =θt,0 + θt,1 · CAAR(−60,−10),i + θt,2 · CAAR(−1,1),i + θt,3 · MBi (5.5)
+ θt,4 · KZi + θt,5 · LNTAi + θt, · CDi + θt,7 · EQi + i,
where δSI
t,i refers to relative short interest of issuer i in reporting period t, CAAR(−60,10),i
denotes cumulative average abnormal return of issuer i in the pre-announcement period
(between -60 and -10 days prior to the announcement of the issue), CAAR(−1,1),i denotes
cumulative average abnormal return of issuer i in a period between a day prior and a day
following the announcement of the issue (share repurchase), MBi denotes market-to-book
ratio, KZi refers to the KZ index that proxies for a degree of ﬁnancial constraint of the
issuer, LNTAi is the size of the issuer measured in log of total assets (in 1998 Canadian
dollar terms), CDi denotes dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the issue is a convertible
bond and 0 otherwise and EQi denotes a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the issue
is equity and 0 otherwise.
For a comprehensive measure of ﬁnancial constraint, we follow Baker, Stein and Wur-
gler (2003). They use a four-variable version of the Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) index, which is
constructed based on the coeﬃcients of the restricted ordered logit model.7 We therefore
construct the KZ index as:
KZit = −1.002 ·
CFit
Ait−1







CF represents the sum of the depreciation, the amortization and the income before ex-
traordinary items, A stands for total assets, LEV represents leverage as debt over the sum of
debt and equity and CASH represents cash and short-term investments. KZ index is higher
for ﬁrms which are more ﬁnancially constrained, since such ﬁrms have exhausted their debt
capacity (high leverage), have a low cash ﬂow from operations, need to pay higher dividends,
but do have good growth opportunities.
In Table 5.4 we present descriptive statistics for the variables that we use as proxies
for the (over)valuation and the ﬁnancial constraint. From the table we ﬁrstly observe that
7This is in some contrast to the approach used by Lamont, Polk and Sa´ a-Requejo (2001). They include the
Q-ratio as an additional component of the index. In our view high Q-ratio might indicate an overvaluation
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equity issuers have higher market-to-book ratios compared to other types of issuers, in par-
ticular share repurchasing ﬁrms in both, hot and cold equity market periods. Secondly, we
observe that the diﬀerences in ﬁrms characteristics between hot and cold equity markets are
signiﬁcant only in the case of equity issuers. The market-to-book ratio is higher in the hot
equity market periods (5.617) than in the cold equity market periods (4.210). Equity issuers
also experience higher preannouncement excess stock returns in the hot equity market peri-
ods (28.7 percent) than in the cold equity market periods (11.4 percent). Moreover, equity
issuers also experience negative postannouncement excess stock returns in the hot equity
market periods (-9.0 percent on average). This implies that the probability of the ﬁrm’s
overvaluation is higher in the hot equity market. In line with the predictions of previous
literature (see for example Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996), equity issuers in the hot equity
markets are signiﬁcantly more ﬁnancially constrained (average value of KZ index of 0.199)
than in the cold equity markets (KZ index 0.022).
5.5.1 Short Interest and the Capital Structure Theories
We proceed by investigating the relationship between the relative changes in short interest
and the (over)valuation and ﬁnancial constraint proxies. Because of the non-normality of
our dependent variable and quite a few extreme values we estimate the parameters of the
model using a robust regression approach. This approach uses iteratively reweighted least
squares, where case weights (Huber weights and biweights) are taken from scaled residuals,
where larger residuals are assigned lower weights. In Huber weighting, observations with
small residuals are assigned a weight of one. In the case of biweighting, all cases with a
non-zero residual get down-weighted, but the weight is decreasing in the absolute value of
the residual. In Panel A of Table 5.5 we show the regression results for the whole sample for
the model without the dummy variables (Equation 5.5).
We perform ﬁve cross-sectional regressions in diﬀerent short interest reporting periods.
In the period of the announcement of the issue we observe a signiﬁcant negative relationship
between the relative changes in short interest (δ0) and the announcement eﬀect (coeﬃcient for
CAAR−1,1 of -0.8004). This suggests that announcements of the issues that induce a larger
negative market response have a larger increase in short interest around the announcement.
For example, a one percentage point more negative announcement eﬀect is related to an
additional increase in short interest in the period of the announcement of 80 percentage
points. In all the regressions (short interest reporting periods) size variables have a signiﬁcant
and positive eﬀect on the relative changes in short interest. This is due to the fact that shares
of larger issuers are easier to short. The eﬀect is economically important, as the diﬀerence
in log total assets between the smallest and the largest issuer (around 10) translates into
around 60 percentage points higher increase in short interest δ0 (0.0561·10 = 0.5610) during
the announcement period. More action can be observed in the ﬁrst period following the108 Security Issue Announcements, Short Interest, Market Timing and Pecking-order
announcement, where we observe that overvaluation has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the
increase in short interest (coeﬃcients for CAAR−60,−10 of 0.3365 and MB of 0.0195), while
the announcement date excess returns exhibit even a stronger negative eﬀect (-0.9391). The
second period after the announcement of the issue seems to be a “quiet” one. The more
interesting is the third period (δ3), where we observe strong reversion of short interest. Here,
the announcement eﬀect of excess returns is now positively correlated with the increase in
short interest (coeﬃcient of 0.6518). If in period 0 we found a negative relationship, which
is in line with the explanations of negative eﬀect of short interest on stock returns, we ﬁnd
a positive relationship (reversion) here. This provides evidence to support the explanations
of the positive eﬀect of stock returns on short interest. More importantly, this supports
the notion that important part of the short positions during the announcement period (δ0)
are due to perceived overvaluation. These induce negative announcement excess returns
(CAAR−1,1), but are later closed as overvaluation dissipates.
We extend the model by adding dummies for the convertible debt and the equity issues to
account for these two security types. The results of the extended model are presented in Panel
B of Table 5.5. The most important conclusions do not change signiﬁcantly. Additionally,
we observe that part of the increase in short interest in period 1 is now directly explained
with the equity issue dummy (0.5874), as well as part of the reversion in period 3 (-0.1838).
This provides evidence to support the market timing explanation of capital structure. In
addition, ﬁnancially constrained issuers (once we control for the equity issuers) are now seen
to experience a signiﬁcantly lower (coeﬃcient of -0.1031) increase in short interest, which
gives some support to the explanation regarding the pecking-order explanation of the capital
structure.
Finally, we started oﬀ by assuming that the relationship between short interest and stock
returns is negative, as shown in the most of the recent literature, but also documented
speciﬁcally for the Canadian market by Ackert and Athanassakos (2005). However, there
are diﬀerent eﬀects of informational content of short interest on stock returns. One can think
of the short interest as being related to “bad news” (i.e. have negative correlation with an-
nouncement period stock returns), but also having a positive correlation with announcement
period stock returns during a period of short interest reversion (along the lines of the tradi-
tional “Wall Street wisdom”). If this is the case, then the initial post-announcement increase
in short interest following the announcement of the overvalued equity issue will be negatively
correlated with the announcement period stock returns, while the latter decrease (reversion)
in short interest will be positively correlated with the announcement period stock returns.
Note that the two explanations for the relationship between short interest and stock returns
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, since the negative relationship inherently refers to the
contemporaneous relationship between the two, while the positive relationship refers to the
prediction of future stock returns by today’s changes (or level) in short interest. Because we5.5. Cross-sectional Determinants of the Changes in Short Interest 109
look at the evolution of short interest after the corporate event with strong informational
content, we can capture and explore both potential relationships. This is conﬁrmed by the
results in both panels. We ﬁnd a negative contemporaneous relationship between short in-
terest (δ0) and excess returns in the announcement period, while later on we show a positive
relationship between the announcement period excess returns (CAAR−1,1) and short interest
(δ3).
5.5.2 Hot versus Cold Equity Markets and the Theories of Capital
Structure
In order to investigate the market timing and the pecking-order explanations in more detail,
we need to evaluate eﬀects in hot and cold equity issuing market separately. Therefore,
we redo the analysis for subsamples of issues in hot and cold equity issuance markets. We
present the results in Table 5.6.
Panels A and B show estimates for a model without convertible bond and equity issue
dummies. Panel A refers to estimates for the subsample of issues in hot equity markets and
panel B to the subsample of issues in cold equity markets.
There are diﬀerences between both panels. First of all, there seems to be a strong and
signiﬁcant negative relationship between announcement returns and increase in short interest
in cold equity markets in period 0 (coeﬃcient of -1.0802), while no signiﬁcant eﬀect is found
in hot equity markets. On the other hand, there is a strong and signiﬁcant negative eﬀect in
period 1 (-1.4898) and a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect (reversion) between excess stock returns
and increase in short interest in the hot equity market in period 3 (0.6310), with marginally
signiﬁcant reversion in the case of cold equity markets. Moreover, there is a signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect for ﬁnancially constrained issuers on changes in short interest in period 1 in
the case of cold equity markets (coeﬃcient of -0.0984), while there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect
in the case of hot equity markets. This gives support to both explanations of the capital
structure, the market timing and the pecking-order. Investors do not seem to diﬀerentiate
between issuers that time the market and those that are ﬁnancially constrained and issue
equity when equity markets are hot. This implies that ﬁnancially constrained issuers are
perceived to be timing the market if they issue equity during hot equity market periods and
will thus exhibit more negative stock returns and larger increases in short interest.
We redo the same analysis with the estimation of the extended model, where we add
dummy variables for convertible debt and equity issues. The results are presented in Panels
C and D of Table 5.6.
The results show that the diﬀerences between hot and cold equity markets are now even
stronger. Most of the valuation eﬀect is now shown to be concentrated around equity issues.
In the case of hot equity markets we ﬁrst observe a signiﬁcant increase in short interest for110 Security Issue Announcements, Short Interest, Market Timing and Pecking-order
equity issuers in period 1 (coeﬃcient of 0.7418) and a subsequent reversion in period 3 (-
0.2527). On the other hand, the increase in period 1 for the equity issuers in the cold equity
markets is much less in size (0.4820), but the same is the case with the reversion in period 3
(coeﬃcient of -0.1267). However, there is again a signiﬁcantly negative relationship between
the degree of ﬁnancial constraint and the increase in short interest (coeﬃcient of -0.1572).
Moreover, in cold equity market periods there is a signiﬁcant positive relationship in the
announcement period (δ0) and the ﬁrst postannouncement period (δ1) between convertible
bond issues and the increase in the short interest (0.2650 and 0.3491 respectively). This
could imply that in cold equity market periods convertible debt serves as a substitute for the
equity. In such case, a convertible debt would be designed to be more equity-like. Loncarski
et al. (2007) show that more equity-like convertible bonds are more underpriced and as
such better suited for convertible arbitrage. This might explain the large and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients for the convertible debt dummies in the cold equity markets, as convertible
arbitrage implies taking a long position in a (underpriced) convertible bond and a short
position in the underlying stock.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we analyze changes in short interest following the announcements of secu-
rity issues (withdrawals). We use the relative changes in short interest, together with the
(over)valuation and ﬁnancial constraint proxies to test the market timing and the pecking-
order theories of capital structure.
We ﬁnd signiﬁcant increases in short interest for equity and convertible bond issuers,
no signiﬁcant changes for straight bond issuers and some signiﬁcant decreases for share
repurchasers. We also ﬁnd consistent evidence to support the market timing explanation of
the capital structure.
Since the issuers and the investors perceive hot and cold equity markets diﬀerently, we in-
vestigate the determinants of short interest in hot and cold equity market periods separately.
In hot equity issuance markets we observe an increase and reversion in the short interest
for equity issuers, while the reversion in cold equity markets is much lower. In addition,
investors do not seem to consider the degree of ﬁnancial constraint of the issuer in hot equity
markets, as they do in cold equity markets. This has several implications.
Firstly, we show that investors perceive equity issue announcements and issuers’ char-
acteristics diﬀerently in hot and cold equity issuance markets. In hot equity markets most
of the attention is focused on overvaluation aspects, while no or limited attention is put on
a degree of ﬁnancial constraint. This is not the case in cold equity markets, where more
ﬁnancially constrained equity issuers experience less of the increase in short positions (even
after we control for the size or limits to arbitrage in the short interest market). This implies5.6. Conclusion 111
either some degree of diﬃculty discerning among diﬀerent equity issuers in hot equity mar-
kets (due to easier mimicking and bunching of the issuers) or lack of rational behavior in the
case or market frenzies (herding). Overall, we see these results as evidence in support of the
market timing and the pecking-order hypothesis of capital structure.
Secondly, we ﬁnd both positive and negative relationship between changes in short in-
terest and stock returns, in particular in hot equity markets. This provides evidence for
both, Diamond and Verrechia’s (1987) “negative information content” and the popular “Wall
Street” reversion explanation. Moreover, given the diﬀerences between convertible bonds and
equity issues, it is clear that persistence in short interest (as is the case for convertible bonds)
also provides evidence for the view that short interest to a certain degree does not have in-
formation content to be transmitted into stock prices. We are able to ﬁnd this by looking
at diﬀerent cross-sections of changes of short interest, as the negative relationship between
short interest and stock returns is contemporaneous, while the positive relationship is based
on the lagged eﬀect.112 Security Issue Announcements, Short Interest, Market Timing and Pecking-order
5.A Tables and Figures
Table 5.1: Wealth eﬀects
Wealth eﬀects associated with announcements of diﬀerent security types and share repurchases. CAARt1,t2
denotes cumulative average abnormal return between days t1 and t2, where t=0 denotes the announcement
date of the security issue or share repurchase. AARt denotes average abnormal return on day t. x denotes
mean value, cx
50 denotes median value, σx denotes standard deviation and n denotes number of observations.
Security Period CAAR−1,1 AAR0 CAAR0,2 CAAR0,5
x 0.264% 0.246% 0.120% 0.231%
Straight debt cx
50 0.055% -0.008% -0.157% -0.245%
σx 3.592% 2.331% 3.772% 5.334%
n 140 140 140 140
x -1.832% *** -1.037% *** -2.048% *** -2.759% ***
Equity cx
50 -2.284% -1.089% -2.613% -3.547%
σx 9.462% 5.753% 8.812% 10.825%
n 550 550 550 550
x -3.030% *** -1.170% *** -3.493% *** -3.383% ***
Convertible debt cx
50 -2.043% -0.358% -2.037% -1.338%
σx 5.438% 3.223% 6.288% 7.470%
n 51 51 51 51
x 1.541% *** 0.794% *** 1.844% *** 2.474% ***
Share repurchase cx
50 0.545% 0.289% 0.770% 1.192%
σx 7.115% 5.062% 8.175% 9.664%














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































65.A. Tables and Figures 115
Table 5.3: Relative changes in short interest
Relative changes in short interest for diﬀerent security types and share repurchases in hot / cold equity
markets for 6 reporting periods following the announcement date of the security issue or share repurchase
programe. Hot equity market is deﬁned as a month of the announcement of the issue where the three month
moving average of the number of the equity issues is above median value. Converse criteria holds for the
deﬁnition of cold equity market. δSI
t is a ratio between short interest in the reporting period t (sit) and the
short interest in preceding reporting period (sit−1). x denotes mean value, cx
50 denotes median value, σx
denotes standard deviation and n denotes number of observations. SD refers to straight debt, EQ to equity










SD x 1.007 2.279 1.184 1.265 1.224 0.975 1.124
cx
50 0.999 1.057 0.999 1.017 1.034 0.990 1.007
σx 0.413 4.979 0.946 1.469 0.984 0.417 0.792
n 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
EQ x 3.475 6.297 5.923 3.562 3.430 2.192 2.025
cx
50 1.005 1.685 1.000 0.867 0.978 1.000 0.992
σx 18.374 20.662 33.790 20.503 20.321 11.132 5.194
n 184 189 199 200 202 200 207
CD x 6.882 10.830 1.178 1.180 1.953 1.107 1.321
cx
50 1.099 0.867 1.083 1.044 1.003 0.983 1.011
σx 22.411 44.532 0.487 0.866 3.981 0.722 1.282
n 21 20 19 20 20 21 21
REP x 3.341 3.720 1.418 3.373 4.333 1.939 1.523
cx
50 1.000 0.977 0.995 1.000 0.966 0.999 1.000
σx 17.471 18.802 2.837 21.133 21.989 5.841 2.654
n 144 142 146 146 148 141 140
Cold equity market
SD x 1.266 1.024 1.070 1.047 6.264 1.539 1.716
cx
50 0.997 0.994 1.005 1.043 1.036 1.043 1.014
σx 1.062 0.484 0.789 0.388 30.383 3.512 3.535
n 42 40 43 42 42 44 44
EQ x 1.642 10.404 22.728 2.032 2.002 1.537 2.348
cx
50 1.000 1.389 0.988 0.909 1.000 1.000 1.000
σx 3.273 37.319 302.752 7.519 6.032 3.262 9.716
n 204 212 226 227 232 237 241
CD x 36.939 1.672 1.159 1.352 1.251 1.098 1.231
cx
50 1.636 1.244 0.983 0.991 1.164 0.985 0.987
σx 148.165 1.396 1.025 1.506 0.644 0.726 1.532
n 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
REP x 4.138 1.056 3.790 2.829 1.243 3.190 5.165
cx
50 1.000 0.964 1.000 1.000 0.994 0.998 1.000
σx 18.878 1.405 27.448 13.668 2.306 15.667 30.593
n 164 164 158 161 161 157 161116 Security Issue Announcements, Short Interest, Market Timing and Pecking-order
Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for the preannouncement excess returns (CAAR−60,−10), winsorized market-to-book
value (MB), KZ index (KZ), and the log size of the company, expressed in 1998 Canadian dollars (LNTA)
across diﬀerent security type issues and share repurchase programs. The sample is split in the hot / cold
equity markets. Hot equity market is deﬁned as a month of the announcement of the issue where the three
month moving average of the number of the equity issues is above the median value. Converse criteria
holds for the deﬁnition of cold equity market. x denotes mean value, cx
50 denotes median value, σx denotes
standard deviation and n denotes number of observations. SD refers to straight debt, EQ to equity issue,
CD to convertible debt issue and REP to share repurchase. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the level
below 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Under the null diﬀerence in means (for the same security type) between
the hot and the cold equity market period is equal to 0.
Security Statistics CAAR−60,−10 CAAR2,60 MB KZ lnta
Hot Equity Market
SD x 0.020 0.029 2.579 0.128 15.254
cx
50 -0.010 0.008 2.274 0.466 15.491
σx 0.122 0.140 1.234 0.906 0.868
n 72 72 70 70 72
EQ x 0.287 -0.090 5.617 0.199 11.542
cx
50 0.047 -0.115 3.035 0.336 11.621
σx 1.959 0.445 6.100 1.181 1.889
n 261 262 259 265 273
CD x -0.005 0.033 2.168 -1.025 13.841
cx
50 -0.028 0.026 1.739 -0.266 13.495
σx 0.147 0.175 2.328 1.879 1.557
n 27 27 27 27 27
REP x -0.020 0.076 1.969 0.183 12.860
cx
50 -0.015 0.032 1.384 0.355 12.642
σx 0.189 0.283 2.345 1.005 1.919
n 267 267 246 246 250
Cold Equity Market
SD x 0.004 -0.029 ** 2.472 0.197 15.186
cx
50 0.004 -0.046 2.091 0.486 15.196
σx 0.115 0.148 1.744 1.114 1.117
n 68 68 67 68 69
EQ x 0.114 * 0.021 *** 4.210 *** 0.022 * 11.880 ***
cx
50 0.044 -0.064 2.721 0.345 11.843
σx 0.464 0.419 4.619 1.458 1.818
n 286 288 290 295 303
CD x -0.013 -0.003 1.837 * -0.299 * 13.591
cx
50 -0.023 -0.014 1.580 0.173 13.393
σx 0.152 0.219 1.406 1.513 1.376
n 23 24 23 23 23
REP x -0.016 0.090 1.826 0.098 12.836
cx
50 -0.036 0.037 1.351 0.293 12.766
σx 0.209 0.351 1.785 1.010 1.827
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Figure 5.1: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns
Cumulative average abnormal returns around the announcements of security issues (share repurchases). t0
represents the announcement date of the security issue (share repurchase). SD refers to straight debt (bonds),
EQ refers to equity issues, CD to convertible bond issues and REP to announced share repurchases.
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Figure 5.2: Changes in Short Interest
Changes in short interest over reporting periods (short interest is reported bi-weekly) after the announcement
of security issue (share repurchase) for diﬀerent types of securities relative to the short interest level at time
t-1. t0 represents short interest reporting period in which security issue (share repurchase) was announced.
The starting level of short interest at time t=-1 is set to 100 for all security types (share repurchases).
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The Rise and Demise of the
Convertible Arbitrage Strategy
6.1 Introduction
Convertible arbitrage1 has been one of the most successful hedge fund strategies at the end
of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, earning annual returns of up to 20% or more.
Even though the returns of convertible arbitrage have strongly decreased in recent years,
its trades currently represent more than half of the secondary market trading in convertible
securities with hedge funds as the most important player in this market.2 Moreover, in the
market of primary convertible bond issues 70% to 75% of the issues are bought by hedge funds
(see for example Arshanapalli, Fabozzi, Switzer, and Gosselin, 2004 and Lian, 2006). This
implies that hedge funds engaging in convertible arbitrage3 are important investors, both in
primary and secondary markets. This chapter studies the diﬀerent eﬀects that convertible
arbitrage has on the capital market and its participants.
Research on hedge fund inﬂows and performance (see for example Agarwal, Daniel, and
Naik, 2004 and Choi, Getmansky, and Tookes, 2006) has shown that inﬂows into hedge
funds chase performance or follow performance with some delay. The inﬂow of funds into
convertible arbitrage hedge funds started increasing exponentially after the market downturn
in 2000, when the returns on convertible arbitrage hedge fund indices peaked at more than
20%, but decreased sharply afterwards, turning negative in 2005. This raises two important
1This strategy is aimed at exploiting the underpricing of convertible bonds. It consists of taking a long
position in the convertible bond and a short position in the underlying asset into which the bond can be
converted. The underlying asset is typically a stock of the company that issues the convertible bond.
2See for example Lhabitant (2002).
3The term convertible bond arbitrage is misleading. The complicated nature of the diﬀerent options that
are combined in a convertible bond combined with the fact that it involves corporate bonds, which are by
deﬁnition risky, makes it impossible to create a real risk-free strategy. However, given that this term is
widely used in the hedge fund industry it will also be used throughout this chapter.126 The Rise and Demise of the Convertible Arbitrage Strategy
economic questions. First, what are the determinants of convertible arbitrage returns? Sec-
ondly, who wins and who loses in this strategy? It is clear that convertible arbitrage hedge
funds are gaining. On the other hand, negative wealth eﬀects associated with the increase
in short positions have a direct negative eﬀect for shareholders of the issuing companies. In
addition to this direct eﬀect, shareholders indirectly suﬀer from the lower market value of
collateral (ﬁrm’s assets), since this will negatively aﬀect the credit spread of the existing
and potential new debt claims (as shown by Longstaﬀ and Schwartz, 1995). Through this
same channel, debt claimants are directly negatively aﬀected as well. The two questions also
seem to be closely inter-related, as the realization of extreme gains and losses may lead to a
change of the type and behavior of the issuers.
In order to shed additional light on the economic issues regarding determinants of con-
vertible arbitrage returns and sources of gains and losses, we do the following. First, we need
to identify convertible arbitrage activities. Since hedge funds are not required to report their
holdings, a direct identiﬁcation of the strategy is not possible. We therefore investigate sev-
eral pieces of evidence that jointly provide proper identiﬁcation. With convertible arbitrage
hedge funds being important investors in convertible bonds, we expect the following devel-
opments around the issuance of convertible bonds. First, convertible bonds are expected
to be underpriced at the issue in order to provide a potential “arbitrage” gain. Second, we
expect a signiﬁcant increase in the short positions (short interest) of the underlying stocks
after the announcement of a convertible issue. This increase is expected to be larger for
the convertible bonds with higher exposure to the underlying stock, as measured by the
delta (more equity-like convertible bonds), since more stock has to be sold short to achieve
a neutral hedge position. We investigate the issue on the sample of convertible bonds on
the Canadian market issued in the period between 1998 and 2004. Toronto Stock Exchange
provides the information on consolidated short positions twice a month, as reported by bro-
kers. For comparison, until recently the data on short positions for the US market was only
available on the monthly basis. Therefore, the bi-weekly Canadian data on consolidated
short positions oﬀers better setting for the investigation of convertible arbitrage activities.
The identiﬁcation of convertible arbitrage activities leads us to several ﬁndings.
First, we examine the mispricing of convertible bond issues. Kang and Lee (1996) and
Ammann, Kind and Wilde (2003) provide evidence on convertible bond underpricing. The
underpricing provides potential arbitrage opportunities, and may attract the attention of
hedge funds, amongst others, nowadays. Based on the valuation model of Tsiveriotis and
Fernandes (1998) we ﬁnd the equity-like issues about 25% underpriced, and the debt-like
convertibles about 5% underpriced at the issue. The underpricing does decline somewhat
immediately following the issue, but nevertheless persists over a longer period of time. We
show that the trading volume (liquidity of the issue), the low investment grade, the size of
the issue and the size of the equity component are potential explanations for the observed6.1. Introduction 127
phenomena. Second, by using information on aggregated bi-weekly short positions on the
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) we investigate changes in short positions (interest) around
the issuance dates of convertible bonds. We observe signiﬁcant increases in the short positions
of the underlying stocks after the announcement of a convertible bond issue. In the 30 trading
days following the announcement of the issue, the increases in relative short positions for
equity-like issuers are about 25 percentage points higher than for debt-like issuers. These
increased aggregated short positions remain stable after the issue of the convertible for a
longer period of time. This indicates that hedge funds, or other participants, construct their
position immediately after the announcement of a convertible issue, and keep the position
for a longer period. The long term changes in the levels of short positions demonstrate a
pattern in investment activities that is a characteristic of convertible arbitrage strategies.
Finally, we investigate the determinants of the convertible arbitrage success as well
as it demise in the recent past. Even though convertible bond strategies have received ample
attention in the popular press, there is not much academic research on this phenomenon. This
is remarkable, given the extent of this market. To the best of our knowledge, four other papers
study convertible arbitrage strategies in detail. In a simulation experiment, Arshanapalli et
al. (2004) show that a convertible arbitrage strategy can be highly proﬁtable, especially
in down equity markets. Similarly, Henderson (2005) ﬁnds positive excess risk-adjusted
returns of convertible arbitrage strategies, in particular up to six months following the issue.
Agarwal, Fung, Loon and Naik (2007) show that abnormal returns of convertible arbitrage
hedge funds can be explained by the underpricing (discount) in the primary market for
convertible bonds and argue that abnormal returns of convertible arbitrage hedge funds are
in fact a liquidity premium, as hedge funds act as liquidity providers in the convertible bond
market. Finally, Choi et al. (2006) examine the impact of convertible arbitrage on equity
market liquidity and stock prices. They ﬁnd evidence for arbitrage induced short selling.
This is signiﬁcantly and positively related to liquidity improvements. We additionally show
that declining equity markets were an important determinant of the success of the strategy in
the past, implying that convertible arbitrage hedge funds were able to generate high returns
mainly due to short positions in declining stocks. This also suggests that the short positions
that hedge funds take in the underlying stocks are not hedge-neutral. These returns were
generated at the expense of the issuers, in the form of more underpriced issues in the past,
and of the investors that lent the shorted stocks. Although the activities of hedge funds
improve the liquidity of convertible bonds and the underlying stocks, the negative eﬀect on
the underlying stock prices aﬀected the universe of potential issuers. We demonstrate that
this universe of issuers changed over time, such that convertible bond issues became less
underpriced at the issuance date and thus less attractive for convertible arbitrageurs. In our
opinion this is an important explanation why convertible arbitrage returns declined in the
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The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.2 we describe the
notion of convertible arbitrage and the role of hedge funds. In addition, we present our
testable hypotheses regarding the identiﬁcation of convertible arbitrage activities and their
eﬀect for shareholders and debtholders of the issuing companies. In Section 6.3 we describe
our sample data. This is followed by the main analysis regarding the relationship between
the mispricing, trading volume and short sales in Section 6.4. In Section 6.5 we analyze
convertible arbitrage returns and provide some insights into the discussion regarding the
reasons for their decline. Section 6.6 concludes.
6.2 Convertible Arbitrage and Hedge Funds
6.2.1 Convertible Arbitrage
The classic convertible arbitrage strategy involves taking a long position in a convertible
bond and a short position in the underlying stock. Similar results can be achieved by warrant
hedging (long position in warrant, short position in underlying stock), reverse hedging (short
position in warrant, long position in underlying stock), capital structure arbitrage (a tech-
nique aimed at exploiting pricing ineﬃciencies in the capital structure of the ﬁrm), as well
as with some other techniques (for more details see Calamos, 2005). In this chapter we focus
on the classic convertible arbitrage, since we explore the relationship between convertible
arbitrage returns, the pricing of convertible bonds and short sales.
The beginnings of convertible arbitrage, albeit not as reﬁned and computationally sound
as today, go back as far as the second half of the nineteenth century, when the ﬁrst convertible
securities were being issued (Calamos, 2005). The “arbitrage” setup was based on the same
principle as today - taking a long position in bonds and a short position in the underlying
stock. The speciﬁc number of shares of common stock to be sold short is a function of the
conversion ratio (number of stocks into which the convertible bond converts), the sensitivity
of the value of the conversion option to changes in the price of underlying equity (the so-
called delta measure), and the sensitivity of the delta measure to the changes in the price of
underlying equity (the so-called gamma measure).
The delta measure is deﬁned as the change in the value of the conversion right due to
the change in the value of the underlying equity. It can be derived from the option pricing
model of Black and Scholes (1973), adjusted for continuous dividend payments in the way
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where C is the value of the conversion option, S is the current price of the underlying
stock, K is the conversion price, δ is the continuously compounded dividend yield, r is the
continuously compounded yield on a selected “risk-free” bond, σ is the annualized stock
return volatility, T is the maturity of the bond and N(.) is the cumulative standard normal
probability distribution. The delta measure always takes a value between 0 and 1. Values
closer to 1 indicate a high sensitivity of the convertible bond value to the underlying equity
(stock) value, implying a high probability of conversion.
The convertible arbitrage strategy provides the following cash ﬂows. First, cash inﬂows
from coupon payments of the convertible. Second, cash inﬂows from the short interest
credit on the short stock account.4 Three, dividend payments on shorted stock lead to cash
outﬂows. This is also the reason why non-dividend paying stock is more desirable for the
strategy. Finally, if at the time of the arbitrage setup the convertible bonds are underpriced,
there is a potential for arbitrage proﬁts.
The hedge ratio and the convertible arbitrage setup are time varying, since they depend
on the stock price. When the stock price approaches the conversion price, the delta of a
convertible bond increases; since the bond becomes more equity-like (i.e. the price of the
bond becomes more sensitive to the changes in the value of the underlying equity). This
means that more stocks need to be shorted in order to maintain the neutral hedge ratio,
which is deﬁned as a product of the conversion ratio and delta. The opposite holds if the
stock price goes down.
It should be noticed that the delta is not a perfect measure for the sensitivity of the
conversion option to changes in the stock price. This is caused by the fact that the conversion
option is in fact an option with a stochastic exercise price (since the underlying bond is used
to pay for the exercise price). Besides that, convertible bonds are almost always callable,
and sometimes also putable. In addition, the exercise of a conversion option leads to the
creation of new shares. All these features are not captured in the delta measure. However,
given the fact that there is no better variable available than the delta measure, we continue
to use this measure as an indicator of the sensitivity of the conversion option to changes in
the price of the underlying stock.5
Calamos (2005) argues that convertible arbitrageurs in general look for convertible bonds
4The borrower of the stock (the party that short sells the stock) needs to keep a certain margin requirement
with the broker where the shares were borrowed. This serves as a guarantee for the future return of the
stock. This margin is typically about 50% of the value of the shorted stock. These funds are then credited
with the short interest credit.
5For the same reason other studies use the delta measure as well; see e.g. Lewis, Rogalski and Seward
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that are more equity-like. The underlying shares have a higher volatility, which translates
into a higher value of the equity option, a lower conversion premium and a higher gamma.
Besides that, they have a preference for underlying stocks that pay low or no dividends,
that are undervalued, liquid and that can be easily be sold short. Additionally, zero coupon
convertible bonds or so-called LYONs (Liquid Yield Option Notes6) are said to be less
desirable for convertible arbitrage, as they do not pay coupons and therefore lack cash
inﬂows in the form of coupon components. For the purpose of this chapter we look into a
simple (stylized) setup of a convertible arbitrage, where a neutral hedge ratio is determined
with the delta measure. We ignore any higher “Greeks” or moments in sensitivity of the
convertible bond value with respect to changes in the value of the underlying equity. This
provides us with a simple and intuitive framework for analyzing the relationship between
underpricing, short sales and convertible arbitrage returns.
6.2.2 Convertible Arbitrage Hedge Funds
Convertible arbitrage has been one of the most successful hedge fund strategies of the end
of the nineties and the beginning of 2000’s. Using a survivorship free hedge fund dataset
of Tass-Tremont, we ﬁnd that the number of convertible arbitrage hedge funds grew from
about 26 in 1994 to about 145 in May 2003. As of that moment the number of convertible
arbitrage hedge funds dropped to about 126 in November 2004. In the same period the
assets under management grew from about 0.7 billion in January 1994 (i.e. about 2.2% of
the total assets under management in the hedge fund industry) to about 11.5 billion in May
2003 (i.e. about 2.8% of the total assets under management) and to 13.9 billion in November
2004 (i.e. about 1.9% of the total assets under management). The average annual return
over the period 1994 - 2004 was 9.40% with an annual standard deviation of 4.66%. For
comparison, during the same period the average annual return of the S&P 500 was 11.68%
with a corresponding standard deviation of 15.24%. This indicates that the risk-reward
trade-oﬀ for the convertible arbitrage strategy was much better than that of a pure equity
strategy.
According to Lhabitant (2002), convertible arbitrage trades represent more than half of
the secondary market trading in convertible securities. This indicates that hedge funds are a
very important liquidity provider in the convertible market. Hedge funds diﬀer from mutual
funds and other investment vehicles by their lack of regulation, with limited transparency and
disclosure, and by their internal structure (see Fung and Hsieh, 1997). Most hedge funds try
to achieve an absolute return target, irrespective of global market movements, while hedge
fund managers typically have incentive-based contracts. Accordingly, hedge funds have a
broad ﬂexibility in the type of securities they hold and the type of positions they take.
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On the other hand, investors in hedge funds are often confronted with lockup periods and
redemption notice periods. Such restrictions on withdrawals imply smaller cash ﬂuctuations,
and give fund managers more freedom in setting up long-term or illiquid positions.
The non-standard features make hedge funds an interesting investment vehicle for in-
vestors with potential diversiﬁcation beneﬁts. From an investor point of view, it appears
that a convertible arbitrage strategy oﬀers a signiﬁcant diversiﬁcation beneﬁt due to a low
correlation between a convertible arbitrage strategy and a pure equity index like the S&P500.
During the period 1994 - 2004 this correlation was about 0.126. Using a sample of convert-
ible bonds issued by Japanese ﬁrms, Agarwal et al. (2007) show that most of the return
variation in convertible arbitrage hedge fund indices can be explained by three risk factors,
i.e., the implied interest rate, the implied credit spread, and the implied option price. It has
to be noticed that these three components also make the pricing of convertibles complex.
This may add to the explanation of the observed underpricing of convertibles.
6.2.3 Hypotheses
Convertible arbitrage hedge funds do not provide explicit data regarding their investment
activities. In order to identify convertible arbitrage we have to rely on evidence that can be
gathered from market data. Given the set-up and characteristics of convertible arbitrage,
we test several hypotheses in order to identify convertible arbitrage.
First of all, the main idea behind convertible arbitrage is the exploitation of the mis-
pricing (underpricing) of convertible bonds. The convertible bond issue has to be mispriced
(underpriced) in order to draw attention of convertible arbitrageurs. We therefore explore
the ﬁrst hypothesis:
H1: Underpricing Hypothesis: Convertible bonds are underpriced at the issuance date.
Secondly, the arbitrageur who is attracted by the underpriced convertible bond has to short
sell shares into which the bond can be converted in order to establish the convertible arbi-
trage. This implies the second hypothesis:
H2: Short interest hypothesis: Short sales of the underlying stock of the convertible bond
issuers will increase around the issuance of convertibles.
The number of shares sold short will be larger for higher values of delta (more equity-like132 The Rise and Demise of the Convertible Arbitrage Strategy
issues). This leads to a sub-hypothesis of Hypothesis 2:
H2a: The eﬀect of the increase in short sales will increase in the value of delta.
In addition we hypothesize that the increase in short sales will persist over a longer period
of time. This persistence shows that we are not simply picking up valuation shorting. This
typically occurs in the case of equity issues (or securities that are equity-like), as any valua-
tion shorting will typically have a more short-lived eﬀect. Therefore Hypothesis 2b is stated
as:
H2b: The eﬀect of the increase in short sales will persist over a longer period of time.
6.3 Data
We investigate the convertible debt issues in the Canadian market between 1998 and
2004. Data regarding the issues and their characteristics is obtained from the SDC New
Issues database and from prospectuses of the issuers (available on the SEDAR web site.7)
Data on the stock prices, market indices, government bond yields, interest rates, dividends,
and number of shares outstanding is obtained from Datastream. Data on convertible bond
prices, their trading volumes, and number of trades is obtained from Stockwatch. Data
on short interest (short sales) is obtained from the Toronto Stock Exchange Group (TSX
Group). TSX provides the information on consolidated short positions for stocks traded
on TSX and TSX Venture exchanges twice a month (every 15th and the last day of the
month), as reported by brokers. Until recently, data on short positions for the US market
for example was only available on monthly basis. Therefore, the bi-weekly Canadian data
on consolidated short positions provides us with a better setting for examining patterns in
the number of stocks sold short of the underlying equity of a convertible issue immediately
after announcing and issuing the convertible. Moreover, short sales on the Canadian market
are said to be easier (less limitation8) and less costly to execute than for example in the
US market. This is especially the case for stocks of companies with options or convertible
bonds outstanding. This makes the Canadian market a suitable setting for the investigation
of short sales and convertible arbitrage returns.
7SEDAR stands for “System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval” and is a service of CSA
(Canadian Securities Administration) providing public securities ﬁlings. (http://www.sedar.com/)
8According to Universal Market Integrity Rules set by Market Regulation Services of Canada
(http://www.rs.ca), which replaced rules of individual exchanges in Canada, short sales are allowed on
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6.3.1 Sample Selection and Description
As mentioned before, we have obtained the data on convertible bond issues in the Cana-
dian market between 1998 and 2004 from the SDC New Issues dataset as the basis for our
sample formation. In total, there were 88 new public convertible bond issues denominated in
Canadian Dollars and registered in the SDC dataset during that period. We exclude all the
exchangeable bonds9 and zero coupon bonds. In case of exchangeable bonds the options are
not written on the issuer’s equity, but rather on another asset (either other companies’ stocks
or a speciﬁc commodity). In this case there is an additional settlement risk involved, which
the valuation model does not take into account. In the case of true convertibles, the issuer
can always deliver its own equity (issue new shares), so that part of the convertible value is
considered to be riskless.10 Zero coupon bonds are excluded, because coupon payments are
an important part of the cash ﬂows for convertible arbitrageurs. Since zero coupon bonds
do not provide these cash ﬂows, they tend to be avoided by convertible arbitrageurs. We
impose the requirement that announcement and issuance dates (completion of the oﬀer) are
veriﬁable either in company’s announcements and prospectuses on the SEDAR website or
in Lexis Nexis. These requirements reduce our sample to 72 convertibles. Finally, all our
bonds in the sample should have stock price and bond price data available on Datastream
or Stockwatch, as well as all the details of the issue provided in the prospectus. This leaves
us with a ﬁnal sample of 61 convertible bond issues.
In Table 6.1 we present the descriptive statistics broken down by the year of the convert-
ible bond issue. We observe that changes in volatility and delta closely correspond over time.
In particular, the average values of delta have decreased over time, from 0.613 in 1998 to
0.111 in 2004. This implies that, according to the delta measure, the average issue was much
more equity-like at the beginning of our sample period than at the end. At the same time
the average volatility of the issuer’s stock price also decreased from 0.485 in 1998 to 0.187
in 2004. The dividend yield increased from 3.2% in 1998 to 11.8% in 2004. The average
maturity of the issue declined from 8.5 years in 1998 to around 6.5 years in 2003 and 2004.
The construction of the delta measure itself implies that lower volatility leads to lower
delta values. The overall volatility in the market has declined after 2000, but we believe that
the universe of issuers has also changed during the same period, thus additionally aﬀecting
the lower value of the delta. Given the important eﬀect of volatility on the value of the delta,
we investigate the changes in the volatility of the issuers by taking into account the changes
in the market volatility at the same time. We look at the ratio between the volatility of




. The higher the ratio, the riskier the issuer compared to the risk of the investment in
9Exchangeable bonds are bonds that are convertible into some other asset than the (equity) stock of the
issuing company.
10The valuation approach is explained in more detail in Section 6.4.1 and Appendix A.134 The Rise and Demise of the Convertible Arbitrage Strategy
the market index. In Table 6.1 we observe that the ratio was the highest in 1998 (3.262),
dropping over the years to 1.567 and 1.796 in 2003 and 2004 respectively. This suggests that
on average the issuers became less risky.
Next, we look at the conversion premium, which is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the






conversion premium is inversely related to the conversion ratio. Higher conversion ratios
(lower conversion premiums) indicate more equity-like convertibles (Kim, 1990) and vice-
versa, since a convertible bond with a lower conversion premium is more likely to become
in-the-money (all else equal) and be converted into equity. Besides the maturity of the bond,
the conversion ratio (or conversion price), on which the conversion premium depends, is the
only parameter in Equation 2 which companies can arbitrary choose. As shown in Table 6.1,
the average conversion premium in our sample of convertible bonds has declined from 0.297
in 1998 to 0.165 and 0.198 in 2003 and 2004 respectively. All else equal, this would imply
that convertible bonds have become more equity-like, which is in contrast to the conclusion
based on the delta measure. However, we argue that the change in conversion ratios indicates
that issuers tried to oﬀset the eﬀect of lower volatility by lowering the conversion premium
and making the issues more attractive for the investors. Otherwise, the issues would have
been even more debt-like and would probably be more diﬃcult to sell.
Finally, we investigate the industry composition of the issuers and observe signiﬁcant
changes in time.11 Financial companies (SIC division H) accounted for between 40 to 55%
of issuers in 1998 and 1999, with almost no issuers from SIC division A (agriculture, mining
and construction) during the same period. In 2001 and 2002 we observe a decrease in the
number of issues by ﬁnancial companies (to one-third of the issues in a given year) and an
increase in the number of issuers from SIC division D (manufacturing), which accounted for
about one third of the issuers. In contrast, we observe 45 to 50% of the issues in 2003 and
2004 being made by companies in agriculture, mining and construction (SIC division A).
In addition, we look at some of the other characteristics of the issue. Although the
maturity of the bonds has decreased over time, time-to-ﬁrst call has not changed signiﬁcantly,
as it is on average between 3 and 4 years over the whole sample period. Call-price premiums
have increased, going from no premium at the end of the nineties to an average call-price
premium of around 1 percent in 2004. More interesting is the comparison of average coupons
across the sample period. Although it seems that the average coupon has little variation
over time (going from 7.1% in 1998 to 10.7% in 1999 and back to 7.3% by 2004), when the
changes in the risk-free rate are taken into account, the relative coupon values (rc) show
much more variation. Bonds in later years of the sample, which are also associated with
lower delta (more debt-like convertibles), seem to have higher credit spreads (rc) than more
equity-like convertibles (higher delta). Although this might seem surprising at ﬁrst (given
11We do not report complete results here. These results are available from the authors upon a request.6.4. Identiﬁcation of Convertible Arbitrage 135
the lower relative volatilities), it can be reconciled from the perspective of the valuation of
convertibles. The equity part of the convertible bond is not risky in terms of its delivery,
while the straight debt part bears the default risk. The larger the debt component, the
higher the probability of the default risk, hence riskier the bond.
We interpret the changes of the delta, volatility, conversion premiums and industrial
composition as evidence for the fact that the universe of issuers and their characteristics has
changed over time. This had an important impact on the delta measure (the design of the
convertible bond issue), in addition to the eﬀect of the overall lower volatility in the market.
6.4 Identiﬁcation of Convertible Arbitrage
6.4.1 Pricing of Convertible Bonds
In general, a convertible bond can be considered as a bundle of a straight bond and a
warrant written on the underlying equity. There are two theoretical approaches to valuing
convertible debt. The so-called structural models use the value of the ﬁrm as the underlying
state variable12, while in the so-called reduced form models the value of the ﬁrm’s equity or
rather the default probability is modeled as underlying state variable.13 The reduced form
models have been adopted in most of the recent literature on the pricing of convertible debt.
Grimwood and Hodges (2002) argue that the most widely adopted model among prac-
titioners for valuing convertible debt is the one ﬁrst considered by Goldman Sachs in 1994
and later formalized by Tsiveriotis and Fernandes (1998). Moreover, Zabolotnyuk, Jones
and Veld (2007) show that the Tsiveriotis Fernandes (TF) model outperforms other recent
convertible bond valuation models that are popular among practitioners. TF use a binomial
tree approach to model the stock price process and decompose the total value of a convertible
bond (CB) in an equity part and a straight debt part (so-called Cash Only part of a Convert-
ible Bond - COCB). The holder of the hypothetical COCB receives all the cash ﬂows, but no
equity ﬂows. The value of the COCB is determined by the convertible bond price, the un-
derlying stock price and the time to maturity, since these so-called early exercise parameters
deﬁne the boundary conditions. In other words, since early call, put or conversion is pos-
sible, the stock prices that trigger these events represent the so-called free boundaries that
aﬀect the COCB and CB values. Since the COCB is risky, the partial diﬀerential equation
(Black-Scholes) must include the issuer’s risk or the credit spread to account for the relevant
risk. The diﬀerence between the value of the convertible bond and COCB is the payment in
equity. Since the ﬁrm can always deliver its own equity, this part can be discounted using
the risk-free rate.14 In this chapter we use the methodology of Tsiveriotis and Fernandes to
12See for example Ingersoll (1977), Brennan and Schwartz (1977 and 1980), Nyborg (1996)
13See for example Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Tsiveriotis and Fernandes (1998).
14For more details see Appendix A and Tsiveriotis and Fernandes (1998).136 The Rise and Demise of the Convertible Arbitrage Strategy
estimate the model prices of convertible debt issues in our sample, since this approach can
take into account any call, put and conversion features of convertible debt.
In order to calculate the theoretical (model) price of a convertible bond we use the
following inputs. For the risk-free rate we use the yield on government bonds (Canadian)
of comparable maturity as the convertible bond. A static spread is used to correct for the
credit risk of the issue. Where the data on credit risk (credit rating of the issue) are not
available, we assumed that the company is of the BBB risk.15 In Datastream only Scotia
Capital provides Canadian corporate bond benchmarks for diﬀerent maturities and diﬀerent
credit ratings. They cover BBB, A and AA rankings of short, medium and long term. Based
on the maturities we have extrapolated the following maturities: 1 year (equivalent to short
term), 3 years (between short and medium term), 5 years (medium term), 7 years (between
medium and long term), 10 years and more (long term). Based on the rankings, we have
also extrapolated the rankings lower than BBB (BB and B) by adding a spread to BBB.
This spread is relative to the spread between BBB and A, but is increasing in a lower credit
quality and maturity. The price of the underlying stock at the valuation date is taken from
Datastream, where we take the average stock price between days -12 and -2 relative to the
announcement date of the issue. The number of steps in the tree is equal to the number of
months to maturity at the issue of the bond. The coupon rate, the number of coupons per
year, conversion ratio and call schedule are all obtained from the respective prospectuses of
the bonds. With respect to the dividend information, we obtained dividend yield data from
Datastream.





where for every issue i ei,t denotes the mispricing at time t, Mi,t represents the model price at
time t, computed using the approach to convertible bond valuation as previously described,
and Bi,t denotes the closing market price of a convertible bond at time t.
Based on the model and observed prices we investigate the mispricing of the convertible
bond issues during the ﬁrst year of trading. Volatility estimates are based on a rolling window
of the past 250 trading days and the delta is estimated for every individual trading day. Both
the risk-free rate and the credit spread are also considered for each trading day separately.
Stock prices are matched to every individual trading day. We use constant dividend yields,
computed as the average dividend yield of the past 250 trading days.
In Table 6.2 (Panels A and B) we present the degree of mispricing (et) at diﬀerent points
15We have also computed model prices by taking the lowest possible credit quality for the issues with no
credit risk information available. The mispricing was on average somewhat lower, but it did not signiﬁcantly
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in time after the issue of the bond for the sub-samples of the equity-like and the debt-like
convertibles.
First, we observe that on average the equity-like convertibles are underpriced by 25.2%
(Panel A) at the issuance date, while the debt-like convertibles are on average only under-
priced by 5.4% (Panel B). This diﬀerence of 19.8 percentage points is statistically signiﬁcant
(Panel C). The underpricing16 at the issuance date in the overall sample is on average 10%.
These results conﬁrm our underpricing hypothesis and are in line with the ﬁndings of Chan
and Chen (2005), who ﬁnd an 8% overall underpricing of convertibles at the issuance date in
the US market. Similarly to the higher degree of underpricing for the equity-like convertibles
in our sample, Chan and Chen ﬁnd riskier companies (those with low or no credit rating) to
be more underpriced. In addition, Kang and Lee (1996) ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of the size of the
equity component on the underpricing and King (1986) ﬁnds issuers with higher volatility
of stock returns (riskier companies) to be associated with a higher underpricing.17
Second, the underpricing on average declines in the ﬁrst 15 trading days following the issue
(Panel D), with a decline of 5.5 percentage points in the case of the equity-like convertibles
and 2.6 percentage points in the case of the debt-like convertibles.18 It increases somewhat
afterwards for the debt-like convertibles and remains at about 5% (Panel B), while the case
of equity-like convertibles shows a slight downward trend, but remains at around 19% by
the end of the eleventh trading month following the issue (Panel A). The diﬀerence in the
underpricing between the equity-like and debt-like issues is still signiﬁcant at 12.2 percentage
points six months (120 trading days) after the issue (Panel C). This is in some contrast to
the previous ﬁndings on the evolution of underpricing following the issue, since Chan and
16Note, that we do not report the total sample averages in detail, but these results are available upon
request.
17We have also looked at the phenomenon of income trusts. These are specially designed ﬁnancing vehicles,
where the trust is positioned as an immediate full owner of a typically mature business. The cash ﬂows from
the ultimate operating company, which the trust owns, are usually fully distributed to the trust and then
passed on to unit holders (owners of the income trust) as dividends. Since the trust accrues no tax payments,
investors then (depending on the tax status of their investment) either pay no or lower taxes as they would
otherwise. The main beneﬁt of the income trust is therefore tax driven. Income trusts have become very
popular in the Canadian market in the last few years. Jog and Wang (2004) report that the number of
income trust IPOs has grown from 9 in 1998 to 64 and 36 in 2002 and 2003 respectively, with the highest
increase in the number of business trusts. Since our sample is drawn from the period between 1998 and 2004,
we have looked into the impact of the income trusts on our results. In total 35 out of 61 of the issues in
our sample have been made by income trusts. They are not uniformly distributed over time, but are rather
concentrated in 2002, 2003 and 2004. This coincides with the increasing popularity of income trusts in the
recent years. We have checked whether our results are driven by income trusts and found no conclusive
evidence to suggest that. The strongest conclusion that can be reached is that the increase in the number of
income trusts coincides with the change in the universe and characteristics of the issuers that we described
in Section 3.1.
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Chen (2005) show that initial underpricing dissipates within the ﬁrst 500 trading days after
the issue. Kang and Lee (1996) ﬁnd the same to occur within the ﬁrst 250 trading days
following the issue.
6.4.2 Liquidity and the Mispricing
We further investigate potential explanations for the mispricing of convertibles. We investi-
gate explanations proposed by Lhabitant (2002) and ﬁnd that the majority of the issuers, in
particular those of the more equity-like convertibles, are below investment grade or without
a credit rating. This reduces the liquidity of their bonds in the market. We analyze trad-
ing volumes of convertibles following the issue. In Table 6.3 we present the results for the
debt-like and the equity-like subsamples.
We ﬁnd relative trading volumes (vt)19 of the more debt-like convertibles to be signif-
icantly higher in the ﬁrst 4 trading days than those of the more equity-like convertibles.
For example, at the issue date (v0) 77.4% of the total issue of the debt-like convertibles is
traded, while only 21.3% of the total issue of the equity-like convertibles. On the fourth
day of trading this number is reduced to only 3.4% of the equity-like convertible issues and
10.1% of the debt-like issues.
In addition, in Table 6.4 we provide correlation coeﬃcients between trading volumes and
mispricing of convertibles. The results show that on the issuance date and the subsequent
ﬁrst three trading days trading volume and mispricing are signiﬁcantly negatively correlated
(correlation coeﬃcients of -0.264, -0.329, -0.227 and -0.298 respectively).20 This further sug-
gests that part of the mispricing is to be attributed to the lower liquidity of the convertibles
in early trading, in particular in the case of the more equity-like issues. This is in line with
the argument of Ammann et al. (2003) that relates the underpricing to the lower liquidity
of convertibles. In addition, we have seen that mispricing decreases during the ﬁrst 15 to
20 trading days (see Panel D of Table 6.2), but nevertheless remains signiﬁcantly positive
afterwards. This is to a certain extent not surprising, since trading volumes and number of
trades become signiﬁcantly lower after the initial 5 to 10 trading days, while major investors
(hedge funds) in convertible securities tend to maintain their positions for a longer period of
time.
We ﬁnd mispricing developments during the initial trading period particularly important
for our analysis, as it shows that convertible bonds are underpriced at the issuance date.
The underpricing does decrease immediately following the issue, but remains present over a
longer period of time afterwards. This suggests that major activities related to convertible
19We construct the relative trading volume (vt) as the ratio between the trading volume and the size of
the convertible bond issue - face value of the issue.
20The correlation coeﬃcient on the second trading day (-0.227) is not statistically signiﬁcant (p-value of
0.109).6.4. Identiﬁcation of Convertible Arbitrage 139
arbitrage take place closely around the issuance date.
So far, we have shown that the more equity-like convertibles are more underpriced than
the debt-like convertible bond issues. If indeed the convertible arbitrage activities take place
immediately after the announcement of the issue, we should be able to observe an increase
in the short positions.
6.4.3 Short Positions
One of the basic principles of convertible arbitrage is to short sell the underlying assets of
the convertible bond, while purchasing the convertible bonds at the same time. An increase
in the short selling activities of the underlying stock at and after the announcement of
convertible bond issues, compared to levels before the announcement, can be interpreted as
additional (and more direct) evidence that convertible arbitrage strategies are taking place.21
For the purpose of investigating the relationship between the short sales, the characteris-
tics of the issue and the underpricing we deﬁne a relative measure of short sales as the ratio
between the short interest in a given period22 and the potential number of shares that are






Zi,t represents the relative short sales (interest) measure for company i at time t (t=0
is the announcement date), ssi,t represents the number of shorted shares (so-called short
interest) of issuer i at time t, nb
i denotes the number of issued bonds of issuer i and cri
denotes the conversion ratio of the issue i. This measure of short interest standardizes
outstanding short positions in every period with the number of new shares to be issued upon
conversion of the convertible bond issue into the issuer’s equity. After the announcement we
expect Zt (cross-sectional average at time t) to be signiﬁcantly higher for the more equity-
like convertibles than for the debt-like convertibles. The reason for this is that, given the
convertible arbitrage strategy, more shares need to be sold short given the higher delta.
In Table 6.5 we present the descriptive statistics for both the level and the changes in
the relative short sales between the consecutive periods in a cross-section of issuers at given
points in time t following the announcement of the issue.
21An alternative for hedging by shorting stocks is to create a hedge that involves writing call options.
However, most Canadian convertibles are issued on stocks on which no exchange-traded call options are
available. For this reason we limit ourselves to considering short positions in stocks.
22Note that the data on short interest (short positions) is available biweekly - in the middle and the
beginning of every month.
23We have also investigated the second relative measure of short sales deﬁned as the ratio between the
short interest in a given time period and the corresponding total number of shares outstanding. The results,
which are available from the authors upon request, are very similar and are only downscaled.140 The Rise and Demise of the Convertible Arbitrage Strategy
With respect to the summary statistics for the measure of the level of short interest,
we observe that in the case of the more equity-like issues (Panel A) the average relative
short interest (Zt) increases from around 4.5% in the last period before the announcement
of the issue to 25.0% of the new potentially issued shares in 4 weeks (t=2) following the
announcement date. In the case of the more debt-like convertibles (Panel B) the mean
relative short interest (Zt) increases slightly from 9.3% prior to the announcement to 11.0% in
the period of the announcement. It declines to 9.7% in 4 weeks following the announcement.
The diﬀerence of 10.4 percentage points between the two sub-samples at t=1 (approximately
two weeks after the announcement of the issue) is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level
(Panel C). The diﬀerence continues to increase following the announcement of the issue
(t=7) to 28.8 percentage points and then declines to 17.6 percentage points after 8 months
(t=16) following the issue announcement (as shown in Panel C). Even after 12 months
(t=24) following the issue announcement, the mean relative short interest for the equity-like
convertible issuers is 15.4 percentage points higher than the average short interest of the
debt-like issuers. This conﬁrms hypothesis 2a.
Panels D and E present results for the changes in relative short interest (dZt) between
consecutive periods. These are also based on the relative short interest measure (Zt) and
deﬁned as diﬀerences between consecutive reporting periods (dZt = Zt − Zt−1). From these
results we conclude that the highest increase in the short interest for the equity-like con-
vertibles is at the announcement of the issue and the immediate subsequent period (average
increase of 6.3 and 9.7 percentage points respectively). This is followed by a more moder-
ate increase of 4.5 percentage points in a period between two weeks and one month (t=2)
after the announcement. Afterwards, the relative short interest keeps increasing, but at a
lower pace of between 2 to 3 percentage points per two weeks. Contrary to that, compa-
nies that issue debt-like convertibles experience an average 1.7 percentage points increase in
short positions just after the announcement of the issue, and a 2.1 percentage points decline
(complete oﬀ-set) after the issue of the bond (t=3).
Moreover, the persistence in the level of open short positions indicates that investors,
who take the short position, do so over a longer period of time, which is consistent with
investors engaging in convertible arbitrage rather than investors shorting the stock, since
they perceive it to be overvalued. If indeed this latter group of investors was shorting the
stock, we would observe a decline in short positions shortly between the announcement and
the issuance dates. However, this is not the case, as can be inferred from the changes in mean
values for relative short positions in Panels D and E in Table 6.5. This conﬁrms hypothesis
2b.
All the evidence on the evolution of short interest conﬁrms the short interest hypothesis.
Together with the conﬁrmation of the underpricing hypothesis this provides identiﬁcation of
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6.5 Convertible Arbitrage Returns
6.5.1 Convertible Arbitrage Setup and Returns
Until now we have presented diﬀerent pieces of evidence that all indicate the existence of
convertible arbitrage activities in the Canadian market and its eﬀect for market participants.
The more important contribution of this chapter is the investigation of the determinants of
convertible arbitrage returns. Other papers that examine this topic in similar spirit are by
Arshanapalli et al. (2004) and Henderson (2005).
Arshanapalli et al. (2004) investigate convertible arbitrage returns for the US market
in the period between 1993 and 2001. However, they use a more simpliﬁed portfolio setup.
Instead of taking the delta into account, they assume equal values for the long position in
convertibles and the short positions in stocks. Their results show positive convertible arbi-
trage returns, especially in declining equity markets. Henderson (2005) analyzes convertible
arbitrage returns using data for the US market in the period between 1998 and 2004. He
structures his investigation of convertible arbitrage returns by taking into account the time-
varying delta value of convertibles when establishing the hedge ratio. He also includes the
borrowing costs for the investment in convertibles. However, he does not take into account
the conversion ratio of the convertibles and the short interest rebate.24
We employ a simple convertible arbitrage strategy, where we go long in one convertible
bond at the issuance date and short the appropriate number of underlying stocks (corre-
sponding to the conversion ratio). In this way we achieve a delta-neutral hedge at the
issuance date. We rebalance the short position as the delta changes over time and we con-
sider the so-called short interest rebate. We take borrowing costs into account, as proceeds
from shorted stock do not suﬃce for the purchase of a convertible bond. For every convertible
issue i, we form the following convertible arbitrage portfolio at time t:












((Bi,0 − ∆i,0 · cri · (1 − gi) · Si,0) · li,t),
| {z }
Borrowing part
24The short interest rebate is interest paid on the share of proceeds of sale of shorted stock that needs to
be kept with the broker as a coverage (margin) for future delivery of shorted stock.142 The Rise and Demise of the Convertible Arbitrage Strategy
where for every issue i Pi,t denotes the value of the convertible arbitrage portfolio at time
t, Bi,t denotes the convertible bond price at time t, Ii,t denotes the accrued interest at time
t, ∆i,t denotes the delta value of the convertible bond issue at time 0 (issuance date), cri
denotes the conversion ratio, gi denotes the short interest coverage ratio, wi,t denotes the
short interest rebate rate per period t, Si,t denotes the stock price at time t, Di,t denotes the
dividend at time t and li,t denotes the borrowing cost from t=0 up to time t.
The convertible bond part consists of the bond price at time t and the accrued interest or
coupon payment at time t. The stock part refers to the short position in the issuer’s stock,
where we assume to take a short position (hedge ratio) in ∆i,t · cri shares. This means that
we hedge the quantity of shares equal to the conversion ratio (shares that we would receive in
the case of conversion of the convertible) taking into account the sensitivity of the conversion
option to the changes in the stock price (delta). The short interest rebate refers to the interest
paid on the margin requirement with the broker for the future delivery of shorted stock. Here,
we assume the margin requirement (gi) to be 50% and the short interest rebate rate (wi,t) to
be 75% of the short-term interest rate. Finally, the borrowing part refers to the borrowing
cost that the arbitrageur incurs by borrowing the shortfall of funds needed to establish a
long position in convertibles at the issuance date. More speciﬁcally, the arbitrageur shorts
∆i,0 · cri shares, but she needs to maintain a margin requirement (gi). She therefore needs
to borrow the diﬀerence Bi,0 − ∆i,0 · cri · (1 − gi) · Si,0 at interest rate li,t. Here, we assume
that the borrowing rate equals the short-term interest rate.
Returns on convertible arbitrage portfolios are computed as:
Ri,t = lnPi,t − lnPi,t−1 (6.6)
Finally, we average the daily convertible arbitrage portfolio returns in a cross-section at
each time t and sum them up in order to obtain cumulative returns for the diﬀerent time
periods. In Table 6.6 we present the cumulative average returns (buy-and-hold strategy at
the issue) of convertible arbitrage, convertible bonds and stocks (raw returns) for the sub-
samples of the more equity-like (∆i > 0.5) and the more debt-like (∆i < 0.5) convertibles.
From the table we observe that the returns on convertible arbitrage are positive over diﬀerent
time periods immediately following the issue of the bond. This result holds both for the
equity- and the debt-like convertibles. In case of the equity-like convertibles, convertible
arbitrage (Convertible Arbitrage column of Panel A) earns a return (Rt) of around 33.8% in
one year, while for the debt-like convertibles this is 10.7% (Convertible Arbitrage column of
Panel B). This result is driven by the very negative return on the underlying stock of around
34.4% (Stock column of Panel A) for the equity-like convertibles (at t=240). This, coupled
with the higher delta, generates the positive return diﬀerence for convertible arbitrage for
the equity-like convertibles.
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six months (120 trading days) after the issue, turn negative to -8.5% (Convertible Bond
column of Panel A) by the end of the ﬁrst year after the issue compared to the issuance
date price. Contrary to the equity-like convertibles, the returns on the convertible bonds are
positive for the more debt-like convertibles after the ﬁrst year of trading. For the debt-like
convertibles, which have low deltas, the average convertible arbitrage return of around 10.7%
is 5.1 percentage points lower than the 15.8% return (Convertible Bond column of Panel B)
on the convertible bond by the end of the ﬁrst year of trading. The diﬀerence is due to the
positive return on the underlying stock, which, given the short positions, oﬀsets the gain on
the long position in the bond.
More interesting is the question of the determinants of convertible arbitrage returns and
the evolution of the returns in the ﬁrst year of trading. By construction of the convertible
arbitrage strategy it is clear that convertible arbitrage returns will be driven by returns on
the long position in convertibles and returns on the short position in stock - i.e. the strategy
will generate positive returns when bond prices rise or stock prices fall, all else being equal.
Given that other parameters in the setup either do not change (conversion ratio, margin
requirement) or change very little (short interest rebate rate, borrowing rate), we focus on
convertible bond returns and raw stock returns.
First, we observe that within 15 trading days following the issue, the returns on the more
equity-like convertibles signiﬁcantly outperform returns on the more debt-like convertible by
2.2 percentage points (Convertible Bonds column of Panel C). At the same time, convertible
arbitrage returns on the more equity-like convertibles are also signiﬁcantly higher than those
on the more debt-like convertibles. The diﬀerence in stock returns between the more debt-
like and the equity-like convertible bond issuers is not signiﬁcant during the same period.
This indicates that during this initial period following the issue, convertible arbitrage returns
are mostly driven by convertible bond returns. These in turn are mostly driven by increases
in stock prices (positive returns for both equity-like and debt-like convertibles). Note that
convertible bond prices positively co-move with the stock prices. Both, downward and up-
ward movements in stock prices, have a dual eﬀect on convertible arbitrage returns, directly
via the stock part of the convertible arbitrage return and indirectly via the convertible bond
part of the return. The indirect eﬀect depends on the delta; as a higher delta corresponds
to the higher sensitivity of the price of a convertible bond to the changes in the price of the
underlying equity.
In Figure 6.1 we present the evolution of the returns on the convertible strategy, con-
vertible bonds and stocks for the sub-samples of the more equity and the more debt-like
convertibles during a period of one year following the issue of the bond. We have argued
that dissipation of underpricing, driven by increases in convertible bond prices in the initial
trading, aﬀects the positive returns on convertible arbitrage in the period immediately fol-
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particular beyond the ﬁrst 120 days of trading, the negative stock returns dominate the con-
vertible arbitrage returns for the more equity-like convertibles. In case of the more debt-like
convertibles, the positive stock returns depress the convertible arbitrage returns in compari-
son to the convertible bond returns. It seems that convertible arbitrage strategies earn very
high returns in case of adverse selection of the issuers and/or the down equity markets. This
is in line with the ﬁndings of Arshanapalli et al. (2004).
6.5.2 Performance of Convertible Arbitrage Hedge Funds
The performance of hedge funds that are involved in convertible arbitrage strategies has
been decreasing over time. In Table 6.7 we present the returns on Convertible Arbitrage
Index HEDG CA that is tracked by CSFB/Tremont, convertible arbitrage returns based on
our sample and MSCI World and S&P 500 indices.
Based on the returns presented in Table 6.7 we observe that, apart from two setbacks
in 1994 and 1998, returns on the HEDG Convertible Arbitrage index have for the most
part been above 15%. However, the convertible arbitrage performance has deteriorated in
later years. The popular press provides diﬀerent explanations for this, ranging from stable
equity markets, rising interest rates, withdrawals from funds, to increased competition in the
hedge fund industry and lower volatilities in the main capital markets. In case of the mutual
fund industry, Berk and Green (2004) show that an increase in fund inﬂows is followed by
a decrease in performance, caused by decreasing returns to scale. Since hedge funds are
typically employing limits to the size of the assets they manage, we expect other factors to
explain the decrease in returns (increased competition in the industry and market stability
among others). Given the set-up of the convertible arbitrage strategy, these factors indeed
contribute to a decreased performance. However, we believe (as we showed in Section 6.3.1)
that the structure of the convertible bond (convertible being either debt- or equity-like)
is an important additional explanatory factor to be considered, as it aﬀects the degree
underpricing.
Agarwal et al. (2007) argue that hedge funds act as liquidity providers (by buying con-
vertibles in the primary market) to otherwise iliquid convertible bond markets. In Table 6.3
we observed that more debt-like convertible bonds have signiﬁcantly higher relative trading
volume than equity-like convertibles. This signiﬁcantly better liquidity of debt-like convert-
ibles can be related to the broader spectrum of investors participating in the trading of such
issues. Ammann, Kind and Seiz (2007) for example analyze the performance of US mutual
funds that invest in convertible bonds. Since these funds are more limited in their investment
policies, in particular in taking the short positions in stock, they might only be able to invest
in the convertible bond issues with low delta and hence lower delta hedge requirements. On
one hand, this emphasizes the importance and the role of convertible arbitrage hedge funds
in the case of the more equity-like convertible bond issues, where the number of investors is6.5. Convertible Arbitrage Returns 145
more limited. On the other hand, it provides some information about the lower degree of
competition among investors on the market for equity-like convertibles.
An important part of the return in the convertible arbitrage strategy represents the proﬁt
from the underpricing of convertible bond issues. The degree of mispricing of convertible
bond issues has shown to be to a large extent determined by characteristics of any par-
ticular issue. In other words, the more equity-like convertible bonds are likely to be more
underpriced than debt-like convertible bonds, as we have shown in previous sections. As
the structure of the convertible bond changed over time from the more equity-like to more
debt-like, we observe less underpricing and less true arbitrage opportunities for convertible
arbitrage strategies. Agarwal et al. (2007) similarly demonstrate that abnormal returns of
the convertible arbitrage hedge funds can be explained by the “original issue discount in the
primary convertible bond market”.
In addition to this established fact, we have shown that the returns on the more equity-
like convertibles were also largely driven by the negative stock returns. This is in some
contrast to the ﬁndings of Agarwal et al. (2007), who ﬁnd very low returns from the “delta-
hedging” activities, but it is in line with the returns in Table 6.7, where the highest returns
were recorded in downward pressured or stagnating stock markets and in years in which most
of the issues were more equity-like (end of the nineties, beginning of the new millenium).
It also shows that our sample is representative of the overall convertible arbitrage hedge
fund universe or, put diﬀerently, that Canada is in that respect not diﬀerent from the other
markets in which convertibles are mostly traded and hedge funds are engaged in convertible
arbitrage activities.
In Table 6.8 we provide the mean for the delta and the mispricing values averaged across
the years of convertible debt issues for the sub-samples of the more equity and the more
debt-like convertible bond issues.
We observe from the table that the mispricing of the convertible bond issues declines
over time. This corresponds to the change in the structure of convertible bond issues from
the predominantly equity-like issues in late 1990s to the more debt-like issues in 2003 and
2004 (as measured by the delta). This is in line with the discussion regarding the change in
the universe of issuers in Section 6.3.1. Second, we demonstrated (see Table 6.6) that the
convertible arbitrage returns are lower for the debt-like convertibles compared to the equity-
like convertible bond issues. Finally, this change towards more debt-like issues corresponds
in time to the decline in convertible arbitrage returns in Table 6.7.
We interpret the joint evidence on the higher underpricing, lower liquidity and higher
convertible arbitrage returns for the equity-like issues, coupled with the shift towards more
debt-like issues in recent years, as an additional explanation for the corresponding deterio-
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6.5.3 Winners and Losers of Convertible Arbitrage
Clearly, as demonstrated so far, convertible arbitrage activities have a positive eﬀect for
hedge funds and other investors that engage in them, as they earn positive returns for the
investors. However, these returns come at the expense “insiders” of the issuing ﬁrms.
As shown before, the short interest signiﬁcantly increases after the announcements of
convertible bond issues. Diamond and Verrechia (1987) for example argue that short in-
terest negatively aﬀects stock returns. Given the cost of shorting the stock, only informed
traders will engage in the activity, thus conveying the new (bad) information to the mar-
ket. A negative relationship between short interest and abnormal returns is for example
found by Aitken, Frino, McCorry and Swan (1998) in the Australian market and Ackert and
Athanassakos (2005) in the Canadian market. On the other hand, Loncarski, ter Horst and
Veld (2007b) ﬁnd a negative downward pressure on cumulative abnormal returns that goes
beyond the announcement date eﬀects of the convertible bond issue and continues up to the
issuance of the bond.
Arbitrage induced short selling therefore seems to have a negative eﬀect on abnormal
returns - a direct negative eﬀect for shareholders of the issuing companies. The results imply
that convertible arbitrage activities create additional adverse wealth eﬀects for shareholders
of the issuing companies. If there was no convertible arbitrage, there would be no increase
in short interest (sales) and no additional negative wealth eﬀect, in particular for the issuers
of more equity-like convertibles. The result has therefore consequences for both shareholders
and debtholders of the issuing company. It clearly negatively aﬀects shareholders by addi-
tionally destroying shareholder value. Moreover, it also aﬀects debtholders. Longstaﬀ and
Schwartz (1995) develop a model in which they show that value of ﬁrm’s assets (proxied by
stock market index) negatively aﬀects credit spread. This implies that existing debtholders
are aﬀected by the negative wealth eﬀect as the lower value of ﬁrm’s collateral generally
leads to an increase in the credit spread and thus a lower value of current (outstanding) debt
claims. In such a context convertible arbitrage seems to have a negative eﬀect for the share-
holders and debtholders of the issuing companies, in particular when the issue is structured
to be more equity-like (high value of delta).
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies determinants of convertible bond arbitrage and its eﬀect on capital
markets and its participants. Convertible arbitrage mostly takes place by hedge funds,
which do not report their holdings. For this reason we have to rely on indirect evidence
to ﬁrst identify convertible arbitrage activities. Several pieces of evidence are presented for
convertible arbitrage. First, we ﬁnd that the convertible bonds are underpriced. Second, we
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Both eﬀects are stronger for equity-like than for debt-like convertible bonds. In addition,
we argue that “arbitrage” increases in short positions negatively aﬀect abnormal returns
around the issue date of convertibles. This has important negative implications for both,
shareholders and existing debtholders of the issuing companies.
Finally, when examining the returns of convertible bond arbitrage strategies, we ﬁnd
that the equity-like convertible bonds have earned much higher returns than the debt-like
convertible bonds. This diﬀerence is approximately 23 percentage points during the ﬁrst
year following the issue. Returns on the convertible arbitrage strategy strongly decrease
towards the end of the sample period. This is mostly caused by the fact that convertible
bond issues and issuers became more debt-like compared to the early years in our sample.
This is, of course, not surprising. The high returns of the hedge funds came at the expense
of the companies issuing convertible bonds. In order to cap their losses, they apparently
either switched to issuing less underpriced debt-like convertible bonds and or they moved
out of the convertible bond market altogether.148 The Rise and Demise of the Convertible Arbitrage Strategy
6.A Tables and Figures
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics (number of observations, mean and standard deviation) for maturity (in years), delta,
issuer and market volatilities, conversion premium, dividend yield, coupon rate, relative coupon rate, time-
to-ﬁrst-call and call-price premium. The statistics are provided based on the year of the issue. T represents
the maturity of the bond at the issue. Both, issuer and market volatility (σi and σM) are the annualized
standard deviations of daily stock returns and returns on S&P TSX composite index based on 250 trading
days prior to the announcement of the convertible bond issue. The delta measure (∆i) is computed as deﬁned
in Equation 2. The conversion premium (cpi) is deﬁned as K−S
S , where K represents the conversion price and
S represents the stock price at the announcement date of the issue. The dividend yield (δi) is the average
dividend yield over the 250 trading days prior to the announcement of the issue. ci represents the coupon
rate of the bond. rci denotes the relative coupon rate, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the coupon rate of
the bond and the “risk-free” rate, which is proxied by the yield of the government bond of the comparable
maturity. The time-to-ﬁrst-call (Tcall) is the time between the issue of the bond and the ﬁrst possible call
date expressed in years. The call-price premium (pcall) is deﬁned as the ratio between the call price and the
par value of the bond, less one (Pcall
Ppar − 1).
year T ∆i σi σM
σi
σM cpi δi ci rci Tcall pcall
1998 N 9 7 9 9 9 8 7 9 9 8 8
Mean 8.49 0.613 0.485 0.144 3.262 0.297 0.032 0.071 0.013 4.04 0
std. dev. 2.24 0.287 0.417 0.017 2.626 0.159 0.052 0.016 0.015 1.66 0
1999 N 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 4
Mean 4.61 0.405 0.441 0.196 2.264 0.174 0.099 0.107 0.050 3.13 0
std. dev. 1.67 0.271 0.179 0.004 0.956 0.163 0.076 0.012 0.017 0.08 0
2001 N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Mean 5.68 0.613 0.548 0.211 2.685 0.077 0.035 0.076 0.020 3.29 0
std. dev. 0.93 0.330 0.367 0.025 1.826 0.100 0.052 0.010 0.009 0.40 0
2002 N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Mean 5.14 0.368 0.389 0.167 2.310 0.233 0.085 0.089 0.037 3.58 0.004
std. dev. 0.17 0.286 0.225 0.017 1.284 0.300 0.072 0.006 0.009 1.08 0.014
2003 N 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10
Mean 6.26 0.239 0.228 0.143 1.567 0.165 0.090 0.078 0.030 3.18 0.010
std. dev. 1.78 0.267 0.142 0.021 0.854 0.174 0.055 0.014 0.016 0.63 0.021
2004 N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 16 16
Mean 6.73 0.111 0.187 0.104 1.796 0.198 0.118 0.073 0.026 3.44 0.022
std. dev. 1.94 0.093 0.038 0.008 0.383 0.394 0.041 0.009 0.014 0.48 0.0266.A. Tables and Figures 149
Table 6.2: Convertible Bond Mispricing
Descriptive statistics (mean, minimum and maximum value, median and standard deviation) for the mis-
pricing measure ei,t =
(Mi,t−Bi,t)
Bi,t , which represents a comparison of the model price (Mi,t) to the trading
price (Bi,t) at time t. ID+t denotes t days after the issuance date of the convertible bond.
***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the level below 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Under the null means are
equal to zero.
Panel A: Mispricing After the Bond Issue for the Sub-sample of the More Equity-like
Convertibles
period N mean min max median sd
ID 12 0.252 *** 0.021 0.500 0.262 0.154
ID+5 12 0.226 *** -0.008 0.471 0.251 0.161
ID+10 12 0.203 *** -0.020 0.463 0.234 0.147
ID+15 12 0.197 *** -0.038 0.473 0.213 0.150
ID+20 13 0.208 *** -0.017 0.472 0.210 0.165
ID+30 13 0.194 *** -0.026 0.514 0.211 0.154
ID+60 14 0.201 *** -0.019 0.499 0.182 0.156
ID+120 15 0.179 *** -0.069 0.402 0.185 0.137
ID+220 15 0.189 *** -0.117 0.848 0.108 0.237
Panel B: Mispricing After the Bond Issue for the Sub-sample of the More Debt-like
Convertibles
period N mean min max median sd
ID 40 0.054 *** -0.067 0.223 0.046 0.066
ID+5 42 0.043 *** -0.078 0.174 0.038 0.061
ID+10 42 0.036 *** -0.115 0.184 0.030 0.059
ID+15 42 0.026 *** -0.121 0.180 0.023 0.060
ID+20 42 0.031 *** -0.105 0.179 0.037 0.060
ID+30 44 0.036 *** -0.090 0.204 0.031 0.063
ID+60 44 0.044 *** -0.067 0.193 0.040 0.058
ID+120 44 0.057 *** -0.091 0.380 0.044 0.093
ID+220 44 0.053 *** -0.127 0.516 0.032 0.119150 The Rise and Demise of the Convertible Arbitrage Strategy
Panel C: Diﬀerences in Means Between the Two Sub-samples Based on the Delta Measure
period diﬀ. in means 95% conf. int. t
ID -0.198 -0.298 -0.099 -4.328 ***
ID+5 -0.183 -0.286 -0.080 -3.867 ***
ID+10 -0.167 -0.262 -0.073 -3.848 ***
ID+15 -0.171 -0.267 -0.074 -3.856 ***
ID+20 -0.177 -0.278 -0.076 -3.794 ***
ID+30 -0.158 -0.252 -0.064 -3.613 ***
ID+60 -0.157 -0.248 -0.066 -3.688 ***
ID+120 -0.122 -0.201 -0.042 -3.206 ***
ID+220 -0.136 -0.271 -0.001 -2.124 **
Panel D: Diﬀerences in Means Between Diﬀerent Time Periods After the Issue for the
Sub-samples of the More Equity and Debt-like Convertibles
periods
∆i > 0.5 ∆i < 0.5
pairwise diﬀ. pairwise diﬀ.
ID to ID+5 -0.026 *** -0.009 **
ID to ID+10 -0.049 *** -0.016 ***
ID to ID+15 -0.055 *** -0.026 ***
ID to ID+20 -0.063 *** -0.024 ***
ID+20 to ID+60 0.008 0.009 *
ID+60 to ID+120 -0.038 ** 0.013
ID+120 to ID+220 0.010 -0.0046.A. Tables and Figures 151
Table 6.3: Trading Volume
Descriptive statistics (mean, median and standard deviation) for the trading volume of convertible bonds
for the two subsamples of the more debt-like (∆i < 0.5) and the more equity-like (∆i > 0.5) convertibles. vt
denotes relative trading volume at time t (t=0 is the issue date of the bond), which is deﬁned as the ratio
between the actual trading volume and the size of the convertible bond issue (nominal value of the issue).
Diﬀerence in means t-test is computed as the two-sided t-test with unequal variances of the two groups
assumed, where under the null diﬀerence in means is equal to 0.
∆i < 0.5 ∆i > 0.5
vt N mean median sd N mean median sd diﬀ. in means t
v0 44 0.774 0.619 0.741 15 0.213 0.129 0.300 0.561 4.13 ***
v1 44 0.232 0.179 0.230 15 0.060 0.036 0.069 0.171 4.40 ***
v2 44 0.156 0.101 0.179 15 0.046 0.010 0.061 0.110 3.52 ***
v3 44 0.116 0.097 0.104 15 0.034 0.017 0.052 0.082 3.96 ***
v4 44 0.101 0.072 0.116 15 0.034 0.015 0.036 0.067 3.39 ***
v5 44 0.073 0.077 0.058 15 0.050 0.011 0.085 0.023 0.96
v10 44 0.046 0.043 0.036 15 0.032 0.020 0.037 0.014 1.31
v20 44 0.023 0.019 0.020 15 0.017 0.011 0.019 0.007 1.12
v60 44 0.023 0.010 0.060 15 0.012 0.002 0.023 0.011 1.03
v120 44 0.021 0.007 0.055 15 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.015 1.80 **
v220 44 0.015 0.005 0.021 15 0.006 0.000 0.012 0.009 2.03 **152 The Rise and Demise of the Convertible Arbitrage Strategy
Table 6.4: Correlations Between Mispricing and Trading Volume
et denotes the average mispricing at time t (average in a cross-section) based on a comparison of the model
price at time t (Mi,t) to the trading price (Bi,t) at time t=0 (issuance date) for each issue i (ei,t =
(Mi,t−Bi,t)
Bi,t ).
vt denotes relative trading volume at time t, which is deﬁned as the ratio between the actual trading volume
and the size of the convertible bond issue (nominal value of the issue). The ﬁrst number in each ﬁeld is
a coeﬃcient of correlation and the second number is a p-value (under the null hypothesis that there is no
correlation).
vt e0 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e10 e20
v0 -0.264 -0.257 -0.242 -0.234 -0.227 -0.189 -0.195 -0.247
0.061 0.066 0.085 0.092 0.102 0.177 0.161 0.072
v1 -0.377 -0.329 -0.323 -0.323 -0.300 -0.293 -0.275 -0.312
0.006 0.017 0.020 0.018 0.029 0.033 0.046 0.022
v2 -0.283 -0.234 -0.227 -0.235 -0.224 -0.219 -0.202 -0.239
0.044 0.095 0.106 0.090 0.108 0.115 0.147 0.081
v3 -0.352 -0.319 -0.320 -0.298 -0.285 -0.265 -0.313 -0.367
0.011 0.021 0.021 0.030 0.038 0.056 0.023 0.006
v4 -0.161 -0.139 -0.123 -0.110 -0.094 -0.099 -0.070 -0.164
0.260 0.326 0.385 0.434 0.505 0.479 0.620 0.236
v5 -0.172 -0.133 -0.121 -0.116 -0.117 -0.097 -0.124 -0.238
0.227 0.347 0.393 0.407 0.406 0.488 0.378 0.083
v10 -0.057 -0.009 0.006 0.009 -0.005 0.027 0.029 -0.166
0.689 0.949 0.964 0.951 0.974 0.851 0.835 0.231
v20 0.079 0.075 0.112 0.120 0.134 0.118 0.064 0.053
0.583 0.598 0.428 0.393 0.338 0.399 0.649 0.7046.A. Tables and Figures 153
Table 6.5: Levels and Changes in Short Interest
Descriptive statistics (mean, minimum, maximum, median and standard deviation) for the relative measure
of short interest for the sub-samples of equity and debt-like convertibles. The relative short interest is deﬁned
as Zi,t = ssi
nb
i·cri, where Zi,t represents the relative short sales (interest) measure for company i at time t (t=0
is the short interest reporting period at the announcement date of the issue), ssi,t represents number of
shorted shares of issuer i at time t, nb
i denotes the number of issued bonds of issuer i and cri denotes the
conversion ratio of the issue i. ∆i denotes the delta value of the issue.
***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the level below 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Under the null means are
equal to zero.
Panel A: Relative Short Interest for the Sub-ample of the More Equity-like Issues (Z∆i>0.5,t)
period N mean min max median sd
t=-2 17 0.037 0.000 0.270 0.013 0.066
t=-1 17 0.045 0.000 0.269 0.013 0.074
t=0 17 0.107 0.000 0.368 0.061 0.117
t=1 17 0.205 0.000 0.664 0.135 0.211
t=2 17 0.250 0.001 0.780 0.158 0.252
t=3 17 0.272 0.000 0.800 0.218 0.258
t=4 17 0.306 0.000 0.952 0.194 0.309
t=5 17 0.333 0.000 1.128 0.249 0.335
t=6 17 0.345 0.000 1.119 0.236 0.342
t=7 17 0.375 0.000 1.320 0.240 0.394
t=8 17 0.354 0.000 0.971 0.246 0.343
t=16 17 0.316 0.007 0.788 0.254 0.269
t=24 17 0.285 0.010 0.813 0.210 0.250154 The Rise and Demise of the Convertible Arbitrage Strategy
Panel B: Relative Short Interest for the Sub-sample of the More Debt-like Issues (Z∆i<0.5,t)
period N mean min max median sd
t=-2 40 0.086 0.000 0.770 0.011 0.172
t=-1 40 0.093 0.000 0.598 0.016 0.160
t=0 40 0.110 0.000 0.587 0.023 0.165
t=1 40 0.100 0.000 0.633 0.021 0.163
t=2 40 0.097 0.000 0.602 0.026 0.160
t=3 40 0.076 0.000 0.578 0.031 0.132
t=4 40 0.091 0.000 0.640 0.039 0.154
t=5 40 0.092 0.000 0.545 0.042 0.137
t=6 40 0.094 0.000 0.551 0.043 0.142
t=7 40 0.087 0.000 0.557 0.051 0.124
t=8 40 0.087 0.000 0.546 0.055 0.123
t=16 40 0.140 0.001 0.999 0.077 0.192
t=24 40 0.131 0.000 0.478 0.057 0.147
Panel C: Diﬀerence in Means Between the Sub-samples; under the alternative hypothesis
Z∆i>0.5,t > Z∆i<0.5,t
Period diﬀ. in means 95% conf. int. t
t=-2 0.049 -0.014 0.113 1.563
t=-1 0.049 -0.014 0.111 1.565
t=0 0.002 -0.075 0.080 0.060
t=1 -0.104 -0.222 0.014 -1.818 **
t=2 -0.153 -0.290 -0.016 -2.307 **
t=3 -0.196 -0.334 -0.058 -2.966 ***
t=4 -0.215 -0.379 -0.050 -2.725 ***
t=5 -0.241 -0.417 -0.065 -2.874 ***
t=6 -0.251 -0.431 -0.072 -2.929 ***
t=7 -0.288 -0.493 -0.082 -2.950 ***
t=8 -0.267 -0.446 -0.087 -3.123 ***
t=16 -0.176 -0.324 -0.028 -2.446 **
t=24 -0.154 -0.289 -0.020 -2.380 **6.A. Tables and Figures 155
Panel D: Between Periods Changes in the Relative Short Interest for the Sub-sample of the
More Equity-like Issues (dZ∆i>0.5,t = Z∆i>0.5,t − Z∆i>0.5,t−1)
period N mean min max median sd
t=-1 17 0.008 -0.015 0.109 0.000 0.029
t=0 17 0.063 -0.002 0.228 0.054 0.069
t=1 17 0.097 0.000 0.328 0.070 0.103
t=2 17 0.045 -0.008 0.153 0.020 0.053
t=3 17 0.022 -0.027 0.105 0.007 0.036
t=4 17 0.034 -0.105 0.457 0.001 0.122
t=5 17 0.027 -0.016 0.175 0.005 0.049
t=6 17 0.012 -0.064 0.066 0.008 0.031
t=7 17 0.030 -0.166 0.647 0.000 0.166
t=8 17 -0.021 -0.393 0.038 0.000 0.097
Panel E: Between Periods Changes in the Relative Short Interest for the Sub-sample of the
More Debt-like Issues (dZ∆i<0.5,t = Z∆i<0.5,t − Z∆i<0.5,t−1)
period N mean min max median sd
t=-1 40 0.007 -0.358 0.306 0.001 0.079
t=0 40 0.017 -0.186 0.251 0.001 0.071
t=1 40 -0.009 -0.379 0.320 0.000 0.091
t=2 40 -0.003 -0.560 0.330 0.000 0.117
t=3 40 -0.021 -0.486 0.040 0.000 0.087
t=4 40 0.015 -0.041 0.348 0.000 0.059
t=5 40 0.001 -0.537 0.342 0.000 0.105
t=6 40 0.002 -0.074 0.114 0.000 0.032
t=7 40 -0.007 -0.418 0.127 0.000 0.077
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Table 6.7: Convertible Arbitrage and Equity Returns
Returns on convertible arbitrage performance index (HEDG CA), convertible arbitrage in the sample (CA
sample), MSCI World Stock Index and S&P 500 index. Data is provided by CSFB/Tremont HedgeIndex
(http://www.hedgeindex.com). Note that year in the convertible arbitrage returns of the sample refers to
the year of the convertible bond issue.
Year HEDG CA CA sample MSCI World Index S&P 500
2005 -3.48% 7.61% 4.88%
2004 1.98% 15.97% 15.25% 10.88%
2003 12.90% 11.02% 33.76% 28.68%
2002 4.05% 16.64% -19.54% -22.10%
2001 14.58% 27.81% -16.52% -11.89%
2000 25.64% -12.92% -9.10%
1999 16.04% 55.23% 25.34% 21.04%
1998 -4.41% -3.83% 24.80% 28.58%
1997 14.48% 16.23% 33.36%
1996 17.87% 14.00% 22.96%
1995 16.57% 21.32% 37.58%
1994 -8.07% 5.58% 1.32%
Table 6.8: Delta and the Mispricing
Mean values of delta (∆0) and the mispricing (e0 at the issuance date of the convertible bond across the







2004 0.068 0.0476.A. Tables and Figures 159
Figure 6.1: Returns on Convertible Arbitrage, Convertible Bonds and Stocks
Cumulative average convertible bond returns, raw stock price returns and convertible arbitrage returns for
convertible arbitrage portfolio as deﬁned in equation (6) for the sub-samples of equity-like and debt-like
convertibles.
Equity-like Convertibles (∆i > 0.5)
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6.B Appendix: Tsiveriotis and Fernandes (1998) pric-
ing model (TF)
6.B.1 The Model
Although convertible bonds (CBs) consist of two parts, a straight bond and a call option
on the underlying equity, multiplicity of terms (callability by the issuers, putability by the
holder, early conversion, etc.) makes it diﬃcult to disentangle the stock option part and the
straight bond part. As TF point out, CBs “can only be accurately valued only by simultaneous
pricing of the equity and ﬁxed-income part.” TF continue by recognizing that CB components
have diﬀerent default risks. The total value of a CB (let us denote this as M) can therefore
be decomposed in an equity part and a straight debt part (so-called Cash Only part of a
Convertible Bond - COCB). The holder of the hypothetical COCB (let us denote this as
Ω) receives all the cash ﬂows, but no equity ﬂows. Since the COCB is risky, the valuation
model must account for the the relevant risk - the issuer’s risk or the credit spread. The
diﬀerence between the value of the convertible bond and COCB (M - Ω) is the payment in
equity. Since the ﬁrm can always deliver its own equity, this part can be discounted using
the risk-free rate.
TF therefore formulate the CB valuation problem as a system of two coupled Black-
Scholes equations (PDE - partial diﬀerential equations) for the value of the bond (M) and


























− (r + rc)Ω + f(t) = 0, (6.8)
where S is the price of the underlying stock, r is the risk free rate, rs is the growth rate of
the stock, rc is the credit spread that reﬂects the default risk and f(t) refers to prespeciﬁed
external cash ﬂows in cash or equity (e.g. dividends, coupons). TF assume that f(t) refers
to cash ﬂows only.
To estimate the value of the CB the system of the two PDEs needs to be solved for. The
value of the COCB is determined by the convertible bond price, the underlying stock price
and the time to maturity, since these so-called early exercise parameters deﬁne the boundary
conditions. In other words, since early call, put or conversion is possible, the stock prices
that trigger these events represent the so-called free boundaries that aﬀect the COCB and
CB values. TF therefore deﬁne the following ﬁnal and boundary conditions.
Consider a CB maturing at time T, which is at any time convertible into shares of the
underlying stock S, pays a principal F at the maturity (T) if not converted and pays a ﬁxed
coupon c at times t. CB can also be callable by the issuer at a price Fc at any time after Tc6.B. Appendix: Tsiveriotis and Fernandes (1998) pricing model (TF) 161
and or putable by the holder for an amount of Fp at any time after Tp. Final conditions at
expirations:
M(S,T) = max(aS,F), (6.9)
Ω(S,T) = max(F,0), (6.10)
where a is the conversion ratio. Upside constraints due to conversion are:
M ≥ aS for t ∈ [0,T], (6.11)
Ω = 0 if M ≤ aS for t ∈ [0,T], (6.12)
Upside constraints due to callability are:
M ≤ (Fc,aS) for t ∈ [Tc,T], (6.13)
Ω = 0 if M ≥ Fc for t ∈ [Tc,T], (6.14)
Here, it is assumed that the holder has the right to convert if the issuer calls the bond.
Downside constraints that arise because of the putability option that can be given to the
holder:
M ≥ Fp for t ∈ [Tp,T], (6.15)
Ω = Fp if M ≤ Fp for t ∈ [Tp,T]. (6.16)
Given the ﬁnal and the boundary conditions, the convertible bond price is obtained using
the binomial tree approach. First, the binomial tree is expanded for the given number of steps
between the time 0 and T (maturity of the bond). At each of the nodes the stock prices are
established. We then start calculating the convertible bond prices from the maturity date
backwards, given the stock prices and the ﬁnal and the boundary conditions. When the
stock price is such that the conversion value is higher than the face value of the bond, the
convertible bond price is equal to the conversion price at the given stock price (aS). In this
case the value of the convertible bond is discounted for one period (back) at the risk-free
rate (r), as explained earlier. When the stock price is such that the conversion value is lower
than the face value of the bond, the CB “behaves” like a straight bond, so the value of the
CB is discounted for one period (back) at the risky rate, which is equal to the risk-free rate
(r) plus the credit spread (rc). At each of the points in time greater or equal to Tc and Tp
callability and putability features are also accounted for in order to obtain CB model prices.
The process is iteratively repeated until the start date is reached and the value of the CB at
that date established.162 The Rise and Demise of the Convertible Arbitrage Strategy
6.B.2 Inputs
In order to calculate the theoretical (model) price of a convertible bond we use the following
inputs. For the risk-free rate we use the yield on government bonds (Canadian) of comparable
maturity as the convertible bond. A static spread is used to correct for the credit risk of the
issue. Where the data on credit risk (credit rating of the issue) are not available, we assumed
that the company is of the BBB risk. In Datastream only Scotia Capital provides Canadian
corporate bond benchmarks for diﬀerent maturities and diﬀerent credit ratings. They cover
BBB, A and AA rankings of short, medium and long term. Based on the maturities we have
extrapolated the following maturities: 1 year (equivalent to short term), 3 years (between
short and medium term), 5 years (medium term), 7 years (between medium and long term),
10 years and more (long term). Based on the rankings, we have also extrapolated the
rankings lower than BBB (BB and B) by adding a spread to BBB. This spread is relative to
the spread between BBB and A, but is increasing in a lower credit quality and maturity. The
price of the underlying stock at the valuation date is taken from Datastream, where we take
the average stock price between days -12 and -2 relative to the announcement date of the
issue. The number of steps in the tree is equal to the number of months to maturity at the
issue of the bond. The coupon rate, the number of coupons per year, conversion ratio and
call schedule are all obtained from the respective prospectuses of the bonds. With respect
to the dividend information, we obtained dividend yield data from Datastream.Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis we investigated two issues, the use of convertible debt by Canadian companies
and the security issuance choice in the Canadian market.
In Chapter 2 we summarized and reviewed the most relevant up to date literature on
the motives for the issuance of convertible debt. Although the evidence is far from being
conclusive and unanimous as to why companies choose to issue convertible debt and how
these motives aﬀect investor reactions to convertible debt issue announcements, there are
some ﬁndings common to all the empirical research. First of all, the wealth eﬀects associated
with the announcements of the convertible debt announcements are generally negative and in
between those for straight debt and equity. Secondly, convertible debt can be structured to
be either more debt- or equity-like. Convertible issues that are more equity-like induce stock
market responses at the issue announcements closer to those, documented for equity issues.
This is consistent with the adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf (1984). Thirdly,
empirical research has documented consistent support only for Stein’s (1992) delayed equity
motive and Kim’s (1990) signaling theory. To a large extent surveys reveal that managers
still ﬁnd a lower coupon rate of convertible debt as an important argument for its issuance,
although the importance of this motive varies over time. Given that convertibles include a
conversion feature (that comes at a price), a view that convertibles are a cheaper source of
ﬁnancing than straight debt is deceptive. The same is true for the practitioners’ view that
convertibles provide means of selling the equity at a premium. Surveys therefore show that
managers base their decisions (or at least so they claim) on irrational motives. There are
two possible explanations for the diﬀerent outcomes of the survey and cross-sectional studies.
The ﬁrst explanation is that the surveys are sensitive to the question contents. Therefore
they may not yield reliable results. It is often argued that “managers act smarter than they
speak”. Therefore they may follow rational motives, without being aware of this. The second
explanation is that the proxies in the cross-sectional studies may be weak. For example, it is
very hard to measure a concept of informational asymmetry using only stock market and/or
accounting data.164 Conclusion
In Chapter 3 we analyzed the size and determinants of wealth eﬀects associated with the
announcements of convertible debt oﬀerings on the Canadian market in the period between
1991 and 2004. Similarly to previous research for other markets, in particular the U.S., we
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative wealth eﬀect associated with the announcement date of convertible
debt oﬀerings. This eﬀect is signiﬁcantly more negative for equity-like convertibles than for
debt-like. Contrary to the results for the U.S. market we ﬁnd the distribution of the delta
(a measure which reﬂects convertible bond design) to be bimodal. Canadian companies
started issuing predominantly debt-like convertibles after 2000. This switch coincides with
the increased popularity of conversions of the businesses into income trusts. We ﬁnd support
for the hypotheses related to the negative impact of equity-related agency costs on the size
of the wealth eﬀect. In particular, we ﬁnd that the determinants of the size of the wealth
eﬀects reﬂect the hybrid nature of convertible debt, where convertible debt issues can be
structured to be either more debt- or equity-like. More speciﬁcally, we show that proxies
for agency costs of equity negatively aﬀect abnormal returns associated with the issue of
more equity-like convertibles, while they do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect wealth eﬀects associated
with the more debt-like convertible issues. The opposite holds for the agency costs of debt,
albeit the evidence is much weaker then in the case of equity-related agency costs. The
results are robust across diﬀerent speciﬁcations and use of diﬀerent measures to classify
convertible bond issues into more debt- or more equity-like. After controlling for convertible
debt design we ﬁnd no evidence that income trusts as particular organizational structure
aﬀect these results. Relating the determinants of the wealth eﬀects to the motives for the
use of convertible debt we ﬁnd evidence that convertibles in the Canadian market used to
be mostly a substitute for equity (as proposed by Stein, 1992), but were also used as a
sequential ﬁnancing device, where the straight debt nature of the convertible is used as a
commitment device for managers (Mayers, 1998). Lately however, when convertible issues
in Canada shifted towards more debt-like design, the role of convertibles has become less
clear.
In Chapter 4 we turned to the security issuance decision, where we looked into the
determinants of security issuance decision in the Canadian market in a period between 1998
and 2004. Our focus was on the external ﬁnancing in the public market (equity, straight debt,
convertible debt and the share repurchases). We used a comprehensive set of accounting and
market variables to revisit capital structure theories - market timing, pecking-order and
agreement between insiders and outsiders. Overall, we found strong and consistent evidence
that overvaluation leads companies to choose equity over debt. This gives support to the
market timing argument for issuing equity. The striking ﬁnding about market timing is that
despite the less negative announcement period returns of equity issuers with high market-
to-book ratios, the long-run performance of those issuers is much weaker than that of issuers
with low market-to-book ratios. This is consistent with previous ﬁndings on market timing165
(e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Gomes and Philips, 2005), but in contrast to Jung et al.
(1996) who refute market timing on the basis of the ﬁnding that the announcement excess
returns are decreasing in the ﬁrms’ market-to-book ratios. Our results also provide support
for pecking-order explanation of capital structure. However, there is a dual nature of equity
issuers. Small equity issuers tend to time the market, while the largest equity issuers seem
to issue equity as a result of “pecking-order behavior”. We ﬁnd no evidence that companies
issue equity when the agreement between outside investors and insiders is high (Dittmar and
Thakor, 2007). At the very least, this ﬁnding suggests that the conclusion that ﬁrms with
high levels of information asymmetry or disagreement between insiders and outsiders prefer
equity issue is not robust to diﬀerent capital markets. Finally, small diﬀerences between
straight debt and convertible debt issuers suggest that few ﬁrms that issue convertible debt
do so to “sweeten” the deal. We also ﬁnd some evidence that is consistent with Mayers’
(1998) proposition on the sequential ﬁnancing role of convertible debt, where the agency
costs of issuing equity could prove to be extremely high and companies issue convertible
debt to mitigate these costs.
In Chapter 5 we analyzed changes in short interest following the announcements of se-
curity issues (withdrawals). We use the relative changes in short interest, together with the
(over)valuation and ﬁnancial constraint proxies to test the market timing and the pecking-
order theories of capital structure. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant increases in short interest for equity
and convertible bond issuers, no signiﬁcant changes for straight bond issuers and some sig-
niﬁcant decreases for share repurchasers. We also ﬁnd consistent evidence to support the
market timing explanation of the capital structure. Since the issuers and the investors
perceive hot and cold equity markets diﬀerently, we investigate the determinants of short
interest in hot and cold equity market periods separately. In hot equity issuance markets we
observe an increase and reversion in the short interest for equity issuers, while the reversion
in cold equity markets is much lower. In addition, investors do not seem to consider the
degree of ﬁnancial constraint of the issuer in hot equity markets, as they do in cold equity
markets. This has several implications. Firstly, we show that investors perceive equity is-
sue announcements and issuers’ characteristics diﬀerently in hot and cold equity issuance
markets. In hot equity markets most of the attention is focused on overvaluation aspects,
while no or limited attention is put on a degree of ﬁnancial constraint. This is not the case
in cold equity markets, where more ﬁnancially constrained equity issuers experience less of
the increase in short positions (even after we control for the size or limits to arbitrage in
the short interest market). This implies either some degree of diﬃculty discerning among
diﬀerent equity issuers in hot equity markets (due to easier mimicking and bunching of the
issuers) or lack of rational behavior in the case or market frenzies (herding). Overall, we see
these results as evidence in support of the market timing and the pecking-order hypothesis of
capital structure. Secondly, we ﬁnd both positive and negative relationship between changes166 Conclusion
in short interest and stock returns, in particular in hot equity markets. This provides ev-
idence for both, Diamond and Verrechia’s (1987) “negative information content” and the
popular “Wall Street” reversion explanation. Moreover, given the diﬀerences between con-
vertible bonds and equity issues, it is clear that persistence in short interest (as is the case
for convertible bonds) also provides evidence for the view that short interest to a certain
degree does not have information content to be transmitted into stock prices. We are able
to ﬁnd this by looking at diﬀerent cross-sections of changes of short interest, as the negative
relationship between short interest and stock returns is contemporaneous, while the positive
relationship is based on the lagged eﬀect.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we turned back to convertible bonds and studied determinants
of convertible bond arbitrage and its eﬀect on capital markets and its participants. This
strategy is aimed at exploiting the underpricing of convertible bonds. It consists of taking
a long position in the convertible bond and a short position in the underlying asset into
which the bond can be converted. The underlying asset is typically a stock of the company
that issues the convertible bond. Convertible arbitrage mostly takes place by hedge funds,
which do not report their holdings. For this reason we have to rely on indirect evidence
to ﬁrst identify convertible arbitrage activities. Several pieces of evidence are presented for
convertible arbitrage. First, we ﬁnd that the convertible bonds are underpriced. Second, we
ﬁnd that short positions in the underlying stocks strongly increase around the issuance date.
Both eﬀects are stronger for equity-like than for debt-like convertible bonds. In addition,
we argue that “arbitrage” increases in short positions negatively aﬀect abnormal returns
around the issue date of convertibles. This has important negative implications for both,
shareholders and existing debtholders of the issuing companies. Finally, when examining
the returns of convertible bond arbitrage strategies, we ﬁnd that the equity-like convertible
bonds have earned much higher returns than the debt-like convertible bonds. This diﬀerence
is approximately 23 percentage points during the ﬁrst year following the issue. Returns on
the convertible arbitrage strategy strongly decrease towards the end of the sample period.
This is mostly caused by the fact that convertible bond issues and issuers became more debt-
like compared to the early years in our sample. This is, of course, not surprising. The high
returns of the hedge funds came at the expense of the companies issuing convertible bonds. In
order to cap their losses, they apparently either switched to issuing less underpriced debt-like
convertible bonds and or they moved out of the convertible bond market altogether.References
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Summary)
In dit proefschrift staat centraal het gebruik van converteerbare obligaties door Canadese
ondernemingen. In het eerste deel van het proefschrift wordt de aandacht gericht op het
gebruik van converteerbare obligaties door Canadese ondernemingen. Een converteerbare
obligatie is een vermogenstitel die kan worden omgeruild voor een vooraf vastgesteld aantal
aandelen van de onderneming binnen een vooraf vastgestelde periode. In essentie is een con-
verteerbare obligatie een combinatie van een standaard obligatie en warrants geschreven op
de aandelen van de onderneming. De vraag waarom ondernemingen converteerbare obligaties
uitgeven heeft in het verleden veel aandacht gekregen. In de praktijk worden converteerbare
obligaties gezien als een uitgestelde uitgifte van aandelen. Bovendien beargumenteert men
dat de lagere coupon rente ten opzichte van een niet converteerbare obligatie, een reden is
om ze uit te geven. Aan de andere kant hebben academici theorien voorgesteld die het ge-
bruik van converteerbare obligaties relateren aan asymmetrische informatie, conﬂicterende
belangen en belasting motieven. Dergelijke theorien suggereren in het algemeen dat on-
dernemingen die te maken hebben met hoge kosten van conﬂicterende belangen, die zijn
gerelateerd aan het gebruik van eigen of vreemd vermogen, kunnen proﬁteren van conver-
teerbare obligaties, in plaats van aandelen of obligaties.
De theoretische en empirische literatuur aangaande de motieven voor de uitgifte van
converteerbare obligaties wordt samengevat in Hoofdstuk 2. Er blijkt in de literatuur een
forse discrepantie te bestaan tussen theorie en praktijk. Interviews met managers tonen aan
dat managers de keuze voor het uitgeven van converteerbare obligaties baseren op irrationele
factoren volgens de theoretische literatuur. De theoretische literatuur daarentegen verschaft
enkele rationele motieven. Dergelijke motieven zijn gebaseerd op het oplossen van problemen
met asymmetrische informatie, conﬂicterende belangen, en belasting motieven. De meeste
rationele theorien zijn onderzocht met behulp van cross-sectionele studies, die in het algemeen
bepaalde theorien ondersteunen. Echter, interviews met managers resulteren in beperkte
ondersteuning van rationele motieven. Dit kan het gevolg zijn van de wijze waarop de
vragen zijn geformuleerd, het gebruik van zwakke instrumenten in cross-sectionele studies of
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een combinatie van beide.
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt het eﬀect bestudeerd van het aankondigen van een emissie van
converteerbare obligaties in de Canadese markt. Het gemiddelde vermogenseﬀect voor een
3-daagse periode rond de aankondiging van converteerbare obligaties, uitgegeven tussen 1991
en 2004, bedraagt een signiﬁcante -2.7%. Wanneer de emissies worden geklassiﬁceerd als
meer gelijkend op eigen of vreemd vermogen, dan vinden we dat dat de vermogenseﬀecten
signiﬁcant negatiever zijn voor uitgiftes die meer op eigen vermogen lijken. Dergelijke con-
verteerbare obligaties worden signiﬁcant negatief beinvloed door de kosten van conﬂicterende
belangen in geval van eigen vermogen. Echter, de kosten die corresponderen met vreemd
vermogen hebben geen signiﬁcant eﬀect op converteerbare obligaties die lijken op eigen ver-
mogen en vice versa voor converteerbare obligaties die lijken op vreemd vermogen. Deze re-
sultaten suggereren dat converteerbare obligaties worden gebruikt om verschillende aspecten
van asymmetrische informatie te mitigeren en zijn in lijn met de motieven zoals voorgesteld
in Stein (1992) en Mayers (1998). Daarnaast zien we een verschuiving in het type con-
verteerbare obligaties naar converteerbare obligaties die meer op vreemd vermogen lijken.
Deze ontwikkeling valt samen met de populariteit van de verandering van Canadese onderne-
mingen naar income trusts. Echter, wanneer we controleren voor het type converteerbare
obligaties en andere determinanten van vermogenseﬀecten, dan vinden we geen signiﬁcante
verschillen die kunnen worden toegeschreven aan deze bedrijfsstructuur. In het tweede deel
van het proefschrift wordt de uitgiftebeslissing in de Canadese markt geanalyseerd. Deze
beslissing is een van de belangrijkste ﬁnanciele beslissingen van de onderneming op de lange
termijn. Ten eerste heeft het een sterke invloed op aandelenrendementen omdat verschil-
lende type vermogentitels verschillende informatie onthullen aan de markt - aandelenemissies
induceren bijvoorbeeld een sterk negatief rendement op het moment van aankondiging. Ten
tweede, het beinvloedt de relatie en incentives van verschillende belanghebbenden (man-
agers, aandeelhouders, verschaﬀers van vreemd vermogen) binnen de onderneming, maar
ook tussen partijen binnen en buiten de onderneming. Ten derde, het bepaalt het invester-
ingsbeleid van ondernemingen - eigen vermogen geeft bijvoorbeeld meer ﬂexibiliteit in het
nemen van risico’s. Het belang van emissiebeslissingen wordt ook duidelijk uit interviews
met managers, waarin managers aangeven ﬁnanciele ﬂexibiliteit, het verwateren van earnings
en recente aandelenrendementen als belangrijkste argumenten te zien. De emissiebeslissing
is in essentie een vermogensstructuur beslissing. In het verleden zijn verschillende verklarin-
gen gesuggereerd over het hoe en wanneer managers leverage verhogen of verlagen, zoals
het pecking-order model, het market timing model en de mate van overeenstemming tussen
mensen binnen en buiten de onderneming.
In Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoeken we de emissiebeslissingen in de Canadese markt in de periode
tussen 1998 en 2004. In het bijzonder wordt onderzocht welke factoren deze emissiebesliss-
ing be?nvloeden. We richten ons op externe ﬁnanciering in de publieke markt (aandelen,Nederlandse Samenvatting (Dutch Summary) 179
vreemd vermogen, converteerbare obligaties en inkoop van eigen aandelen). We beschouwen
een aantal theorien voor de ﬁnancieringsstructuur - market timing, pecking order en de mate
van overeenstemming tussen mensen binnen en buiten de onderneming. We vinden sterk en
consistent bewijs voor het feit dat overwaardering van de aandeelprijs bepaalt dat onderne-
mingen aandelen uitgeven, in plaats van vreemd vermogen. Dit ondersteunt het market
timing argument voor het uitgeven van aandelen. Het is consistent met eerdere bevindingen
aangaande market timing (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Gomes and Philips, 2005), maar
contrasteert met Jung et al. (1996) die market timing weerleggen op basis van het resultaat
dat de buitengewone rendementen rond aankondigingen negatief gecorreleerd zijn met de
market-to-book ratios van de ondernemingen. Nadat we corrigeren voor de omvang van de
onderneming, vinden we steun voor de pecking-order theory. We vinden geen bewijs dat on-
dernemingen aandelen uitgeven wanneer de mate van overeenstemming tussen investeerders
binnen en buiten de onderneming hoog is (Dittmar en Thakor, 2007). Dit suggereert op zijn
minst dat de conclusie, dat ondernemingen met veel asymmetrische informatie of onenigheid
tussen partijen binnen en buiten de onderneming aandelen prefereren, niet robuust is in
verschillende kapitaalmarkten.
In Hoofdstuk 5 gebruiken we veranderingen in de short posities na de aankondiging van
een emissie (inkoop) om de market timing en de pecking-order theorie, te onderzoeken. We
vinden een signiﬁcante toename in de short posities voor ondernemingen die aandelen en
converteerbare obligaties uitgeven. Verder vinden we geen signiﬁcante veranderingen voor
ondernemingen met vreemd vermogen en een signiﬁcante verlaging voor ondernemingen die
aandelen terugkopen. Belangrijker, we bekijken het eﬀect van (over)waardering en proxies
voor ﬁnanciele restricties op veranderingen in de short posities om de market timing en de
pecking order theorie te testen. We doen dit onafhankelijk voor zogenaamde hot en cold
equity markets, omdat de literatuur suggereert dat ondernemingen en investeerders zich dan
anders gedragen. We vinden bewijs voor beide theorien. Ten tweede, we vinden zowel posi-
tieve als negatieve relaties tussen veranderingen in de short posities en aandelenrendementen,
in het bijzonder voor hot equity markets. Dit geeft bewijs voor zowel Diamond en Verrechia’s
(1987) ”negative information content” als de populaire ”Wall Street” reversion verklaring.
Tenslotte, in Hoofdstuk 6 bekijken we wederom converteerbare obligaties en analyseren
convertible arbitrage, een van de meest succesvolle hedge fund strategien. We identiﬁceren
allereerst convertible arbitrage activiteiten. We vinden dat converteerbare obligaties on-
dergewaardeerd zijn op het moment van uitgifte. Tegelijkertijd nemen de short posities van
het onderliggende aandeel signiﬁcant toe. Beide eﬀecten zijn sterker voor converteerbare
obligaties die meer op aandelen dan op obligaties lijken. Ondanks het feit dat de convertible
arbitrage strategie een positief eﬀect heeft op de liquiditeit van de onderliggende instru-
menten, vinden we tevens dat de short posities een negatief eﬀect hebben op aandeelhouders
en bestaande obligatiehouders. Het blijkt dat, over een 1-jaars periode na emissie, conver-180 Nederlandse Samenvatting (Dutch Summary)
teerbare obligaties die op aandelen lijken 20% procent punten meer rendement genereren dan
converteerbare obligaties die op obligaties lijken. In de recente jaren zijn de rendementen op
de convertible arbitrage strategie sterk afgenomen, ondermeer omdat ondernemingen meer
converteerbare obligaties hebben uitgegeven die op obligaties in plaats van aandelen lijken.